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This research analyzed the quantity and nature of new information citizens 
acquire and process to formulate their policy judgments. I investigated the factors that 
drive variability in individuals’ cognitive efforts in seeking and processing the relevant 
information available from the environment and the impacts of the variability on policy 
judgments.  
I asked three principle questions about the formation of policy preferences, 
focusing on information acquisition: first, which persons expend more time and effort to 
find and acquire political information; second, what type of information finds its way into 
policy judgments; and lastly, how this information acquisition affects policy judgments. 
Drawing on the information processing perspective, I begin with a postulation that 
citizens are neither predisposition-driven nor information-driven in making their policy 
judgments. Rather, they are continually compelled by the interaction between priors (i.e., 
 vii
predispositions or preexisting values, beliefs, and attitudes) and external stimuli (i.e., new 
information available from the environment) in making their policy judgments. 
My analyses are based on two primary data sources: one is a large-scale survey 
data from National Election Studies (NES); another one is an original data from my own 
experiment. Taking online information processing method along with online polling, I 
created a unique data set in which the complete information search process is tracked and 
recorded. I tested two sets of hypotheses. The first set of hypotheses deals with the 
determinants of information acquisition. The second set of hypotheses is about the 
consequences of information acquisition.  
The evidence provided here shows that (1) many individuals are able and willing 
to engage in active information seeking to warrant a deeper understanding of the issue at 
hand; (2) partisan information is not always preferred over factual information; (3) policy 
judgments about affirmative action are significantly influenced by the extent to which an 
individual uses incoming, relevant information; (4) different levels of cognitive 
engagement interact with the different types of information to make a difference in policy 
judgments about affirmative action.   
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PERSPECTIVE, SCOPE, AND STRATEGY OF RESEARCH 
 
This research analyzes the quantity and nature of new information citizens 
acquire and process to formulate their policy judgments. By investigating the 
factors that drive variability in individuals’ cognitive efforts in seeking and 
processing the relevant information available from the environment and the 
effects of the variability on policy judgments, my research reveals the dynamics 
of citizens’ policy preference formation. Specifically, this study examines three 
principle questions about the formation of policy preferences: which persons 
expend more time and effort to find and acquire political information, what type 
of information finds its way into policy judgments, and lastly, how this 
information acquisition affects policy judgments.  
Scholars have long studied the formation of public opinions, focusing on 
the role of a priori political predispositions, such as values, beliefs, and attitudes 
(Peffley and Hurwitz 1985, 1987, 1998; Feldman 1988; Miller and Shanks 1996; 
Zaller 1992; for a comprehensive review, see also Kuklinski 2002; Krosnick 
2002; Tetlock 2000). Less studied is how new information works and plays with 
political predispositions in the formation of policy preferences (see Mutz, 
Sniderman, and Brody 1996; Feldman 1995; Lau and Redlawsk 1997, 2001a, 
2001b; Lodge and McGraw 1995). Scholars have assumed that citizens use little 
relevant information from the environment and that, if some information is 
needed for specific judgments, they, rather than commit energy and time in 
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information acquisition, rely on political heuristics, information shortcuts, or 
political cues to make political judgments.1 However, as Kuklinski and Hurley 
(1994) contend, minimal use of information and prevalent use of political 
heuristics are assumed but not empirically demonstrated. How empirically 
compelling is the case for this minimal use of information assumption? Has this 
scholarly emphasis on citizens’ reliance on heuristics had been empirically 
grounded?  
I contend that the scholarly attention to low-information decision making 
and political heuristics has obscured understanding the extent to which individuals 
acquire and process new information, and the way they do so, to make political 
judgments. It appears that the burden of proof has been imposed on demonstrating 
that citizens use more than minimal information rather than on the low-
information assumption. In this regard, investigating citizens’ information 
acquisition is a worthwhile contribution to our understanding of opinion 
formation. Indeed, little scholarly effort has challenged the implicit notion of 
minimal use of the information (see Lau and Redlawsk 1997, 2001a, 2001b) and 
prevalent use of political heuristics (Kuklinski and Hurley 1994). Or, to put it 
differently, many political science models of the opinion formation assume the 
acquisition of information, but none specify how variations in information 
 
1 By political heuristics, information shortcuts, and political cues, I refer to the information that 
contains partisan frames communicated by political parties, politicians, interest groups, and public 
opinion polls. Information shortcuts and political cues are sort of heuristics, by which one makes 
judgmental tasks simpler. There are many kinds of “political” heuristics. Lau and Redlawsk 
(2001) present five common cognitive heuristics in politics, which include the partisan heuristic, 
ideology heuristic, endorsement heuristic, viability heuristic (polls), and candidate appearance 
heuristic. All political heuristics except the last one are based on partisan cues. 
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acquisition might well be responsible for policy judgments. Analyzing how 
citizens actually seek and acquire new information allows questioning the 
theoretical assumption of citizens’ minimal information use, converting a 
supposition into an empirical question.  
Using the data derived from two primary sources—a large-scale survey of 
National Election Studies (NES) and an original experiment, I address a question 
that has been seldom confronted: what policy judgments citizens will make if they 
are given opportunities to seek out and process the relevant information. Drawing 
on an information processing perspective (Chaiken and Trope 1999; Eagly and 
Chaiken1993), I begin with a postulation that citizens are neither predisposition-
driven nor information-driven in making their policy judgments. Rather, they are 
continually compelled by the interaction between priors (i.e., predispositions or 
preexisting values, beliefs, and attitudes) and external stimuli (i.e., new 
information available from the environment) in making their policy judgments 
(Chaiken and Trope 1999; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Chaiken 1980; Ratneshwar 
and Chaiken 1991; Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Petty and Wegener 1999). By 
taking process-tracing technique (see Ford et al. 1989; Lau 1995; Lau and 
Redlawsk 2001a), this research seeks to empirically demonstrate that: (1) 
individuals vary in their cognitive attention to incoming, relevant information; (2) 
individuals’ preferences vary about the kind of information they rely upon to 
make policy judgments; (3) variation in cognitive engagement with new 
information results in differences in policy judgments, meaning those who are 
highly cognitively engaged in information seeking and processing reach a policy 
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understanding that differs from the less cognitively engaged; and (4) acquiring 
different kinds of information results in differences in policy judgments. Those 
who prefer factual information reach a policy understanding that differs from that 
of those who prefer partisan information.2  
MINIMAL USE OF NEW INFORMATION 
 
As Robert Dahl (1961) famously asserts, “Politics is a sideshow in the 
great circus of life” (305). Most ordinary citizens typically do not reason about 
incoming political information by weighting it in a rational manner (Simon 1982, 
1985; Kinder 1983; Zaller 1992; Converse 1964). When ordinary citizens feel it 
necessary to acquire relevant information to make political judgments, they 
follow the “least-effort principle” (Allport 1954; see Lodge and Taber 2001), 
taking cues or information shortcuts from political parties, politicians, interest 
groups, or polling results (Lau and Redlawsk 2001a; Page and Shapiro 1992; 
Mondak 1993; Popkin 1991; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Zaller 1992; 
Carmines and Kuklinski 1990; Kingdon 1984; also see Downs 1957; Tversky and 
Kaheneman 1974; Fiske and Taylor 1984, 1991).  
To say that many citizens are not willing to acquire new information is 
unexceptional, yet addressing the question of comparing information misers vis-à-
vis those who do seek and use new information has been uncommon. To assert 
that many citizens prefer heuristics-based information sounds plausible, yet to 
 
2 I use the term “partisan information” to refer to cues, information shortcuts, and heurtistics that  
produce reductions in citizens’ cognitive efforts to make sense of politics. In politics the first and 
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identify the extent to which individuals rely on heuristics-based information 
among other kinds of information requires empirical validation. A harder task is 
thus to demonstrate the extent to which and the way that an individual actually 
uses new information to make policy judgments.  
Another question to be addressed is why be concerned if citizens would 
not pay attention to incoming information and if they rely on political cues. One 
answer may be that expending no cognitive effort to engage in seeking and 
processing relevant information, depending only on partisan information, 
facilitates less competent3 political judgments rather than reason-centered, 
informed judgments (Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Chaiken and Trope 1999; Petty 
and Cacioppo 1986; Petty and Wegener 1999). On the other hand, another answer 
posits that citizens who are badly informed about politics can use a few political 
cues and heuristics to overcome their chronic lack of relevant information and still 
make a reasoned choice (Lupia 1994, 2000; Popkin 1991; Page and Shapiro 1992; 
Lupia and McCubbins 1998; McKelvey and Ordeshook 1986; Sniderman et al. 
1991).  
The variability in the use of new information across citizens represents the 
core of the disagreements permeating the debate. I believe that the answers here 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Rather than consider information 
acquisition and political cue usage as either zero or full, I believe that questions 
 
perhaps most important cues, information shortcuts, and heuristics are related to partisan schema, 
which is distinct from objective, factual information.   
3 There are different conceptualizations and measures of competent political judgments. I discuss 
these terms in detail in Chapter 6. Briefly, by competent political judgment, I refer to the political 
judgments made by relatively knowledgeable individuals.   
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should be expressed to measure a fuller range of possibilities. We need to pose the 
questions, “to what extent do individuals care to know about issues by acquiring 
and processing available new information,” and, “to what extent do individuals 
prefer political cues or partisan information to factual, objective type of 
information.” Addressing these questions requires a theoretical perspective that 
guides us toward exploring individuals’ use of external stimuli (i.e., the 
information available from the environment).   
INFORMATION PROCESSING PERSPECTIVE 
Social psychologists have focused on information processing as a central 
theme in studying opinion formation and change (Eagly and Chaiken 1993; 
Chaiken and Trope 1999; Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Fazio and Williams 1986; 
Dunton and Fazio 1997; Levine, Thomsen, and Gonzales 1997; Jude, Drake, 
Downing, and Krosnick 1991; Mutz, Sniderman, and Brody 1996). The 
information processing perspective has provided an invaluable insight by which 
scholars explore the mental mechanisms underlying a wide variety of social and 
political judgments and human decision-making. Indeed, the information 
processing perspective is sufficiently comprehensive to account for a full range of 
ramifications and variations in opinion formation and change, addressing the 
questions of “who engages in which sort of cognitive processing under what 
conditions and what differences that makes to coding, retention, attitude change, 
and other cognitive variables with implications for mass politics” (Luskin 2002, 
238). 
 7
The information processing perspective postulates that (1) individuals are 
not just passive receptors of new information, but can be active information 
seekers, interpreting information, making inferences, and choosing suboptimal 
policy options, and that (2) opinion formation and change are not just a derivative 
from the priors but complex outcomes mediated by the way that relevant 
information is sought and processed. What determines opinion formation and 
change are not only one’s priors, but also how one’s priors are translated into 
policy judgments and which sort of information processing is adopted in this 
translation (Chaiken and Trope 1999; Uleman 1987; McGraw 2003; Fiske 1986; 
Fiske and Neuberg 1990; Lodge and Taber 2004).  
Dual-Process Models 
Information processing perspective rests on the notion that ordinary 
citizens are flexible information processors, capable of engaging in either theory-
driven or data-driven, stereotypic or individuating, peripheral or systematic, and 
effortless or effortful information processing. Various dual-process models have 
been identified: offhand versus serious information processing, automatic versus 
controlled (Devine 1989), category-based versus piecemeal (Fiske and Pavelchak 
1986), heuristics versus systematic (Chaiken 1980; Petty Cacioppo 1981), 
categorized versus individuating (Brewer 1988; Fiske and Neuberg 1990), 
effortless versus effortful (Tyler et al. 1979), peripheral versus central (Eagly and 
Chaiken 1993), and mindless versus mindful (Langer, Blank, and Chanowitz 
1978).  
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These paired sets of information processing reflect the common tension 
between the “drives for accuracy” and the “desire for belief perseverance” when 
individuals are being exposed to new information and making policy judgments 
(Chaiken and Trope 1999; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Fiske and Taylor 1984). 
Individuals who have the drives for accuracy in their judgmental tasks are likely 
to take the path of serious, controlled, piecemeal, systematic, individuating, 
effortful, central, rational, and mindful mode of information processing. In 
contrast, individuals who are motivated to preserve their own preexisting beliefs 
and values tend to take the path of offhand, automatic, category-based, heuristics, 
categorized, effortless, and mindless mode of information processing.   
For instance, individuals may act as “lay scientists,” attempting a thorough 
search and evenhanded evaluation of the evidence, investing considerable effort 
in examining information specific to a situation to make judgments. By taking the 
more costly and time-consuming route of gathering individuating pieces of 
information rather than relying on heuristics, stereotypes, and habitual schemas 
about the target object, lay scientists want to avoid stereotypic, unconscious, or 
habitual responses. In contrast, individuals may act as “amateur lawyers,” who 
selectively seek out information to justify a specific, pre-selected conclusion, 
relying on and persevering their own beliefs and attitudes. Amateur lawyers are 
thus unwilling to expend much effort in processing information in a balanced way 
and likely rely on simple heuristics, stereotypes, and habitual schemas to which 
they have been used (Chaiken 1980, 1987; Chen and Chaiken 1999; Chaiken and 
Trope 1999; Petty and Cacioppo 1986). 
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Dual-process models propose a synthesis about how new information 
becomes processed and thereby explain the effects of different modes of 
information seeking and processing on judgments. More precisely, dual-process 
models propose that the variation in cognitive engagement with political issues is 
determined by the implications the issues have on one’s personal interests, core 
values, or to associated social groups. If cognitive engagement is sufficiently 
aroused, one should be motivated to seek and process information in systematic, 
controlled, effortful, and mindful ways in order to produce the most valid and 
least biased judgments. In contrast, if cognitive engagement is not sufficiently 
aroused, one likely seeks and processes information in heuristic, automatic, 
effortless, and mindless ways and is prone to produce stereotypic and less 
reasoned judgments (Chaiken and Trope 1999). This distinction implies that the 
different modes of information processing lead individuals who share 
predispositions to reach different judgments, depending upon their cognitive 
engagement with incoming, relevant information.   
Automatic and Controlled Processes 
Of late, social psychologists have focused a great deal on the strength and 
pervasive influence of automatic information processing in social life (Bargh 
1994, 1997, 1999; Bargh, Chen, and Burrows 1996; Bargh and Ferguson 2000; 
Chartrand and Bargh 1999; Greenwald and Banaji 1995; Gardner and Cacioppo 
1997; Banaji and Greenwald 1994; Dovidio et al. 1997). According to the thesis 
of “automaticity,” individuals are “cognitive monsters” (Bargh 1984). That is, 
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individuals are so adept at effortless and mindless information processing that 
much of their social and policy judgments are made automatically. In this view, 
making judgments is largely an automatic process devoid of conscious processing 
of relevant information. This view suggests that individuals’ predispositions, 
traits, and stereotypes, imbedded in one’s minds and unconsciously and 
automatically activated by a little stimuli, play a significant role in determining 
policy judgments.  
By the same token, social psychologists have become more concerned 
with cognitive control (see Cohen, Dunbar, and McClelland 1990; Miller and 
Cohen 2001; Monsell and Driver 2000; Pashler, Johnston, and Ruthruff 2001). 
Individuals are not just doomed to be cognitive monsters, but can be flexible 
processors. Studies show that some individuals under certain conditions are 
motivated to control or censor the automatic processes in judgmental tasks 
(Dovidio et al. 1997; Devine 1989; Devine and Monteith 1993; Fazio and Dunton 
1997). Studies suggest that it is quite possible for individuals to be conscious 
about or attentive to their thought processes. Fiske (1989) argues that an 
individual can make the hard choice and overcome stereotypic influences on 
judgments if sufficiently motivated to do so. Mendelberg (2001) suggests that “all 
whites know the content of racial stereotypes and thus all whites are susceptible to 
racial priming, but some are more powerfully motivated to control it while others 
are less so” (123-24, emphasis added). In somewhat similar vein, Valentino, 
Hutchings, and White (2002) conclude that “when citizens are aware of the racial 
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cues in a particular message, they seem to suppress racial thinking” (88, emphasis 
added).  
The question is therefore empirical: do individuals guard against or yield 
to the impact of automatically activated personal trait and social stereotypes when 
they make political judgments? To address this critical question, it is necessary to 
examine how individuals process relevant information, through which either 
automatic or controlled information processing finds its way into policy 
judgments. 
SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
I apply dual-process models and the theories of automatic and controlled 
processes to white citizens’ judgments on public policy questions pertaining to 
race, particularly affirmative action programs. I provide an empirically grounded 
account of white Americans’ policy judgments on race issues, focusing on the 
cognitive processes through which new information interplays with racial 
considerations.  
Using issues and policies relating to race in my analysis is not arbitrary. A 
reason why I take race as the central issue in my analysis is that as Dawson (2000) 
claims, “racial considerations remain critical for shaping Americans’ attitudes and 
policy preferences” (Dawson 2000, 344) while politics and ideologies matter as 
well. Indeed, many white Americans tend to understand contemporary politics in 
racial terms, both explicitly and at a more subtle, symbolic level (Kinder and 
Sears 1981; McConahay and Hough 1976; Sears and Kinder 1971; Sears and 
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McConahay 1973; see also Mendelberg 2001; Hutchings and Valentino 2004; 
Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002).4 The association of many policies (e.g., 
crime, capital punishment, welfare, spending on the poor, food stamps, family 
values, child care, gay rights, and immigration) with race—both in political 
discourse and in public opinion and among white Americans as well as black 
Americans—is pervasive (Winter 2006; Federico 2004; Glaser 2002; Kinder and 
Winter 2001; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Gilens 1995, 1999, 2001; Hurwitz and 
Peffley 1997; Peffley and Hurwitz 2002; Hurwitz, Peffley, and Sniderman 1997; 
for a review of the electoral connection of race, see Gilens, Sniderman, and 
Kuklinski 2000; Kuklinski, Cobb, and Gilens 1997; Edsall and Edsall 1992; 
Frymer 1999). Accordingly, understanding how racial considerations operate 
among white Americans is critical to explain policy judgments of white 
Americans on a host of policy issues. The racial attitudes literature, which is 
ample and in many respects illuminating, helps in this regard. But while it has 
focused on the attitudes (e.g., racial prejudice5 and resentment6) and stereotypes7 
 
4 In addition, the racial divide is substantial in American public opinion even on nonracial 
policies, such as general government spending on social services, education, and assistance for the 
poor (Tate 1993; Dawson 1994; Smith and Seltzer 2000; Kinder and Winter 2001) and on values, 
such as egalitarianism, the optimal size of government, and the general fairness of the American 
political system (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Kinder and Winter 2001). 
5 By racial prejudice I refer to the attribution of a strong, openly expressed, negative evaluation of 
African Americans as a group and individuals (see Kinder and Sears 1981; McConahay and 
Hough 1976; Sears and Kinder 1971; Sears and McConahay 1973). Racial prejudice is now more 
likely to surface as racial resentment over what many whites see as special government treatment 
of blacks who do not deserve it.   
6 According to Kinder and Sanders (1996), racial resentment refers to the juncture of anti-black 
attitudes and traditional American values. The typical argument is that white opposition to race-
based policies derives from anti-black affect and the belief that blacks have received unearned 
advantages in the post-Civil Rights era (see Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears 1988). 
7 Racial stereotypes are not just a heuristic device to simplify experience, but destructive forces 
that historically have evoked punitive and discriminatory responses to racial groups. A substantial 
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that tend to follow, it has not focused specifically on the cognitive processes 
through which racial considerations are transformed into policy judgments, 
working with the information available from the environment. What cognitive 
processes make racial considerations play such an important role in opinion 
formation? How would racial considerations function if individuals were given 
opportunities to seek out the relevant information available from the environment 
to make policy judgments on race matters? What do dual-process models and 
theories of automatic and controlled processes tell us about the variables and 
processes that make racial considerations either reinforce or moderate the effect 
of racial considerations on policy judgments on race matters?  In short, given 
that racial considerations play such an important role on a host of policy issues, 
we need to know more about the conditions and mental processes in which racial 
considerations interplay with the political stimuli from the environment in the 
case of, at first, race issues.   
The second reason why race is the central issue in my analysis is its 
salience in American politics. It is a well-documented fact that ordinary citizens 
hold relatively strong opinions about race matters (see Schuman et al. 1997; 
Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo 2000), and that they draw on easy decision-making on 
race matters. To quote Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991),  
 
minority of white Americans views blacks as a “hostile” and “lazy” underclass of the undeserving 
poor (see Hurwitz and Peflley 1998; Bobo 1988; Schuman et al. 1988). Stereotypes of blacks as 
lazy and in violation of core American values thus play a central role in formulations of the new 
prejudice. With regard to racial stereotypes, it is important to understand how they are triggered. A 
growing body of work on priming and framing effects finds that racial stereotypes are activated 
with a mere exposure to racial cues, especially coded language or implicit racial messages with 
deniability (Edsall and Edsall 1992; Jamieson 1992; Mendelberg 2001; Valentino et al. 2002).   
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Ordinary people may have trouble putting their ideas together consistently in 
some domains of politics; indeed, they can fail to form any idea at all, let alone 
one consistent with their other opinions. No one, however, supposes that the 
public is similarly handicapped on issues of race: The average citizen knows 
what she thinks about increasing government spending to assist blacks, about 
busing, about affirmative action (211, emphasis added). 
 
Similarly, according to Carmines and Stimson (1989), race is an easy issue among 
other policy issues in the sense that 
[Race issues] require almost no supporting context of factual knowledge, no 
impressive reasoning ability, [and] no attention to the nuances of political life. 
Thus they produce mass response undifferentiated with respect to knowledge, 
awareness, attentiveness, or interest in politics; none of these is a requisite of 
response (Carmines and Stimson 1989, 11). 
 
These arguments imply that the association between the stimuli from the political 
communications (e.g., political message or the relevant information) and the 
judgmental tasks on race demands little conscious thought. To put it simply, 
making policy judgments on race matters is not a cognitively demanding task. In 
this regard, explaining why he takes race issues as a case for his study, Zaller 
(1992) points out that     
If information can affect racial opinions, which appear to be among the most 
deeply felt of mass opinions (Carmines and Stimson 1982; Converse 1964; 
Converse and Markus 1979), it can probably affect most other types of opinions 
as well (13).  
 
Given strong racial attitudes and their impacts on policy judgments on race 
matters and other race-related policy issues, the argument goes, it is supposed to 
be redundant for ordinary citizens to gather relevant information and process it in 
a cognitively systematic and effortful way to make policy judgments. It follows 
that it is highly probable that most individuals expend little or no time and effort 
to become more informed on racial issues. But this conclusion would be too hasty 
as evidence from dual-process models demonstrate.  
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A considerable body of research finds that variation in cognitive 
engagement exists and has both direct and intervening effects on policy 
judgments in a variety of issue domains (Chaiken and Trope 1999; Eagly and 
Chaiken 1993). In addition, affirmative action programs might not be just a 
symbolic, emotionally-charged, easy issue, as is often thought (Sniderman and 
Piazza 1993; Sniderman and Carmines 1997; see also Hochschild 2001; Edsall 
and Edsall 1991; Shipler 1976). Evidence shows that ordinary citizens’ 
perceptions of affirmative action programs are constrained not just by race, but 
also by political and ideological considerations (Sniderman and Piazza 1993; 
Sniderman and Carmines 1997; Stoker 1998; Kuklinski et al. 1997; Gilens, 
Sniderman, and Kuklinski 2000).  
The extent to which individuals use stimuli on race policies is, once again, 
an empirical question. My agenda includes exploring variation in information 
seeking with regard to race matters and to estimate the impact that cognitive 
engagement has on policy judgments on race matters, vying against the anti-black 
attitudes that are known to be a major factor that determines white Americans’ 
policy judgments on race matters.  
In a review of the racial attitudes literature, Mendelberg (2005) points out 
that “[The] literature on racial attitudes started out relatively narrowly and with 
implications limited to racial policies; but as it developed it began to offer fruitful 
implications for a variety of themes” (640). Similarly, I believe that research on 
cognitive engagement with new information in the case of race matters will 
produce implications that are not limited to racial policies. It will contribute to our 
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understanding of citizens’ judgments on a host of policy issues that are 
emotionally-charged, hot-button issues like abortion, gay rights, and capital 
punishment.  
HYPOTHESES 
I test two sets of hypotheses. The first set of hypotheses deals with the 
determinants of cognitive engagement with the given information related to 
affirmative action programs. I expect that individuals’ cognitive engagement, 
measured by the time expended during the exposure to information, will vary 
according to political attitudes and racial affect toward blacks. The second set of 
hypotheses is about the consequences of cognitive engagement. The degree to 
which individuals weigh race in making policy judgments on affirmative action 
programs will decrease as a function of the extent to which individuals expend 
time in information seeking and processing and of the kind of information on 
which they rely.  
Which Persons Expend More Time to Acquire Information? 
We have little evidence that demonstrates how individuals acquire and 
process information while they face the stimuli from the environment. Rather than 
rely on the low information assumption, I address the question of which persons 
expend more time and effort to acquire relevant information in terms of the 
factors, such as party identification, political ideology, general political 
knowledge, race-specific knowledge, political interest, and racial affect. To 
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account for variation in time expended in information seeking and processing, I 
hypothesize 
H1: Individuals with strong partisan and ideological motivation will 
expend more time in seeking and processing the given information;  
 
H2: Individuals with a great deal of stored knowledge about general 
political matters and race-specific matters will expend more time in seeking and 
processing the given information; and 
 
H3: Individuals with higher levels of political interest will expend more 
time in seeking and processing the given information.  
 
To explain what kind of information citizens favor, I hypothesize that when 
individuals are exposed to both of partisan and factual information,     
H4: Individuals will prefer partisan information to factual information; 
  
H5: Individuals with strong partisan and ideological motivation will prefer 
partisan information to factual information; and  
 
H6: Individuals with higher levels of political knowledge and political 
interest will prefer partisan information to factual information.  
What Are the Consequences of High and Low Levels of Information Seeking?  
 
Different levels of cognitive engagement with new information, I also 
argue, are not without consequence. The variability in use of new information is 
in part a consequence of the political and racial predispositions8 and is central to 
                                                 
8 By racial predispositions, I refer to white citizens’ attitudes toward blacks that include racial 
resentment, racial prejudice, and racial stereotype. The concepts of racial resentment, prejudice, 
and stereotype are typically viewed as being interrelated although the precise relationships among 
them are complicated. For instance, it is unclear whether racial resentment derives from racial 
prejudice or ideological principles. In addition, racial resentment means different things to white 
liberals and conservatives (Feldman and Huddy 2005). Some scholars hold that a racial stereotype 
is the cognitive component of racial prejudice (Harding, Proshansky, Kutner, and Chein 1969; 
Secord and Backman 1974) while others suggest that racial stereotype is functional for the 
individual allowing rationalization of his or her racial prejudice (Allport 1954; LaViolette and 
Silvert 1951; Saenger 1953; Simpson and Yinger 1965). On the other hand, it seems clear that 
while most white Americans are not bigots, many of them hold racially predisposed attitudes that 
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understanding policy judgments. Policy judgments on racial issues depend not 
only on political and racial predispositions but also on the extent to which 
individuals use new information. Information processing has several 
consequences, three of which I shall explore. First, in accounting for how varied 
levels of information seeking affect policy judgments on affirmative action 
programs, I hypothesize  
H7: Individuals who expend more time in information seeking and 
processing will be more likely to view affirmative action programs in liberal 
ways.   
 
Second, in explaining the effects of the partisan and the factual 
information, I hypothesize 
H8: Individuals who seek and process the factual information will be more 
likely than individuals who seek and process the partisan information to view 
affirmative action programs in liberal ways.   
 
Third, there will be a joint effect of information search and type of 
information. I hypothesize 
H9: Individuals who expend much time in seeking and processing the 
factual information will be more likely than others to view affirmative action 
programs in liberal ways.  
RESEARCH STRATEGY 
To test these hypotheses, I undertake three separate empirical analyses—
one that addresses the determinants of information processing and two that 
investigate the effects of information processing on policy judgments. The data 
for my project are derived from two sources: a cross-sectional survey data from 
 
are early-learned and cognitively simple (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Kinder and Sears 1981; 
Sears 1988; Katz and Hass 1988; see also Rogers and Prentice-Dunn 1981; Gaertner and Dovidio 
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the 1996 and the 2004 National Election Studies (NES) and an original online 
experiment. It is worth noting that my data from the experiment is one of a few 
that estimate individuals’ acquisition of new information while they are making 
policy judgments (see Lau 1995, Redlawsk 2004; Lau and Redlawsk 1997, 
2001a).  
First, using the 1996 and 2004 NES,9 I analyzed how cognitive 
engagement with judgmental tasks in the survey processes moderates the impact 
of anti-black attitudes on public opinions about race-targeted public policies. 
Evidence from the NES survey data indicates that effects of cognitive engagement 
with judgmental tasks among the general population on policy judgments on race 
matters are significant, holing other relevant variables constant. More precisely, 
those with high levels of cognitive engagement with race issues broached during 
the survey interview processes are significantly less likely to be influenced by 
their anti-black attitudes when they produce political judgments on the race-
related policy issues.  
In another respect, however, the results from survey data analysis are 
rather implicational in studying information processing through which individuals 
make policy judgment. That is, survey respondents normally express public 
opinion as it is—affected neither by information nor reflection. The survey 
instrument does not capture variables that reflect how individuals use new 
information available form the environment to make policy judgments. Although 
 
1986).  
9 These two data sets contain all variables that are necessary for the analysis, but others do not. I 
will back to this topic in Chapter 3 in which the two data sets are analyzed.   
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my measure of cognitive engagement in the survey context is a proxy but not a 
direct one of how individuals use new information, this study provides empirical 
evidence that supports my arguments.  
Second, to confirm and extend the findings from the cross-sectional data, I 
investigate the effect of information processing with an experiment crafted 
specifically to measure the amount of time respondents use in seeking and 
processing information. To explore and demonstrate how differences in the extent 
and manner of information seeking and processing are affected by individual 
predispositions and, in turn, determine policy judgments on affirmative action 
programs, I created a unique data set in which the complete information search 
process is tracked and recorded. Taking online information processing method 
along with online polling, data were collected on the type of information and the 
duration of information acquisition for each respondent. By analyzing this data, I 
further substantiated the roles that cognitive engagement plays in making policy 
judgments on race matters. In contrast to the much existing research, I find 
information processing to be more prominent than conventionally thought, as well 
as consequential to policy judgments.  
DESIGNING EXPERIMENT 
The two experiments investigated the determinants of variability in 
individuals’ cognitive engagement with the given information and its 
consequences on policy judgments on race matters, respectively. The experiments 
were designed to observe and record participants’ activities as they accessed and 
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acquired the given information and account for the causes and effects of 
information processing on policy judgments on affirmative action programs. The 
subjects’ activities in information seeking and processing were monitored and 
recorded by computer programs in terms of what information they accessed and 
how long they sifted through information. Below I describe the specific 
parameters and attributes of experiments. See Table 1.1 for a tabular summary of 
the experiment.   
Subjects 
Those that participated in the survey included 1,065 undergraduate 
students, recruited from 17 introductory government classes at the University of 
Texas at Austin and three introductory government classes at Austin Community 
College in May, July, and October of 2005. For incentives, subjects received 
minor extra credit for the participation toward their final grade in the course. My 
convenience sample is not representative of the nation as a whole, but it does 
contain reasonable variation along several important attitudinal dimensions 
making the data suitable for analysis. 
Procedure 
The courses’ instructors announced the experiments to the class during 
lecture by giving students the web address where students could participate on 
their own time using the internet. Students who decided to participate in the 
experiment accessed the experiment’s web site, using their own internet-
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connected computers at their convenience. When participants opened up the first 
page of the experimental site, they were given the general instructions for the 
experimental tasks.   
The experiment consisted of an information session and a survey session.  
In the survey session, subjects were asked to complete a questionnaire that asked 
a standard array of political and attitudinal questions. In the information session, 
subjects were asked to seek information about affirmative action programs by 
clicking the labels on the computer screen they wanted to probe and scrolling 
down the web pages. Subjects did not initially see the content of the information. 
They had to choose certain labels on computer screen by clicking it to read the 
information. Examples of the information pages that subjects viewed are available 
in Appendix 4.B.  
Manipulation of Treatment 
I constructed stimulus material, i.e., briefing documents, containing a rich 
amount of information about affirmative action programs and provided the 
subjects in the information session. The information provided consisted of two 
types of information, the partisan information and the factual information. 
Subjects in control group were presented with both the partisan and the factual 
information. Subjects in two experimental groups were assigned to either the 
partisan information or the factual information at random.  
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CHAPTER PLAN 
Chapter 2 sets the stage for the study by discussing dual-process models 
and theories of automatic and controlled processes. Based on dual-process models 
and theories of automatic and controlled processes, I raise a theoretical possibility 
that individuals actively use incoming, relevant information if they are given the 
opportunity for information seeking at the minimum cost, and that this affects 
policy positions of white citizens on race-targeted public policies.  
Chapter 3 presents survey data-based evidence of the basic proposition of 
the dissertation—the effects of cognitive engagement on the formation of racial 
policy judgments. Cognitive engagement with relevant information associated 
with policy issue at hand is assumed to benefit the citizens’ opinion formation. 
Nonetheless, the effects of cognitive engagement on racial policy judgments have 
yet to be fully demonstrated empirically, especially based on the survey data from 
general population. Using the National Election Studies (NES) data, I demonstrate 
that cognitive engagement, vying against the dominant role of racial attitudes such 
as racial resentment and racial stereotypes, moderates the opposition of whites’ 
opinions to racially targeted policies.  
Recognizing that the measure of cognitive engagement tapped by a cross-
sectional survey instrument reflects only a part of the variable of interest, I extend 
the analysis in Chapter 3 to an experimental design. In Chapter 4, I present results 
from an experiment crafted to measure cognitive engagement directly, in terms of 
the time that individuals expend for information seeking and to estimate the effect 
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of cognitive engagement on policy judgments. I describe the data collection 
method and discuss the innovative features of process-tracing method in studying 
the formation of racial policy judgments. While absolute certainty is elusive in the 
study of public opinion, I believe that the techniques that I employed achieve a 
reasonable measure of how citizens process and choose information.    
The next two chapters are the highlights of the dissertation. Chapter 5 
analyzes the data from Experiment 1, featuring the findings regarding variation in 
individuals’ use of incoming, relevant information. I demonstrate that individuals 
are not adroit practitioners of information seeking and processing but nor are they 
hopelessly muddled incompetents. I also demonstrate that individuals do not 
always rely on simple, easy-to-execute heuristics; rather some expend a fair 
amount of time and effort on careful examination and analysis of incoming, 
relevant information. 
Chapter 6 analyzes the data from Experiment 2. Here, I document the 
effects of information processing behavior on racial policy judgments. I 
demonstrate that policy judgments on affirmative action programs vary, 
contingent on levels of cognitive engagement with the given information and 
types of information individuals processed. More precisely, individuals view 
affirmative action programs in liberal ways to the extent that they sought out and 
processed the factual information. Importantly, this tendency is clearer among 
those who expended relatively longer time in seeking and processing information. 
I argue that racial attitudes are not overwhelming and constant, nor are they far 
beyond the power of conscious, effortful information seeking and processing.  
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Chapter 7 wraps up the dissertation with a review and presents the 
implications of the findings from the substantive chapters. The result of these 
analyses is a clearer understanding of the role of cognitive engagement with new 
information. In contrast to the much existing research, I find that a considerable 
part of racial policy judgments is driven by how incoming, relevant information is 
sought out and processed, and that Americans’ racial policy judgments stem from 
more than immutable anti-black attitudes. More broadly, findings suggest that a 
starting point to change white Americans’ opposition to affirmative action 
programs and other race-targeted policies might be to let them be involved in and 
pay attention to the issue. This may guarantee neither a change in white citizens’ 
global attitudes toward blacks nor an immediate shift of their policy positions on 
race-targeted policies, but it makes them at least less susceptible to their anti-
black attitudes.   
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Table 1.1. Summary of Experiments 
 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
   
Procedure  Survey followed by  
Information Seeking 
Information Seeking followed by 
Survey 
   
   
Briefing Documents Partisan and Factual Information  • Group 1: Partisan Information 
• Group 2: Factual Information 
• Group 3: No Information 
   
   
Dependent Measure • Time expended in seconds in 
seeking information; and  
• Preferred type of information 
accessed 
Policy judgments on Affirmative 
Action programs 
   
   
Explanatory 
Variables 
• Political predispositions, such 
as party identification, 
political ideology, political 
knowledge, and political 
interests 
• Race related attitudes such as 
affective attitudes about blacks 
• Time expended in seconds in 
seeking information; and  
• Preferred type of information 
accessed 
   
   
Hypotheses  Variations in information search 
in terms of search time and 
preferred type of information  
• by political predispositions; 
and 
• by race-related attitudes 
Information effects on policy 
judgments 
• by different types of 
information; and  
• by information with reference 
to no information 




                                                
CHAPTER TWO 
THEORIES OF INFORMATION PROCESSING, COGNITIVE ENGAGEMENT, AND 
POLICY JUDGMENTS ON RACE 
 
 
An extensive body of research has examined the question of how 
individuals make political judgments (Simon 1985; Chaiken and Trope 1999; 
Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Fiske and Taylor 1991; Lodge and McGraw 1995; 
Zaller and Feldman 1992; Lau and Redlawsk 1997, 2001a, 2001b). Great progress 
has been made in our understanding of the mental mechanisms and processes that 
underlie individuals’ formulation of political judgments. Three major arguments 
regarding opinion formation stand out. First, individuals typically do not reason 
about their political judgments in a rational and calculating manner (Converse 
1964; Kinder 1983).10 Second, many individuals lack not only relevant political 
knowledge but also the motivation and ability to thoroughly consider new 
information (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Zaller 1992; Gerber and Green 
1998, 1999; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Carmines and Stimson 1989). Third, 
many individuals almost always rely on simple, easy-to-execute decision rules, 
rather than spending the time and effort to examine and acquire “encyclopedic” 
information (Simon 1985; Lupia 1994, 2000; Lupia, McCubbins, and Popkin 
2001).11  
 
10 It is known that most individuals tend to be “muddled incompetents,” instead of “adroit 
practitioners” of information processing, anchoring their political judgments on preexisting 
beliefs, values, and attitudes.  
11 By encyclopedic information, I follow the term by Lupia (1994), referring to objective, factual 
information.   
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I do not dispute the importance and validity of these arguments. Rather, I 
contend that the scholarly obsession with the nature of opinion formation has 
underestimated another aspect of opinion formation: individuals’ use of new 
information available from the environment. Along the lines of my argument, an 
increasing number of studies in social and political psychology have attempted to 
take a closer look at the role of new information when individuals make political 
judgments. These studies find that the extent to which individuals acquire and 
process new information, and the way they do so, make a substantial difference in 
political judgments (Chaiken and Trope 1999; Singer 2002; Goyder 1987; Bargh 
1994, 1997; see Lodge and McGraw 1995; Lau 1995; Lau and Redlawsk 2001b; 
Taber, Lodge, and Glathar 2001). The underlying assumption of this approach is 
that some individuals are responsive to information available in the environment, 
and that, for those who are, political judgments will be driven not only by 
preexisting values, beliefs, and attitudes (i.e., priors or predispositions), but also 
by the extent and manner of information acquisition (Lau 1995; Lau and 
Redlawsk 1997, 2001a, 2001b; see also Chaiken and Trope 1999; Eagly and 
Chaiken 1993; Higgins and Bargh 1987). Some individuals, under certain 
conditions, are more likely to process and acquire the new information, and 
thereby are likely improve their understanding of the issues, hold more considered 
understandings, and justify their policy judgments with a better reasoning (e.g., 
Page 1996; Mansbridge 1983; Fishkin 1992, 1995; Iyengar, Luskin, and Fishkin 
2003; Druckman 2004).  
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This does not mean prior attitudes play an insignificant role in policy 
judgments. Rather, taking the extent and mode of information acquisition and 
processing into account yields a more precise understanding of the nature of 
opinion formation. In other words, it is critical that scholars take a more 
comprehensive account of the roles that mental constructs (i.e., predispositional 
factors) and procedural factors (i.e., information processing) play together in 
producing individuals’ political judgments. Doing so will improve our 
understanding of how individuals make political judgments. As Taber, Lodge, and 
Glathar (2001) contend, “We have focused too heavily on the content and 
structure of beliefs and have paid too little attention to cognitive process” (198). 
In other words, we have exclusively focused on “chronically accessible political 
constructs” (e.g., political predispositions or schemas, such as party identification, 
political ideology, belief systems, and knowledge structures like political 
awareness, sophistication, and political ideology in Conversian terms). And the 
way that the new information is actually gathered and transformed into political 
judgments has been relatively neglected.  
In this chapter I provide a theoretical framework for better understanding 
individuals’ policy judgments, putting emphasis on the concept of cognitive 
engagement, a critical determinant of the mental operations when policy 
judgments are produced. On this account, I contend that the effects of 
predispositions on policy judgments will be either moderated or reinforced to the 
extent, and by the way, that individuals utilize new information in making policy 
judgments.  
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I begin by discussing on-line (OL) and memory-based (MB) processes of 
political judgments. Next, I discuss an information processing perspective, 
focusing on dual-process models and theories of automatic and controlled 
process, both of which have been at the center of research in social psychology to 
examine social judgments. In this discussion I highlight critical functions of 
cognitive engagement as a determinant of political judgments. I then review 
previous work on cognitive engagement in political science. Next, I address the 
issue of how policy judgments about race issues can be better explained by an 
information processing perspective. Finally, I present arguments that the 
consequences of different levels of cognitive engagement with incoming 
information and of different types of information that individuals process are 
significant influences on policy judgments on matters concerning race.  
ON-LINE VERSUS MEMORY-BASED PROCESS: THE ROLE OF 
INFORMATION ACQUISITION 
Studies on political judgments can be sorted into two broad categories: 
those concerned with the structure and mental representation of political objects, 
such as candidates or issues and those concerned with the dynamics and 
mechanisms of cognitive processes underlying political judgments (Lodge 1995; 
Lau 1995; Lodge and Taber 2001; Wyer and Ottati 1993).  
On the one hand, research on chronically accessible political constructs 
(e.g., belief system, attitude, and stereotype) is concerned with estimating their 
consistent and reliable effects on political judgments and behavior (Campbell et 
al. 1964; Krosnick 1983; Kinder 1983; Kinder and Sears 1985). And research on 
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political memory (e.g., political sophistication, awareness, and knowledge) has 
been concerned with measuring with precision the structure of the information 
stored in memory and examining the consequences of knowledge structures for 
subsequent inferences and judgments (Converse 1964; Luskin 1989; Delli Carpini 
and Keeter 1996; Zaller 1992). According to these studies, new information is 
encountered, and some of it is stored in long-term memory. When a judgment is 
needed, individuals search long-term memory for information and use the 
retrieved information to make a judgment.12
On the other hand, scholars, taking a closer look at the dynamics of 
cognitive processes, posit that political judgments and decision-making are 
formed on-line, in which new information plays a significant role. The 
information processing approach is concerned with identifying the processes by 
which individuals use new information to form political judgments. The way in 
which new information is acquired and processed is the fundamental building 
block in this approach. According to Lodge and colleagues, individuals integrate 
the evaluative implications of new information by continuously updating an “on-
line running tally” when new information is encountered (Lodge and McGraw 
 
12 In the process of computing judgments, the accessibility of a concept in memory is determined 
in part by the frequency with which the concept has been used in the past. Life goals, values, and 
past experiences can influence the frequency with which certain concepts have been used and thus 
can produce differences in the chronic accessibility of these concepts. Also, events that one 
experiences a short time before information is received also can activate concepts that are used to 
interpret this information and, as a result, can influence judgments of the object to which the 
information refers (Wyer and Srull 1989; Zaller 1992). Another determinant of the concepts a 
person is likely to bring to bear on information is the already acquired knowledge about the person 
or object to which the information pertains or, alternatively, about a group or category to which 
the target belongs. 
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1995; Lodge and Taber 2001; Taber, Lodge, and Glathar 2001; Lau 1995; Lau 
and Redlawsk 1997, 2001a, 2001b).  
Whether an individual adopts an on-line or memory-based approach 
depends on individual and contextual differences. For instance, more 
sophisticated individuals are more likely to be habitually adept at on-line 
processing, whereas unsophisticated individuals are more likely to rely on 
memory-based strategies (McGraw, Lodge, and Stroh 1990). And opinions about 
the issues that are of great importance to an individual are formed on-line, 
whereas the issues that are unimportant are more likely to produce memory-based 
opinions (McGraw, Lodge, and Stroh 1990). As another example, contextual 
parameters, such as information structure and task complexity, are also considered 
important regulating conditions for individuals to take on-line or memory-based 
process to make political judgments (Lau and Redlawsk 2001a). More precisely, 
memory plays an important role in making a decision when judgmental tasks are 
complex and information is given in an uncontrolled way; otherwise, the on-line 
information search is responsible for decision-making.    
One of the questions that the two approaches address is about the role of 
new information in making policy judgments. That is, how much of what kind of 
new information will enter into the decision calculus? How will individuals look 
at all, some, little, or none of the available information, and, if attended to, how 
does this heeded information produce judgments and choice? I turn now to 
discussing these questions within the framework of dual-process models.  
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DUAL-PROCESS MODELS 
The idea that there exist two distinct kinds of information processing has 
been around for as long as philosophers and psychologists have written about the 
nature of human thought (see Chaiken and Trope 1999). Only in recent years, 
however, have cognitive scientists proposed the striking and strong claim that 
there are two quite separate cognitive systems underlying judgments and decision-
making (see Chaiken and Trope 1999; Eagly and Chaiken 1993). Presently, dual-
process theories are ubiquitous. There are dual-process theories of attribution 
(Trope 1986; Uleman, Newman, and Moskowitz 1996), perception (Brewer 1988; 
Fiske and Neuberg 1988; Gilbert 1989; Zárate, Sanders, and Garza 2000), 
stereotyping and prejudice (Devine 1989), persuasion (Chaiken 1980; Petty and 
Cacioppo 1986; Chaiken and Trope 1999; Chaiken and Eagly 1993), mental 
control (Wegner 1994; Wenzlaff and Wegner 2000), self-regulation (Baumeister 
and Heatherton 1996; Metcalfe and Mischel 1999; Bargh 1994, 1997), emotion 
(Teasdale 1999; van Reekum and Scherer 1997), and personality (Epstein 1998).  
Despite diverse versions and focuses of dual-process models, dual-process 
models posit in common that: (1) when individuals are sufficiently motivated and 
have enough cognitive resources available, they engage in conscious, elaborated, 
and effortful information seeking and processing; (2) individuals’ different levels 
of cognitive engagement with the incoming information make a difference in 
policy judgments; and, more precisely, (3) as cognitive engagement with the 
incoming information increases, its relative influence on policy judgments 
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becomes stronger. Individuals who have their own motivation for correct or 
optimal judgments are likely to take their judgmental tasks more seriously, invest 
more effort, and bear more of the responsibility of decision-making (Petty and 
Cacioppo 1986, 1990; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Chaiken and Trope 1999; see 
Kuklinski et al. 2001). Among other dual-process models, the Elaboration 
Likelihood Model (ELM) and Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM) have become 
increasingly popular with researchers over the past decade. Here I briefly present 
these two models.  
In HSM, heuristic processing is said to involve use of simple, well-
learned, and readily accessible decision rules like “experts are always right,” “the 
majority is correct,” or “statistics don’t lie.” Heuristic processing is the default 
processing mode; individuals will use decision shortcuts unless special 
circumstances intervene. Individuals will perform systematic processing when 
circumstances (1) make them feel an unusually great need to be accurate, defend 
an attitude, or create a positive impression; and (2) offer enough time and 
cognitive capacity to permit more effortful processing. This processing involves 
the active, effortful scrutiny of all relevant information and therefore demands 
considerable cognitive capacity (Chaiken et a, 1989; Chen and Chaiken 1999).  
Similarly, in ELM (Petty and Cacioppo 1981, 1986), elaboration 
likelihood is the extent to which the impact of a persuasive message is caused by 
the arguments contained in the message (high elaboration) versus peripheral 
aspects of the message (i.e., message source and the persuasion situation) (low 
elaboration). As in the heuristic-systematic processing model, it is assumed that 
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when people are low in ability or motivation, they will not engage in high 
elaboration. Then, judgments will be based mostly on highly salient peripheral 
cues. When people posses both capacity and motivation, they perform a detailed 
analysis of the message. They consider argument strength as well as grasp an 
opportunity to correct for effects of any potentially biasing peripheral cues (Petty 
and Cacioppo 1981, 1986; Petty and Wegener 1999).  
In short, dual-process models assume that individuals have the cognitive 
flexibility of choosing either path of high or low elaboration and/or heuristic or 
systematic information processing to make political judgments, depending on 
their motivation and cognitive ability (Chaiken and Trope 1999; Eagly and 
Chaiken 1993).  
AUTOMATIC AND CONTROLLED PROCESSES 
Of late, researchers in social cognition have documented that most 
individuals are unintentional or unconscious in their judgmental tasks, and that 
much of information processing occurs automatically—that is, spontaneously, 
unconsciously, uncontrollably, and effortlessly (Bargh 1994, 1997; Bargh, Chen, 
and Burrows 1996; Fazio 1986). Certain attitudes become activated automatically 
by the mere presence of external stimuli and then affect judgments and behaviors 
(Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, and Pratto 1992; Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, and 
Hymes 1996; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, and Kardes 1986). Automatic 
processing involves the unintentional or spontaneous activation of some well-
learned set of associations or responses (e.g., racial prejudice and stereotypes) that 
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have been developed through repeated activation in one’s life time. Automatic 
processing likely occurs when less information is available and information 
recently accessed is affectively congruent with the priors (Bargh 1994, 1997; 
Bargh, Chen, and Burrows 1996).  
In contrast, controlled processing is intentional and requires individuals’ 
active attention to the information object. Studies show that the ultimate 
judgments are mediated by conscious processing of information (Dovidio et al. 
1997; Devine 1989; Monteith and Devine 1993; Monteith, Sherman, and Devine 
1998; Fazio and Dunton 1997). Devine (1989), for example, argues for a two-
stage model of prejudice in which the perceptual phase is automatic (i.e., 
activation of stereotypes by the target individual's features), whereas the second 
phase is a matter of conscious choice, driven by one's relevant values. She 
demonstrates that “controlled process can inhibit the effects of automatic 
processing when the implications of such processing compete with goals to 
establish or maintain a nonprejudiced identity” (Devine 1989, 15). And, in 
situations in which controlled process is precluded or interfered with, automatic 
processing effects may exert the greatest influence on responses.  
 At present, there is considerable debate concerning the efficacy of efforts 
to control stereotype activation and application (see Monteith, Sherman, and 
Devine 1998). Some research suggests that intentional control over activation and 
use of stereotypes is possible even if difficult. Other research suggests that efforts 
at control may backfire, producing unintended heightened activation and use of 
stereotypes. Taking automatic and controlled processes of information together, 
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the question is how often, and under what conditions, the automatic process is 
overridden by the controlled process. Control over automatic activation of 
preconscious attitudes requires three things: (1) awareness of the influence, or at 
least the possibility of influence, by preconscious attitudes; (2) motivation to exert 
the control of it; and (3) enough attentive capacity (or lack of distractions) at the 
time to engage in processing information (see Bargh 1989; Wegner 1994). 
Awareness of the automatic effect is necessary for the motivation to be engaged, 
and for the motivation to operate to control the automatic impulse it must be 
supported by sufficient processing capacity. Given that the controlled process 
requires all three of these features to be in place, it is difficult to see that there are 
many real-world circumstances in which all three are present. Even with the best 
of cognitive engagement, one cannot control an influence if one is not aware of its 
operation, or at least its potential for operating (Devine 1989).  
To put it similarly yet simply, Fazio (1990; and Fazio and Dunton 1997) 
posits that motivation and opportunity to engage in the issues determine whether 
individuals follow a relatively spontaneous process driven by the influence of 
automatically activated attitudes or a more deliberative process characterized by 
effortful and conscious analysis. In the case of race-related judgments, the 
relevant motivation involves a desire to control seemingly prejudiced reactions 
and to think and learn about the issue at hand. 
To summarize, the distinction between automatic and controlled process 
basically lies in the extent to which individuals exert cognitive effort to involve in 
the issue at hand by acquiring and processing the incoming, relevant information. 
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The more time and effort one expends in acquiring and processing relevant 
information, the more likely one is to use a controlled process rather than an 
automatic process.  
COGNITIVE ENGAGEMENT 
A review of dual-process models reveals that cognitive engagement is at 
the center of information processing perspective. To account for the process by 
which information is acquired, it is critical to precisely measure cognitive 
engagement. For this task, I begin this section by distinguishing cognitive 
engagement, by which I mean “attention” to the issue, from knowledge, which 
refers to “understanding” of the issue. I contend that typical measures of 
knowledge do not do a good job of discriminating who in fact acquires 
information. I also contend that the scholarly focus on citizens’ chronic lack of 
political knowledge and their reliance on political heuristics have misguided our 
understanding of the role cognitive engagement plays in the formation of political 
judgments. Finally, I briefly discuss the measures of cognitive engagement 
devised by Lau and Redlawsk (1997, 2001a).   
Cognitive Engagement and Knowledge 
In political science, Zaller (1992) identifies that cognitive engagement is a 
principal analytical component in the study of the nature and origins of public 
opinion. Nevertheless, he adopts another term, “political attentiveness,” as his 
principal analytical concept. He writes: 
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Although cognitive engagement is the right specification for my model, it is a 
cumbersome and somewhat precious phrase. Therefore, I will, through most of 
the analysis that follows, use a simpler phrase, namely political attentiveness or 
political awareness. But cognitive engagement, political attentiveness, and 
political awareness are meant to convey the same thing (Zaller 1992, 43, 
emphasis added).  
 
By political awareness Zaller (1992) refers to “the extent to which an individual 
pays attention to politics and understands what he or she has encountered” (21). 
Given this definition, in order to measure political awareness, Zaller (1992) uses a 
battery of the factual questions13 that reflect one’s basic understanding of political 
structures, processes, and figures. Therefore, Zaller (1992) assumes at the 
conceptual level that political awareness refers to both attention and 
understanding, yet at the operational level, his political awareness reflects 
understanding but not attention. Acknowledging this, Zaller (1992) notes, 
In using this sort of measure, I will be assuming that persons who are 
knowledgeable about politics in general are habitually attentive to 
communications on most particular issues as well (43). 
 
However, this assumption awaits corroboration by empirical evidence. We do not 
have evidence that shows whether politically knowledgeable individuals pay more 
or less attention to new information available when they make political 
judgments. Furthermore, paying attention to new information is conceptually 
distinct from understanding issues based on knowledge. Attention is the 
assignment of cognitive effort to process incoming information (i.e., external 
stimuli) from the environment, whereas understanding is the product of both 
cognitive engagement with issues and preexisting knowledge structured in one’s 
 
13 The items include which party controls Congress, the term office of a U.S. senator), ability to 
evaluate a variety of somewhat obscure political figures (e.g., Henry Jackson), ability to recall the 
names of Congressional candidates, and ability to locate accurately the policy positions of 
prominent individuals and groups. 
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long-term memory. By lumping “attention” with “understanding,” Zaller (1992) 
leaves the question of how individuals with different levels of knowledge actually 
acquire and process information from the environment and convert it into political 
judgments unaddressed.14   
Let me turn to a discussion about how knowledge becomes to be 
considered to the same as cognitive engagement. The original impetus for the idea 
of minimal use of information comes from Downs (1957). According to Kuklinski 
and Hurley (1994),  
Downs first demonstrates the irrationality of investing time, attention, and 
resources to become politically informed; and he then proceeds to reveal the 
value, from the citizen’s standpoint, of informational shortcuts, especially the 
reliance on trusted experts (730).  
 
Subsequent studies of citizens’ decision-making have supported Downs’s 
speculation, showing that most citizens “know” little about politics (Converse 
1964; Sniderman 1993; Luskin 1989; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Then, 
minimal use of information is premised on the findings of citizens’ chronic lack 
of political knowledge. The well-documented findings of the American public’s 
lack of political knowledge are taken as evidence that most citizens do not attend 
to, or care about, incoming, relevant information from the political environment 
(see Carmines and Kuklinski 1990; Page and Shapiro 1992; Sniderman, Brody, 
 
14 In another study (Price and Zaller 1993), Zaller contends that “general political knowledge” is 
a better measure for “actual reception” of news than the self-reported measure of “media use” that 
actually captures “simple exposure” to news.  I agree with this argument. But my point here is 
that even Zaller’s measure of “current news reception” is based on the respondents’ ability to 
recall basic information about a variety of current news events, but not related to cognitive 
engagement or attention. Current new reception is measured in the way that respondents who 
correctly answered the follow-up question about rudimentary elements of the story they said they 
had heard or read were counted as having actually received a given news story. Thus, general 
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and Tetlock 1991; Zaller 1992; Mondak 1993; Lupia 1994, 2000; Lupia and 
McCubbins 1998). In short, the notion of citizens’ minimal use of information, 
which is initially derived from Downs’s deductive reasoning and then supported 
by the second-hand evidence of citizens’ lack of knowledge, has become 
considered to be matter-of-fact.  
Cognitive Engagement and Political Heuristics 
Drawing on social psychology literature on “cognitive heuristics” (see 
Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Niesbet and Ross 1980; see also Downs 
1957), political scientists have presumed that most individuals rely on information 
shortcuts or partisan cues to comprehend politics just as they do in their everyday 
lives.15 Indeed, political heuristics seem indispensable to any individuals, trying to 
make political judgments with the least amount of effort. But, what if only a few 
people use political heuristics? Which persons rely on political heuristics to make 
political judgments? Do people rely more on political heuristics than other types 
of information? In order to address these questions, researchers must be able to 
identify the extent to which heuristics-based information is preferred over other 
types of information when individuals make political judgments.  
Some studies in political science examined how use of cues from political 
elites and political frames leads to different policy judgments within the 
theoretical perspectives of framing and priming (see Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 
                                                                                                                                     
political knowledge and current news reception are related to the cognitive ability to recall 
information, but not cognitive attention to information.  
15 A multitude of “political heuristics” has been identified: party identification (Campbell et al. 
1960), candidate traits (Popkin 1991), trusted elites (Mondak 1993), interest groups (Lupia 1994), 
public mood (Rahn 2000), and ideological labelings (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). 
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1997; Valentino 1997; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002; Nelson 204; 
Druckman 2004; Kuklinski et al. 2001; Lupia 2000). There has been, however, 
little empirical research about which types of information people use to make 
political judgments. In fact, individuals’ reliance on heuristics-based information 
other than other types of information awaits empirical corroboration.  
Measures of Cognitive Engagement 
A reason that political scientists have been less concerned about 
estimating citizens’ actual use of different types of information is easy to 
understand: the data are hard to acquire (see Lau 1995; Lau and Redlawsk 1997, 
2001a, 2001b). Lack of relevant method for observing information processing has 
led scholars to premise, rather than demonstrate, minimal use of information and 
prevalent use of heuristics. Measuring an individual’s acquisition of information 
is not an easy task because it is a mental activity that cannot be directly observed. 
In order to measure it, researchers must have a methodology or technique that 
enables them to track down and record individuals’ behaviors of information 
seeking and processing while they are seeking and processing incoming 
information.  
In attempting to examine decision-making process and its impact on 
political judgments, Lau (1995) and Lau and Redlawsk (1997, 2001a, 2001b) 
develop measures of how individuals search information. They estimate 
information search by three measures—“content of search” (i.e., the specific type 
of information acquired during search), “sequence of search” (i.e., temporal order 
in which information is acquired), and “depth of search” (i.e., the amount of 
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information considered during search / the amount of time spent during search 
and the priority of accessing different types of information). Depth of search, 
among others, is closely related to cognitive engagement. The underlying 
expectation of the measure of depth of search is that the longer the search time (or 
the more the information considered), the deeper and more comprehensive the 
information search, while the shorter the search time (or the less the information 
considered), the shallower or more cursory the information search. My measure of 
cognitive engagement in this research principally follows Lau and Redlawsk’s 
measure of depth of search.  I will discuss in detail this issue in Chapter 4.   
COGNITIVE ENGAGEMENT AND RACE MATTERS 
Race has been, and is, not only an important social and political issue that 
has a great deal of implications for American life, but also an excellent case that 
allows scholars to build and test their theories about the mass public’s social and 
political cognition, perception, and judgments (see Mendelberg 2005). Progress in 
our understanding in this highly packed sub-field of public opinion study is 
noticeable (for a review, see Hutchings and Valentino 2004; Mendelberg 2005; 
Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo 2000). But the progress is centered on certain aspect of 
the problem: as Sniderman and Carmines (1997) put it, “the problem of race, now 
as ever, is defined…as a problem in the hearts and minds of white Americans” 
(5). Major studies on white racial attitudes have been based on the proposition 
that white citizens rely heavily on anti-black attitudes that are principally affective 
and negative toward black Americans when they are asked to make policy 
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judgments on race matters and race-related matters (Winter 2006; Federico 2004; 
Glaser 2002; Hurwitz and Peffley 1997; Peffley and Hurwitz 2002; Edsall and 
Edsall 1991; Gilens 1996, 1998, 1999; Peffley, Shileds, and Williams 1996; 
Valentino 1999). These attitudes are learned at some earlier point in their life 
time, and thus immutable (Sears 1986, 1988; Schuman et al. 1997).  
It follows that scholarly focus on anti-black attitudes in accounting for the 
formation of racial policy preferences is likely to under-estimate the role that 
cognitive elements might play, thus undermining attempts to observe its 
subsequent effects. Thus, cognitive elements, such as general political knowledge 
and race-specific knowledge, are considered to matter little in accounting for 
whites’ policy judgments on race issues (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Sears et al. 
2000; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sidanius et al. 1997; Federico and Sidanius 
2002; Bobo and Hutchings 1996). It is presumed that white citizens are not 
engaged in seeking new information about race matters, trying to reconcile newly 
acquire information with their global attitudes toward blacks; rather, they simply 
base their policy judgments on race matters on their global attitudes toward 
blacks.  
Therefore, as the argument goes, little individual difference in seeking and 
acquiring new information about race matters among white citizens warrants no 
impact of cognitive engagement on policy judgments on race matters.  
In another respect, evidence shows that white citizens’ policy judgments 
on race matters are fragile (Nelson 2004; Kuklinski and Hurley 1997; Stoker 
1998; Hochschild 2000). We do not have any ex ante reason or indisputable 
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evidence that leads us to think that white citizens have exceptionally well-
developed true opinions on race issues. Instead, many white citizens are 
ambivalent about their issue position on race. They are vulnerable to the ways that 
issues are framed (Entman and Rojecki 2000; Nelson 2004; Druckman 2004; 
Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997; Kuklinski and Hurley 1997; Stoker 1998) and 
the ways that that racial cues prime anti-black predispositions (Mendelberg 2001; 
Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002; Huber and Lapinski 2006; Winter 2006). 
Issue frames can unconsciously associate policies with white citizens’ anti-black 
attitudes, and racial cues can unconsciously activate white citizens’ anti-black 
attitudes. White opinion on many policy issues are easily racialized (Gilens 2001; 
Winter 2006).  
However, the power of racial attitudes varies, depending on the message 
characteristics. For instance, as Valentino, Hutchings, and White (2002) claim,  
stereotype-inconsistent cues may…suppress priming by making people spend 
time thinking about how to reconcile the new information with prior 
beliefs….when campaigns emphasize policies that have been linked previously 
to blacks, they boost the impact of racial attitudes on candidate 
evaluations….when they [campaigns] violate those stereotypes by presenting 
blacks in a favorable light, or present images of nonstereotyped groups in these 
negative roles, that impact declines. When citizens are aware of the racial cues 
in a particular message, they seem to suppress racial thinking (88, emphasis 
added). 
 
Similarly, as Mendelberg (2001) implies, conscious processing of verbal racial 
cues (i.e., explicit racial cues) allows those viewing an explicit appeal to identify 
racial content and reject it in favor of widespread egalitarian norms. Thus 
judgmental tasks on race issues normally demand less conscious thought, but 
certain messages boost conscious thought when doing judgmental tasks on race 
issues.  
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These implications are perfectly compatible with dual-process models and 
theories of automatic and controlled information processing. That is, the power of 
racial attitudes depends on levels of cognitive engagement with the information 
available from the environment that drive racial attitudes to be either automatic or 
controlled. Regarding this, the social psychology literature provides plenty of 
evidence (Devine 1989; Devine and Monteith 1993; Fazio and Dunton 1997; 
Wegener and Petty 1995). For instance, individuals for whom racial attitudes are 
significant are more likely to respond quickly and easily to the race-targeted 
public policies without expending much cognitive effort to seek and process the 
relevant information. Individuals for whom race is emotion-evoking are likely to 
weight race more heavily in judging race-based public policies. In contrast, 
individuals who are well aware of their racial attitudes are likely to expend 
relatively more cognitive effort to seek and process the relevant information and 
thus correct their initial considerations driven by negative racial feelings toward 
blacks. Individuals motivated to control their seemingly race-based, prejudiced 
reaction are less likely to use race in judging and expressing their policy 
judgments (Devine 1989; Monteith, Sherman, and Devine 1998; Fazio and 
Dunton 1997; Bargh, Chen, and Burrows 1996). 
Race may be somewhat idiosyncratic or anomalous in the minds and 
hearts of white Americans in a sense that anti-black attitudes are a powerful 
predictor of white opinions on a host of issues. Yet it is still possible for white 
Americans to apply their global political beliefs or the social norms of racial 
equality to implanted racial policy issues if they consciously control their anti-
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black attitudes. Critical to accounting for white Americans’ policy judgments on 
race matters, as well as other policy matters, is to examine who more or less 
cognitively involves in the given information about race matters, under what 
condition.  
QUESTIONS OF COGNITIVE ENGAGEMENT IN RACIAL POLICY 
JUDGMENTS 
 
Based on the theories and models that I have so far discussed, I examine 
the following questions. How do individuals vary in their cognitive engagement 
with new information in the case of race-related policy issues? What causes this 
variability, if any? How does information seeking and processing affect policy 
judgments on race matters? What differences in policy judgments are made due to 
variability in the way and to the extent that individuals seek and process new 
information? How do the priors interplay with different levels of cognitive 
engagement?  
First, I will demonstrate that individuals do vary in their cognitive 
engagement in terms of time spent seeking and processing the given information, 
depending on their motivation and cognitive ability, as dual-process models 
suggest. With regard to motivation and cognitive ability, we have well-developed 
measures of “political” motivation and “political” cognitive ability, which is party 
identification (and political ideology) and political knowledge, respectively. I 
expect to find that individuals who have partisan and ideological motivation 
regarding the issue of affirmative action programs and hold relatively well-
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organized political knowledge will be likely to take systematic and central 
information processing, rather than heuristic and peripheral information 
processing, by expending more time in acquiring and processing the given 
information to make policy judgments. 
Second, I will demonstrate how variability in time spent in information 
seeking and processing results in different policy judgments on affirmative action 
programs. As dual-process models and theories of automatic and controlled 
process suggest, those who are consciously and effortfully engaged in the given 
information will produce more informed and better reasoned policy judgments on 
affirmative action programs, through the weighting of the given information and 
controlling their racial attitudes.  
Third, I will demonstrate how different types of information affect policy 
judgments on affirmative action programs. I expect that individuals who seek and 
process the factual information will hold policy judgments different from those 
who seek and process the partisan information. As dual-process models suggest, 
seeking and processing the factual information likely lead individuals to respond 
to the “content” of the information, while seeking and processing the partisan 
information likely induce individuals to pay attention to “sources” of the 
information. More precisely, those who are aware of sources of the information 
will be more likely than those who are exposed to contents of the information to 
make policy judgments that are in line with their political and racial attitudes. 
This indicates that those who process the partisan information are less likely than 
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those who process the factual information to be influenced by acquisition of new 
information.  
Fourth, I expect to find that less knowledgeable individuals can emulate 
the policy judgments of more knowledgeable individuals to the extent that less 
knowledgeable individuals expend relatively longer time in seeking and 
processing the given information. 
Finally, I will demonstrate that the magnitude of the impact of racial 
attitudes will be moderated among those who spend more time in seeking and 
processing the given information. That is, as theories of automatic and controlled 
processes suggest, the more one cognitively involves in the issue by seeking and 
processing the given information, the less likely she is to rely on racial attitudes.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
EVIDENCE FROM SURVEY DATA: THE ROLE OF COGNITIVE ENGAGEMENT 
IN SELF-CENSORING PROCESS OF RACIAL PREDISPOSITIONS 
 
Explaining why individuals who are committed to the principle of racial 
equality continue to oppose race-targeted public policies has been the subject of 
extensive research and intense debate by scholars over the past quarter-century 
(see Sears et al. 2000; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sidanius et al. 1997; Bobo and 
Hutchings 1996; Sniderman and Piazza 1993). There is a general agreement 
among scholars that making judgments on race-targeted policy issues is marked 
by a tension between “emotions driven by racial predispositions” and “values and 
self-concepts best characterized by the principle of racial equality.”  
Three points of agreement stand out. First, white Americans acquire anti-
black attitudes early and firmly. Almost all white Americans have somewhat, yet 
genuinely, negative attitudes toward blacks (Sears et al. 2000; Sidanius et al. 
1997; Federico and Sidanius 2002; Kinder and Sanders 1996). Second, although 
cultural norms have become increasingly negative toward straightforward racial 
prejudice and stereotypes, and support for the principle of racial equality has 
increased, support for policies to realize equality have either remained the same or 
fallen off (Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1998). Third, when white Americans are 
asked about racial policies, the tension between anti-black attitudes and racial 
norms creates ambivalence, instability, and inconsistency (Stoker 1998; 
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Hochschild 2001; Entman and Rojecki 2001; Kuklinski, Cobb, and Gilens 1997; 
Edsall and Edsall 1991).16
It should be noted, however, that anti-black attitudes have been considered 
a primary factor in determining policy judgments on race matters. While not 
disputing the importance of this argument, I contend that the focus on anti-black 
attitudes has underestimated the role of racial norms, undermining understanding 
of the formation of racial policy preferences. I also contend that taking cognitive 
engagement with the issues into account yields a more precise understanding of 
the formation of racial policy preferences.  
Previous studies implicate the role of cognitive engagement in the 
formation of racial policy preferences. For instance, some individuals, including 
those who are racially prejudiced or hold strong racial stereotypes, tend to 
suppress their expressions of prejudiced or stereotyped policy preferences if they 
care about how others view them (Berinsky 1999, 2002; Krysan 1998; 
Kawakamin et al. 2000). Kuklinski, Cobb, and Gilens (1997) claims that “What 
we found is … a reluctance among many of today’s southerners to admit their 
feelings about blacks, at least to survey interviewers who ask them directly. Just a 
few decades ago, even this reluctance did not exist” (347). And, Kinder and 
Winter (2001) find that “On issues of race…, for blacks and whites alike, 
speaking to a member of the opposite race resulted in more moderate opinions 
 
16 Edsall and Edsall (1991) conclude that “race is no longer a straightforward, morally 
unambiguous force in American politics; instead, considerations of race are not deeply imbedded 
in the strategy and tactics of politics, in competing concepts of the function and responsibility of 
government, and in each voter’s conceptual structure of moral and partisan identity” (53). See also 
Sniderman and Piazza (1997) and Sniderman and Carmines (1993). 
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and therefore a smaller racial divide” (451). Similarly, Mendelberg (2001) shows 
that    
unconscious priming can be controlled if people are motivated and aware 
enough to guard against it... All whites know the content of racial stereotypes 
and thus all whites are susceptible to racial priming, but some are more 
powerfully motivated to control it while others are less so (123-24).  
 
In short, self-motivated controlling over racial stereotypes, impression 
management, or social desirability effects can lead some individuals to control or 
suppress their anti-black attitudes and respond more in-line with egalitarian 
beliefs. Racial attitudes are more malleable than previously thought and racial 
policy preferences are conditional on the extent to which individuals are 
motivated to manage or control their anti-black attitudes. As discussed in Chapter 
2, this conclusion is compatible with the proposition that social judgments are 
determined by whether individuals have controlled, systematic decision-making 
processes or automatic, heuristic ones (Devine 1989; Devine et al. 2002; Fazio 
and Dunton 1995).  
In this chapter I examine the interaction between anti-black attitudes and 
cognitive engagement, focusing on whether, and to what extent, cognitive 
engagement with judgmental tasks in survey processes moderates the impact of 
anti-black attitudes on policy judgments on race matters. I begin with a brief 
review of the existing literature on the tension between anti-black attitudes and 
racial norms. Then I present theories of self-censoring processes of racial 
attitudes. I argue that the impact of anti-black attitudes and racial norms on racial 
policy preferences is contingent upon the extent to which individuals cognitively 
engage in judgmental tasks at hand. I test this hypothesis, proposing a measure of 
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cognitive engagement in the survey context as a focal independent variable. 
Finally, I present the findings and discuss the implications of the analysis.  
THE UNEVEN EFFECTS OF ANTI-BLACK ATTITUDES AND RACIAL 
NORMS 
White Americans prize the principle of racial equality while also holding 
negative racial attitudes toward black Americans (Bobo and Kluegel 1993; 
Jackman and Muha 1984; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears 1988; Schuman et al. 
1997; Mendelberg 2001). The tension between the racial norm and anti-black 
attitudes depends upon the contexts in which the issues are raised and framed 
(Nelson 2004; Stoker 1998; Kuklinski, Cobb, and Gilens 1997). In some contexts 
where the racial norm is presented, white Americans appear unprejudiced and are 
likely to support the race-targeted public policies. Krysan (1998) finds that the 
normative climate presently salient creates social desirability pressures, resulting 
in an overstatement of liberal racial attitudes, especially by more educated 
respondents. In other contexts when complete privacy is guaranteed (e.g., when 
questionnaires are mailed to and returned by respondents without any interviewer) 
or when racial cues designed to activate or prime anti-black attitudes are 
provided, white Americans express less liberal attitudes and are likely to oppose 
race-targeted public policies (Krysan 1998; Dovidio and Fazio 1992; Feagin and 
Sikes 1994; Bargh 1994, 1999; see also Mendelberg 2001).  
It is important to note here that in normal conditions anti-black attitudes 
are more present in the minds of white Americans than the racial norm is, and that 
racial cues are more frequently available from the environment than the racial 
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norm is (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears and Citrin 1985; Kinder and 
Mendelberg 1995; Schuman et al. 1997).  
On this score, three points deserve some emphasis. First, as Sears and his 
colleague state, “racial predispositions dominate all other factors in terms of 
individual correlations or regression coefficients, and in their capacity for 
explaining variance in policy preferences” (Sears et al. 1997, 44). Second, whites’ 
anti-black attitudes draw upon the residues of commonly held negative 
socialization processes in (white) American culture, so that they are evoked 
unconsciously or automatically. Therefore, racial framing or cues need not be 
explicit. Instead, subtle racial framings or cues that are implicit or with deniability 
are strong enough to evoke racial predispositions (Mendelberg 2001). Third, anti-
black attitudes are acquired early in life and persist into adulthood, so they are 
embedded in (white) American culture (Schuman et al. 1997; Sears et al. 1997).  
It follows that white Americans must put in an extensive effort and 
develop effective regulatory strategies in order to control or suppress their life-
long racial predispositions. It is improbable, if not impossible, for ordinary white 
citizens to censor or regulate their anti-black attitudes in the normal conditions 
where the racial norm is not present or racial cues are readily available. I now turn 
to discuss the literature on individual-level mental mechanisms through which the 
tension between racial predispositions and racial norm works in producing racial 
policy preferences.   
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SELF-CENSORING PROCESS AND COGNITIVE ENGAGEMENT 
Scholars in social psychology have long debated the mental mechanisms 
underlying social judgments, focusing on the concepts of automaticity, control, 
consciousness, and intention (see Uleman and Bargh et al. 1989; Hassin, Uleman, 
and Bargh et al. 2005). The evidence is mixed. That is, controlled and conscious 
processing of making social judgments does not always exist, and automatic and 
preconscious processing depends on context and individual differences (Bargh 
1989). Many scholars agree that the question of whether an individual takes 
automatic or controlled process to make policy judgments is empirical rather than 
theoretical. Indeed, we do not yet have the right model for predicting with 
confidence who takes which mode of information processing.  
In addressing this question, it is important to distinguish between 
activation and application of racial predispositions (Bargh 1996; Devine 1989; 
Fiske 1989; Fazio and Dunton 1994). Activation is automatically determined by 
the accessibility of the information stored in memory and it is fit to the target 
object for making judgments. Application refers to use of activated and now 
available perception or evaluation of the target object. Judgments occur in two 
stages: (1) a relatively automatic characterization (i.e., activation) stage in which 
information stored in memory is retrieved and activated and thus ready to be used 
for judgmental tasks at hand and (2) a more deliberate correction (i.e., 
application) stage in which the initial characterization of the target object is 
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modified or reinforced in light of contextual and individual constraints on the 
target object.  
Activation of racial predispositions is thought to be normal, given that 
racism is deeply embedded in white American culture (Sears et al. 1997; Kinder 
and Sanders 1996; Mendelberg 2001), despite lack of empirical grounds to expect 
automatic activation of racial predispositions for most white Americans. 
Meanwhile, when individuals are motivated to be correct or unprejudiced, when 
cognitive resources are sufficient for making judgments, or when egalitarian 
racial norms are heightened, individuals control the judgmental processes by 
overriding activated perceptions or evaluations stemming from anti-black 
attitudes (Devine 1989; Fiske 1989; Monteith and Voils 1998; Gaertner and 
Dovidio 1986). According to Devine (1989) and Monteith, Sherman, and Devine 
(1998), the key to the self-censoring process is heightened cognitive engagement 
with the judgmental tasks at hand, which leads individuals to react consciously 
against the automatically-activated affective feelings. 
Given this literature, it is reasonable to postulate that the impact of racial 
predispositions on racial policy judgments is moderated by one’s attention to 
judgmental tasks about race matters. After controlling for individual differences 
especially in anti-black attitudes and political attitudes such as party identification 
and political ideology, some will succeed in restraining hasty stereotypical 
responses by heightened cognitive engagement with the judgmental tasks at hand 
while others will not (see Dovidio et al. 1997; Devine 1989; Devine and Montieth 
1993; Fazio and Dunton 1997; Wegener and Petty 1995).  
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This postulation might be questioned in two ways. One might argue that 
although a majority of white Americans now censor their negative feelings on 
something as blatantly prejudiced as opposing a black family moving next door 
into their neighborhood, some of them also consider it legitimate to oppose 
affirmative action programs or federal programs to aid blacks, especially since 
many elites have opened the door by challenging such programs. In another 
respect, others might argue that it is too early to conclude the validity of the role 
of cognitive engagement in censoring racial predispositions because this 
conclusion has been found in laboratory contexts and corroborated by a 
convenient sample, but not from random surveys of the general population. While 
there is strong experimental support for censoring processes on a range of racial 
attitudes, these findings have not been supported by survey research based on 
large-scale random samples. 
An important task is thus to present survey evidence of the significant role 
that cognitive engagement with the judgmental tasks plays among large, 
representative samples in the controversial issues like affirmative action programs 
and federal programs to aid blacks. I will show that survey respondents who have 
high levels of cognitive engagement tend to less influenced by anti-black attitudes 
and more likely to support affirmative action and federal aid to blacks.  
DEFINING COGNITIVE ENGAGEMENT IN A SURVEY CONTEXT 
There are many conceptualizations cognitive engagement including 
personal relevance, issue involvement, task importance, accountability, and 
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responsibility for message evaluation. All these categories are based on the 
assumption that individuals who are motivated to engage in judgmental tasks are 
likely to hold different opinions from those who are not motivated to do so 
(Chaiken and Trope 1999; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Petty and Cacioppo 1986, 
1990; Eagly and Chaiken 1993). In other words, individuals who consider 
judgmental tasks important or personally relevant in the survey process are likely 
to expend cognitive efforts in shaping and expressing their judgments. In addition, 
given the normative climate in which anti-black attitudes are considered socially 
undesirable traits, it is reasonable to presume that as one’s cognitive engagement 
with the judgmental tasks associated with race matters increases, he or she is 
likely to care about automatically activated negative racial considerations.  
By cognitive engagement, I refer to the extent to which an individual takes 
cares about the judgmental tasks that he or she is encountering in the survey 
processes. A high degree of cognitive engagement reflects conscious, effortful, 
and controlled engagement with the survey tasks for making judgments on and 
expressing opinions about policy issue. I will discuss how I operationalized this 
concept of cognitive engagement in the survey context in the next section.    
DATA AND MEASURES 
 For the analyses I used the 1996 and 2004 National Election Studies 
(NES). The reason that only two data sets were analyzed is other NES data sets do 
not contain the questions necessary for measuring cognitive engagement. Since 
there is no theoretical reason to believe that the hypothesized relationships among 
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the variables of interest in the 1996 NES are different from those in the 2004 
NES, I pooled the two data sets for multivariate analysis. For coding schemes of 
all the measures except cognitive engagement, I followed Sears et al. (1997), 
which is a robust study that demonstrates the dominant impact of anti-black 
attitudes on racial policy preferences. Variable codes and coding schemes are 
provided in Appendix 3.A. And descriptive statistics of the variables are 
presented in Table 3.1.  
Dependent Variables 
For racial policy preferences, two items—federal programs to aid blacks 
and affirmative action—were tapped. The question wording of the former was 
“Should we increase or decrease federal spending on programs benefiting blacks.” 
The question wording of the latter was “Are you for or against preferential hiring 
and promotion of blacks.”       
The NES codes federal assistance as 1 for “[g]overnment should help 
blacks” and 7 for “Blacks should help themselves” and affirmative action as 1 for 
“Favor” and 5 for “Oppose.” Thus higher scores represent more opposition to 
racially targeted policies. Data shows that 83% and 86% of white respondents 
oppose affirmative action programs in the 1996 and 2004 NES, respectively. 
Forty percent and 57% of whites think that blacks should help themselves in the 
1996 and 2004 NES, respectively.   
Independent Variables 
The Key Variable: Cognitive Engagement. A critical task in this study is to 
develop a measure that can serve as an indicator of cognitive engagement when 
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survey participants respond to questions about the race-targeted public policies. 
Several items, such as political participation (such as engagement in political 
discussions with friends and contribution of money to political candidates), 
political interest (such as campaign interest), and media use seem suitable 
measures of cognitive engagement. These are all self-reported measures and thus 
are susceptible to social desirability bias. The presence of a social desirability bias 
attenuates or inflates relationships between the variables (Fisher 1993). Research 
that does not take steps to minimize the social desirability bias likely reaches 
theoretically and practically spurious conclusions (Fisher 1993). And when it 
comes to race, social desirability bias seriously damages the validity of the 
estimated relationships among the variables (Krysan 1998; Cook and Campbell 
1979; Runkel and McGrath 1972). As Fisher (1993) contends, it is necessary to be 
cautious when adopting self-reported measure that is especially related to socially 
desirable attributes as dependent or independent variables.  
Regarding the tendency of survey respondents’ exaggeration in the items 
related to socially desirable traits, the interviewer’s ratings of a respondent’s 
“general level of information about politics and public affairs” have previously 
been used to measure political knowledge (Bartels 1996; Gay 2002). It turns out 
that despite its subjectivity, this item is a surprisingly good measure of political 
knowledge (Zaller 1986; see also Luskin and Bullock 2004). As Zaller (1986) 
indicates, “these five-point items [of interviewers’ ratings about respondents’ 
level of political knowledge—my addition] were very powerful, and that they 
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were essentially free of contamination by interviewers who might be biased in 
favor of higher status respondents” (17).  
Given this result, it seems reasonable to use other interviewer ratings of 
the respondent attitudes in the survey process. The items, such as the respondent’s 
interest in the interview, the respondent’s sincerity in their judgmental tasks, and 
the respondent’s cooperation in the survey processes, reflect how sincerely, 
cooperatively, and actively the respondent engages in the judgmental tasks 
through the interview process. These items can be considered a good proxy for the 
respondent’s general level of cognitive engagement with the survey questions and 
the judgmental tasks. That is, survey respondents with the attitudes of high levels 
of sincerity, cooperation, and interest are likely to consciously involve themselves 
in their opinion formation processes rather than produce hasty responses through 
automatic, unconscious, effortless information processes.  
In another respect, however, these items are a broad, general-level 
estimation of the respondent’s involvement in the whole survey process, not a 
domain-specific estimation of attitudes. So it is needed to construct a measure of 
cognitive engagement specific to the respondent’s attitudes associated with race 
matters. To this end, I took the question of “[h]ow important is the issue of aid to 
blacks to the respondent personally,” which measures personal importance of the 
issue of aid to blacks. Given the finding that individuals try to cognitively engage 
issues that are personally important (see Maheswaran and Chaiken 1991), it is 
legitimate to assume that this item functions as an issue-specific weight to race 
matters.  
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To operationalize the four items (i.e., three interviewer’s ratings and 
personal importance of the issue of aid to blacks), I first summed the three 
instrumental items of the interviewer ratings of the participants involvement in, 
cooperation with, and sincerity in the survey processes, which are significantly 
correlated (α = 0.686). The three instrumental items represent the general level of 
cognitive engagement with the survey processes. Then, I multiplied the sum of the 
three instrumental items by the personal importance of aid to blacks positing a 
joint effect of cognitive engagement with the survey tasks in general and personal 
importance of aid to blacks on racial policy preferences. That is, the effect of the 
three instrumental items on racial policy preferences is greater at higher levels of 
perceived importance of the issue of aid to blacks and the effect of personal 
importance of aid to blacks on racial policy preferences is greater for those who 
are highly engaged in the survey processes in general. This postulation is 
theoretically sound and supported by the significant correlation of the sum of the 
three instrumental items and the measure of personal importance of the issue of 
aid to blacks (r = 0.054, p < 0.03 in the 1996 NES; r = 0.07, p < 0.024 in the 2004 
NES).  
To test the performance of the measure of cognitive engagement, I 
examined the correlations between the measure of cognitive engagement and 
other measures that are supposedly related to cognitive engagement, such as self-
reported campaign interest, the reviewer’s estimation of the respondent’s 
intelligence, the intensity of political ideology, and turnout. Performance of a 
measure depends on how it shows as stable and consistent relationships with other 
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measures as is expected by theory. As presented in Table 3.2, my measure of 
cognitive engagement consistently shows significant relationships with relevant 
attitudinal variables. Those who are rated more knowledgeable by the interviewer, 
are more interested in political campaigns, hold a strong political ideology, and 
participate in a poll are more likely to highly engage themselves in the judgmental 
tasks during the survey processes.  
I also examined if the item of issue importance regarding aid to blacks 
covaries with competing explanatory variables (i.e., symbolic racism and racial 
stereotypes). If this is the case, the importance of aid to blacks and cognitive 
engagement represents the same attitudes domain as symbolic racism and racial 
stereotypes. The results presented in Table 3.3 show that individual items that 
make up cognitive engagement are not correlated with the symbolic racism or 
racial stereotypes with two exceptions. It is worth emphasizing that the personal 
importance of aid to blacks is not correlated with the competing independent 
variables, symbolic racism and racial stereotypes. Finally, the composite measure 
of cognitive engagement is not correlated with symbolic racism and racial 
stereotypes. This indicates that my measure of cognitive engagement does not 
share the attitudinal dimension to which symbolic racism and racial stereotypes 
belong.  
Competing Variables. I included two competing explanatory variables, 
symbolic racism and racial stereotypes, to estimate the impact of racial 
predispositions on racial policy preferences. For this, I followed the measures 
used in previous studies. Symbolic racism consists of the four attitude domains—
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denial of continuing racial discrimination, blacks should work harder, blacks’ 
excessive demands, and undeserved advantage for blacks (see Sears et al. 1997).  
To measure racial stereotypes, I followed Sears et al. (1997). Racial 
stereotypes consists of the respondent’s ratings of blacks on 7-point scales whose 
endpoints are that blacks are hard-working—lazy, intelligent—unintelligent, and 
trustworthy—untrustworthy. 
Control Variables. I also included party identification, political ideology, 
and socioeconomic status variables including age, gender, and region, which are 
generally expected to affect racial policy preferences (Sears et al. 1997; Kinder 
and Sanders 1996).   
MODELS 
I ran two models using a least-square estimator. Model (1) replicates Sears 
et al. (1997) as a baseline model by estimating the impacts of symbolic racism 
and racial stereotypes on the racial policy preferences. The functional form of the 
model is as follows. 
Racial Policy Preferences = α + β1*Symbolic Racism + β2*Racial Stereotype 
+ β3*Party Identification + β4*Political Ideology + β5*Age + β6*South 
+ β7*Male + u                                                             
(1) 
  
Where, α is constant, βs are ordinary least-squares regression coefficients, and u 
is an error term; The model was run on federal assistance to blacks and 
affirmative action, separately; and age, south, and male are dummy variable. 
Details of coding schemes for other variables are presented in Appendix 3.A.   
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Then, to test if the effect of racial predispositions on racial policy 
preferences is moderated by cognitive engagement, Model (2) incorporates the 
variables of cognitive engagement and two interaction terms of cognitive 
engagement by symbolic racism and by racial stereotype. The functional form of 
the model is as follows. 
Racial Policy Preferences = α + β1*Symbolic Racism + β2*Racial Stereotype 
+ β3*Party Identification + β4*Political Ideology + β5*Age + β6*South 
+ β7*Male + β8 *Cognitive Engagement + β9*(Cognitive 
Engagement*Symbolic Racism) + β10*(Cognitive Engagement*Racial 
Stereotype) + u                                                              
(2) 
 
Where, α is constant, βs are ordinary least-squares regression coefficients, and u 
is an error term; The model was run on federal assistance to blacks and 
affirmative action, separately; age, south, and male are dummy variable; and 
cognitive engagement and two interaction terms are incorporated. Details of 
coding schemes for other variables are also presented in Appendix 3.A.   
In Model (2), I expect that cognitive engagement will be significant. I also 
expect that the interaction terms will be significant, indicating that the impact of 
symbolic racism or racial stereotype is dependent on one’s level of cognitive 
engagement. That is, individuals that are highly involved in racial issues will be 
more likely to support race-targeted policies.  
RESULTS 
As is reported in Table 3.4, the results of OLS regressing the two policy 
preferences as the dependent variables onto the explanatory variables support my 
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argument and yield a better understanding of the formation of racial policy 
preferences. First, as expected, party identification and political ideology play 
significant roles in determining racial policy preferences in both Models (1) and 
(2). Republicans and conservatives are more likely than Democrats and liberals to 
oppose racially targeted policies.  
Second, as expected, symbolic racism and racial stereotypes show robust, 
positive impacts on the dependent variables, which indicates that respondents 
with more symbolic racism and racial stereotypes are more likely to oppose 
federal aid to blacks and preferential hiring and promotion of blacks.  
Third, Model (2) reveals that the coefficient of symbolic racism is not 
statistically significant while the coefficient of racial stereotypes is significant. 
These results indicate that the impact of anti-black attitudes decrease when 
cognitive engagement is included in the model. In contrast, cognitive engagement 
shows a statistically significant effect.  
Fourth, the interaction between cognitive engagement and symbolic 
racism is significantly related to one’s position on federal assistance and 
affirmative action, which indicates that magnitude of the effect of symbolic 
racism changes with different levels of cognitive engagement. The existence of 
significant joint effect of symbolic racism and cognitive engagement suggests that 
Model (1) provides an inaccurate estimation of the true relationships between the 
dependent and independent variables. In addition, given that the adjusted R 
squares of Model (2) are greater than those of Model (1), Model (2) is a more 
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accurate account for racial policy preferences and explains more of the variation 
in the dependent variables.  
Finally, the cognitive engagement-symbolic racism coefficient of the 
interaction term of symbolic racism and cognitive engagement is positive. That is, 
the higher the symbolic racism, the greater the effect of cognitive engagement on 
racial policy preferences. By the same token, the higher the cognitive 
engagement, the greater the effect of symbolic racism on racial policy 
preferences.  
For a graphic demonstration of the interaction effects of cognitive 
engagement and symbolic racism on policy preferences, I divided respondents 
into those with high and low levels of cognitive engagement. High cognitive 
engagement includes those who are one standard deviation above the mean of 
cognitive engagement and low cognitive engagement includes those who are one 
standard deviation below the mean.17 Predicted values of the dependent variable 
at different levels of symbolic racism are then calculated for those who with high 
and low levels of cognitive engagement.  
The results, as illustrated in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, reveal that those who 
belong to high level of cognitive engagement are more likely than with low levels 
of cognitive engagement to support federal aid to blacks and preferential hiring 
and promotion of blacks at the same level of symbolic racism. More precisely, 
those with high levels of cognitive engagement are more likely than those with 
 
17 No theoretical standard exists for deciding what level of cognitive engagement is high (and 
low). The actual cut points that I took here are arbitrary.  
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low levels of cognitive engagement to moderate their opposition of race-targeted 
policies when racial dispositions are relatively weak. Thus, among those who are 
low on the racism scale, moving from low to high level of cognitive engagement 
induces more support for race-targeted policies. 
DISCUSSION 
There are at least three noteworthy implications that warrant more 
discussion. First, expressing racial policy preferences is not only a function of 
racial predispositions but also a function of cognitive engagement. The greater 
cognitive engagement leads to more supports for race-targeted public policies. 
Second, racial predispositions are persevering, but they are neither 
immutably nor indelibly so. The impact of racial predispositions on racial policy 
preferences vary according to levels of cognitive engagement with the judgmental 
tasks. Racial predispositions are not a cross-cutting, dominant factor that drives 
racial policy preferences. More precisely, symbolic racism means different things 
to those who are more or less cognitively engaged in judgmental tasks regarding 
race matters as well as to liberals-Democrats and conservatives-Republicans.  
Third, previous models that do not take cognitive engagement into account 
when explaining racial policy preferences are at least under-specified and 
potentially misleading. Racial policy preferences of white Americans are better 
predicted when different levels of cognitive engagement with judgmental tasks 
are taken into account.  
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LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Laboratory studies have established that controlled forms of information 
processing or heightened attention to judgmental tasks is important for overriding 
an automatic, race-biased response. But this finding has never been corroborated 
by large-scale survey data. The analyses here benefit from something missing 
from previous experimental designs: external validity from a random, 
representative sample of the general population.  
The measure of cognitive engagement in the survey context I devised here 
is reasonably sound and functioned well, yet falls short of the requirements that 
some might find necessary. Indeed, for a better measure of cognitive engagement, 
we need to directly observe mental processes through which individuals engage in 
judgmental tasks to make political judgments. To confirm and extend the results 
reported here, I also have experimental data.  I now turn to the experimental 
design that allowed me to directly observe individual’s information processing 
and to measure cognitive engagement during information processing.   
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TABLE 3.1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
The 1996 NES      
Cognitive Engagement  
    (4 items; α = 0.453) 1,648 0.05 1 0.62 0.20 
Symbolic Racism  
    (2 items) 1,524 2 10 6.42 1.46 
Racial Stereotypes  
    (3 items; α = 0.831) 
1,446 3 21 11.57 3.02 
Party Identification 1,695 1 7 3.68 2.10 
Political Ideology 1,651 1 5 3.48 1.84 
Knowledge  
    (6 items; α = 0.607) 1,521 0 6 3.68 1.62 
Education 1,711 1 7 4.10 1.65 
Age 1,714 18 99 47.60 17.49 
South (dummy) 1,714 0 1   
Federal Assistance  1,269 1 7 4.69 1.62 
Affirmative Action  1,282 1 5 4.21 1.35 
The 2004 NES      
Cognitive Engagement 
     (4 items; α = 0.568) 1,155 0.12 1 0.64 0.18 
Symbolic Racism  
    (4 items; α = 0.781) 1,046 4 20 13.40 3.99 
Racial Stereotypes  
    (3 items; α = 0.802) 1,066 3 21 11.27 2.95 
Party Identification 1,195 1 7 3.88 2.09 
Political Ideology 1,156 1 5 3.37 1.88 
Knowledge  
    (5 items; α = 0.739) 1,066 1 5 2.89 1.61 
Education 1,212 0 7 4.30 1.61 
Age 1,212 18 90 47.27 17.14 
South (dummy) 1,212 0 1   
Federal Assistance  782 1 7 4.82 1.63 
Affirmative Action  744 1 5 4.35 1.14 
 
Source: The 1996 and 2004 National Election Studies. 
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TABLE 3.2. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COGNITIVE ENGAGEMENT 
AND OTHER FACTORS 
Factors The 1996 NES The 2004 NES 
   
Political Knowledge 0.093*** 0.171*** 
 (1,466) (1.017) 
   






   
Campaign Interest 0.239*** 0.255*** 
 (1,479) (1,017) 
   




   
Turnout 0.127*** 0.149*** 
 (1,479) (1,155) 
   
 
Notes: 1. Entries are Pearson correlation coefficients. 2. Valid number of cases is in parentheses.  
*** p < .001; **  p < .01; * p < .05. 
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TABLE 3.3. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE ITEMS 
INCORPORATED IN COGNITIVE ENGAGEMENT AND SYMBOLIC 
RACISM/RACIAL STEREOTYPES 
 









     







     







     







     







     







     
 
Notes: 1. Entries are Pearson correlation coefficients. 2. t-ratio is in parentheses. 








TABLE 3.4. THE IMPACT OF COGNITIVE ENGAGEMENT AND 
OTHER VARIABLES ON RACIAL POLICIES, POOLED DATA OF THE 
1996 AND 2004 NES 
 
 Federal Assistance Affirmative Action 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2) 
     







































































Adj. R2  0.177 0.235 0.112 0.153 
N 1816 1789 1860 1823 
     
Source: The 1996 and 2004 National Election Studies.  
Notes: 1. Entries are OLS regression coefficients with standard error in parentheses. 2. Positive sign 
indicates that higher values of the variables produce more opposition to the federal assistance to blacks 
and affirmative action. 3. Party Identification is coded 1 as Democrat, 3 as Independent, and 5 as 
Republican; Political Ideology is coded 1 as liberal, 3 as moderate, and 5 as conservative. 4. South and 
Male are dummy variables, coded 1 as south and male. 4. Political Knowledge was initially entered 
into the analysis, along with Cognitive Engagement. Significant effects were found but it is dropped 
for model simplicity.    
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; *p < .05. 
 
FIGURE 3.1. PREDICTED VALUES OF FEDERAL AID TO BLACKS 
FOR THOSE WHO BELONG TO HIGH AND LOW LEVELS OF 
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tes: 1. Federal Aid to Blacks is coded 1 as strong supporter and 7 as strong opponents. 2. 
mbolic Racism is coded 0 for non-racists and 20 for racists. 3. Those who are attentive (circle 
 gray dots) are more likely to support Federal Aid to Blacks if they hold the same level of 
mbolic Racism as those who are not attentive (square and black dots) do. 4.  Predicted 
ues are calculated based on Model (2).  
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FIGURE 3.2. PREDICTED VALUES OF PREFERENTIAL HIRING AND 
PROMOTION OF BLACKS FOR THOSE WHO BELONG TO HIGH AND 
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EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND DATA  
 
Our inability to directly observe an individual’s information processing 
has left many questions unaddressed. Only a few studies in political science have 
examined who actually acquires information and uses it in forming and changing 
political judgments. Lau and Redlawsk (2001, 2002; Lau 1995; Redlawsk 2003) 
deserve credit in this instance. They introduced the “process-tracing method” into 
political science and developed it to study citizens’ voting decisions. The process-
tracing method is based on the assumption that decision-making and judgments 
can best be studied by the data collected while decision-making and judgments 
are being produced (see Abelson and Levi 1985; Ford et al. 1989; Payne, 
Bettman, and Johnson 1993). This method enables researchers to directly identify 
what information is accessed and how long it is studied. This knowledge then can 
be used to make inferences about how acquisition of information affects 
subsequent political judgments (Ford et al. 1989; Mutz, Sniderman, and Brody 
1997; Geva et al. 2000; Lau and Redlawsk 1992; Taber and Steenbergen 1995).  
Relying on the process-tracing method, I conducted two experiments to 
estimate the determinant and consequence of acquisition of new information in 
forming policy judgments. Each experiment serves independently to accomplish 
distinct research goals, and both experiments work together to meet requirement 
for “pre-treatment and post-treatment test control group design” in which attitudes 
are measured before and after treatment (Campbell and Stanley 1963).  
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A first experiment (Experiment 1) was designed to examine the factors 
that drive variability in individuals’ cognitive efforts in seeking and processing 
the given information. A pre-treatment survey was performed to measure 
participant’s political and racial attitudes. Then participants were free to access 
the given information as much as they wanted, and their behaviors in information 
seeking were tracked and recorded. A total of 658 subjects were recruited from 16 
introductory government classes at The University of Texas at Austin (13 classes) 
and Austin Community College (3 classes). Data collected from this experiment 
are analyzed in Chapter 5.  
A second experiment (Experiment 2) was designed to estimate the impact 
of acquisition of new information on policy judgments. Contrary to Experiment 1, 
participants here were asked to first seek out information and then to complete a 
post-treatment survey. A total of 407 participants, recruited from four 
introductory government classes at The University of Texas at Austin, were 
assigned to the treatment—the two distinct sets of information—at random. A 
group of participants was exposed to the factual information about affirmative 
action programs. Another group of participants received the partisan information 
about affirmative action programs. From this experiment, I sought to identify and 
explain the distinct effect of the two sets of information, along with the effect of 
the different quantity in acquisition of the information, on policy judgments on 
affirmative action programs. Findings are reported in Chapter 6.  
In this chapter, I describe the two experiments in detail and discuss the 
characteristic features of the experiments—a web-based, online survey combined 
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with the computer-aided process-tracing method. Throughout the chapter, I call 
attention to how the data collected by the two experiments makes it possible to 
uncover unexplored aspects in the formation of whites’ policy judgments on 
affirmative action programs.  
PARTICIPANTS 
A total of 1,065 undergraduate students participated in the two 
experiments from May to October 2005. Table 4.1 shows the number of 
participants across each of the 20 classes.  
In Experiment 1, 658 participants were recruited, and the number of white 
participants was 302 (46%). Participants were evenly divided by sex, and the 
average age was 20. Among the white participants who identified themselves with 
political parties, Republicans numbered 42%, Democrats 39%, and independents 
19%. And, conservatives numbered 26%, liberals 39%, and moderates 36%. 
Other characteristics of the participants are presented in Table 4.2.  
In Experiment 2, 407 participants were recruited, and the number of white 
participants was 177 (43.5%). Among white participants, 92 (51%) participants 
received partisan information and 85 (49%) participants received factual 
information. There was no significant difference in terms of sex, and the average 
age was 20. Among white respondents who identified themselves with political 
parties, Republicans numbered 45%, Democrats 38%, and independents 17%. 
And, conservatives numbered 31%, liberals 38%, and moderates 31%. Other 
characteristics of the participants are presented in Table 4.3. 
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This convenience sample showed substantial variance on key attitudinal 
characteristics.  
PROCEDURES 
The courses’ instructors announced the experiments to the class during 
lecture by giving students the web address where students could participate on 
their own time using the internet. Students who decided to participate in the 
experiment accessed the experiment’s web site, using their own internet-
connected computers at their convenience. When participants opened up the first 
page of the experimental site, they were given the general instructions for the 
experimental tasks.  
Each experiment consisted of two sessions, an “information session” and a 
“survey session.” In the survey session, subjects were asked to complete a fairly 
standard questionnaire designed to measure their political and racial attitudes. The 
wording of the questionnaire is presented in Appendix 4.A. In the information 
session, subjects were exposed to a series of information regarding affirmative 
action programs and could learn about the issue by clicking the label of the 
information they personally chose to explore. I tracked and recorded subjects’ 
behaviors of seeking information by using computer programs. I will discuss 
details of the information provided and the technique I took for tracing subjects’ 
activities of information seeking later in this chapter.  
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MANIPULATION OF EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENT 
Experimental stimuli, a series of the information about affirmative action 
programs, were manipulated in two ways for three randomly assigned groups. 
First, I varied the order of the two sessions in Experiments 1 and 2. Subjects in 
Experiment 1 were asked to complete the survey before they were exposed to the 
experimental treatment, while subjects in Experiment 2 were asked to complete 
the survey after they were exposed to the experimental treatment. Experiments 1 
and 2 can be diagramed as follows. 
 
Random Assignment Pre-treatment Test Treatment 
Post-treatment 
Test 
Experiment 1:  
Control Group 
Yes Partisan and Factual Information† No 
Experiment 2: 
Treatment Group 1 No Partisan  Information Yes 
Experiment 2: 
Treatment Group 2 No Factual Information Yes 
 
† Subjects in this group had the information session. Yet this information session was a dummy 
session because attitudes were measured before subjects were exposed to treatment. Subjects’ 
behaviors in the information session can be explained in terms of attitudinal variables measured in 
the pre-treatment survey session. 
 
As is illustrated, the survey responses in Experiment 1 were measured 
from a pre-treatment test and thus were not affected by experimental treatment, 
while the survey responses in Experiment 2 were measured from a post-treatment 
test and thus were supposed to be affected by experimental stimuli. Given this 
experimental setting, the effect of the treatment on the policy judgments on 
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affirmative action programs can be calculated by the comparison between the pre-
treatment test score in Experiment 1 and the average of the post-treatment test 
scores in the two treatment groups in Experiment 2. Additionally, Experiment 1 
made it possible to estimate the effect of political and racial attitudes on 
information seeking behaviors by regressing pre-treatment test scores of political 
and racial attitudes on information seeking behaviors.  
Second, subjects in Experiment 2 were randomly assigned into two groups. 
Subjects in each group were provided with different sets of information, partisan 
and factual information. Subjects exposed to the factual information regarding 
affirmative action programs read the introduction that follows 
Many believe that substantive, factual knowledge is essential to make a sound, 
rational decision. Here are Statistics of Lives of African Americans, Historical 
Origins of Affirmative Action Programs (AAP), Must-know Rulings of the 
Supreme Court on AAP, and Recent Events regarding AAP.  
 
Subjects exposed to the partisan information about affirmative action programs 
read the instructions that follow 
A shortcut to posit yourself on policy issues is to look at the positions of 
reference groups or individuals who you can trust. Here are ideas, arguments, 
and perspectives of the Presidents and prominent Politicians, Public Interest 
Groups, the Political Parties, and Public Opinion Polls.  
 
With the random assignment of subjects into the two groups with the two 
different types of experimental stimuli, the effects of different types of 
information can be estimated by the comparison between the post-treatment test 
scores in the two groups. Also, the effects of information seeking can be 
estimated by the comparison between the pre-treatment test score in Experiment 1 
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(as a test score of the control group) and the post-treatment test scores in 
Experiment 2 (as a test score of the treatment group).   
Experiment 1 does not seem like a typical experiment by itself in the sense 
that there is no randomization of the sample or manipulation of stimuli. Yet, 
survey responses in Experiment 1 function as the pre-treatment test score, which 
can be compared with the post-treatment test score in Experiment 2. And, the 
information session in Experiment 1 was not a necessary component for the study 
of the consequence of information seeking in policy judgments, but it made it 
possible to examine how an individual subject sought out the given information 
and how political and racial attitudes measured prior to information seeking are 
responsible for the variation in individuals’ information seeking behaviors.   
BRIEFING DOCUMENTS AS EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENT 
Subjects were provided with a great amount of information about 
affirmative action programs through the experimental web sites. The briefing 
documents in Experiment 1 consisted of 40 web pages under eight labels. Among 
them, 20 web pages contained the partisan information and another 20 web pages 
contained the factual information. And, each label had four to six sub-web 
pages.18 The partisan and the factual information were presented in different color 
schemes to help subjects recognize that they were given two different kinds of 
 
18 Each label had the following number of sub web pages: the arguments/perspectives of the 
Presidents and prominent politicians (5 pages), of the public interest groups (5 pages), of the two 
political parties (5 pages), the public opinion polls (5 pages), statistics of lives of African 
Americans (6 pages), historical origins of affirmative action programs (5 pages), must-know 
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information: Green for the partisan information and orange for the factual 
information.  
Subjects in the two groups in Experiment 2 were provided with 20 web 
pages under four labels, respectively. One group was provided with the partisan 
information and the other group was provided with the factual information. A full 
script of the briefing documents was presented in Appendix 4.B. 
MOTIVATIONAL CUES 
Evidence shows that very simple instructions like “Think about the issue 
at hand as if you were a responsible public official” facilitates cognitive 
engagement with the issue (Kuklinski et al. 2001). To invoke increased 
involvement in the given information, I provided several motivational cues that 
underscored (1) the importance of the issue of affirmative action programs, (2) the 
conceptual ambiguity regarding affirmative action programs, (3) the general 
ignorance of American citizens about race matters, (4) some hard questions on the 
nature of economic and social inequality between the races and the effectiveness 
and the nature of affirmative action programs, and  (5) a special request to think 
about the issue as a responsible public official. The instructions were as follows:  
Affirmative action has been one of the most controversial policy issues in the 
U.S. The issue has historically been, and continues to be, plagued by ambiguity 
surrounding the concept and by the manner in which the various policies have 
been implemented. This is primarily because since the 1970s there have been 
many different kinds of affirmative action regulations, programs, 
understandings, and purposes.  
 
 
rulings of the Supreme Court on affirmative action (4 pages) and recent events regarding 
affirmative action (5 pages).  
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It might be easy to answer the question of whether to support or oppose AAP. 
But it might NOT be easy to explain to others about what one knows about 
them. According to a study, approximately 40 percent of people are completely 
unfamiliar with the concept of Affirmative Action; and many of those who 
claimed familiarity provide a vague or inaccurate definition. This study indicates 
that many people do not have knowledge about AAP, and that they lack 
opportunity to acquire information to enlarge their knowledge and sharpen their 
rationale for or against AAP.  
 
As you access the websites here, we want you to try to think about the following 
questions: Do the nature and magnitude of continuing economic and social 
inequality between the races require concerted public and private action, or are 
natural forces in the economy satisfactorily narrowing the gaps? Do race-based 
discrimination and exclusion continue to be important factors in American life, 
affecting the opportunities and welfare of blacks and other minorities, or are 
they not aberrant and insubstantial? Is affirmative action effective in combating 
discrimination and exclusion? Is it consistent with inviolable principles in the 
U.S.? 
 
You can best answer the survey questions when you are more informed and 
imagine yourself as a responsible public official. Feel free to think and take time 
while processing information and answering the survey questions.  
 
Given the length of the motivational cues, it is important to identify who 
paid more or less attention to them. I measured the time span that an 
individual participant expended in reading them, which turned out to vary 
across individuals.  
COMPUTER-AIDED PROCESS TRACING METHOD  
To accurately represent or describe the mental mechanisms of individuals’ 
decision-making process requires a methodology that captures their activity 
during the decision process, without constraining their ability to drive the process. 
Process-tracing methods allow the study of issues that have not been previously 
explored, in this instance acquisition of new information. Acquisition of the 
information was identified and recorded by computer programs. I used 
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ColdFusion19 commands and functions to enable the extension of standard HTML 
file with database commands. More precisely, by using ColdFusion, I wrote and 
put ColdFusion tags,20 which were invisible to respondents but functioned to 
identify the time and the web pages that a subject hit and transfer them in a 
database server (MS SQL server) I designated, into the HTML21 texts of the 
experimental web site. 
Respondents started with an introduction screen (see Figure a in Appendix 
4.B) linked to a main menu screen (see Figures b, c, and d in Appendix 4.B). To 
acquire the information about affirmative action programs a respondent had to 
click on the label of the information to enter into the specific information screen. 
Each label was linked to the specific information regarding certain aspects of 
affirmative action programs, as well as a small section that displayed the options 
in the main menu Thus respondents could keep seeking the information by 
clicking the options at their convenience. The clicks that a respondent made and 
the time she clicked were captured in the database server.  
My measurement of information processing is thus a direct estimation of 
the actual activities of the subjects—a behavioral measure22—rather than self-
reported one. Scholars warn of measurement-induced distortions of self-reported 
 
19 ColdFusion is a development tool that enables the creation of interactive, dynamic, and 
information-rich Web sites. ColdFusion can communicate with databases or spreadsheets and 
extract information to dynamically create Web pages.  
20 Tags mean commanding codes used in ColdFusion.  
21 HTML (hypertext markup language) refers to the document format used on the Web. Web 
pages are built with HTML tags (codes) embedded in the text. HTML defines the page layout, 
fonts and graphic elements as well as the hypertext links to other documents on the Web.  
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beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors relating to social desirability23 (e.g., Campbell 
and Stanley 1966; Cook and Campbell 1979; Runkel and McGrath 1972). 
Behavioral measures are relatively free from social desirability bias. My position 
should not be taken as an overall indictment of self-reported measures of attitude 
and behavior. Instead, I contend that behavioral measures are less likely to mis-
specify actual use of new information, thus undermining attempts to observe 
subsequent effects. I do not intend to argue that my measure of information 
processing adopted in this research estimates a whole array of information 
processing. Like any new measures, my measure has some bugs that must be 
worked out (I will discuss them later in this chapter). Nonetheless, as a new 
measure for exploring information search and process, it offers an exciting new 
avenue for studying how new information is gathered and how it is used in policy 
judgments.  
DEPENDENT MEASURES 
The Dependent Variable in Experiment 1 
The dependent variable in Experiment 1 is cognitive engagement, which 
was measured in two folds. In one way, cognitive engagement with the 
information available from the environment might be either effortful/time-
consuming or effortless/time-saving (Tyler et al. 1979; Chaiken and Trope 1999). 
                                                                                                                                     
22 “Behavioral measure” refers to a measure that experimenters can “directly observe the behavior 
of subjects by, for example, videotaping them and later examining the tapes for characteristics 
such as facial expressions or tendency to dominate in a group” (McDermott 2002, 35). 
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In this regard, “time” for seeking and processing new information to make 
political judgments is a natural characteristic of individuals’ cognitive 
engagement with judgmental tasks. The more time a subject expends in seeking 
and processing the information, the more should he or she be cognitively involved 
with the issue. I estimated the time expended by an individual subject in seeking 
and processing the given information, measured in seconds (search time).  
A proper technique to measure the extent to which individuals committed 
themselves to acquire new information available from the environment was hard 
to come by. It is not surprising that my measure of cognitive engagement with 
new information is among the few used. Lau and Redlawsk examine the decision 
rules employed by voters, measuring the information search undertaken during a 
simulated campaign. They contend that “particular information search patterns 
imply specific decision rules and can be identified by three key search process 
measures” (Redlawsk 2004; see also Lau 1995; 2003; Lau and Redlawsk 2001a, 
2001b). The three key search process measures are depth of search (the time 
subjects spent searching for information, the amount of available relevant 
information actually considered, the amount of distinct attributes considered, and 
the amount of alternatives (candidates) considered), the comparability of 
alternatives under consideration (the extent to which a voter gathers the same 
information about all relevant candidates), and the sequence of search (the order 
in which information is accessed). 
 
23 Social desirability bias refers to “systematic error in self-report measures resulting from the 
desire of respondents to avoid embarrassment and project a favorable image to others” (Fisher 
1993, 303) 
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Among the three key search process measures, the depth of search, which 
can be deep or shallow, indicates more or less the cognitive effort to seek and 
process the given information. In depth of search, Lau and Redlawsk focus on the 
amount of the information considered, assuming that the more the amount of the 
information considered, the deeper or more comprehensive the information 
seeking. In this regard, Lau and Redlawsk’s measure of depth of search is 
compatible with my measure of cognitive engagement, search time.  
The two measures, depth of search and search time, have different 
strategies to estimate cognitive engagement, focusing on the amount of the 
information contacted and the time spent in processing the information, 
respectively. Of course, the two measures are interdependent or covary: The 
longer the time for seeking the information, the more the information considered. 
Indeed, the amount of information considered and the time spent are statistically 
significantly correlated (Pearson r = 0.717,  p < 0.000) in my data.24 The 
question is which one can better identify who actually gets the information. Only 
people who in fact acquire the information can use it in forming and changing 
their political evaluations. The measure based on the amount of the information 
contacted, whatever its other virtues, does not do a good job of discriminating 
“acquisition” of information. Acquisition of information requires not only 
contacting with the information but also attending to the information. And the 
 
24 More precisely, correlation coefficient of the two variables in Experiment 1 is 0.735 and that in 
Experiment 2 is 0.704. Both are statistically significant at p < 0.000. Descriptive statistics show 
that participants in Experiment 1 viewed 12.06 pages on average out of 48 pages, spending 8’28” 
(read 8 minutes and 28 seconds), and participants in Experiment 2 viewed 9.04 pages on average 
out of 24 pages, spending 7’51”.   
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latter can best be measured by the time spent in seeking and processing the 
information. Thus researchers who rely on the measure based on the amount of 
the information contacted are likely to understate the impact of acquisition of the 
information on individuals’ opinion formation. 
Now let me turn to discuss another aspect of cognitive engagement, the 
type of information considered. Individuals who adopt systematic and central 
information processing pay attention to information content or the factual 
information; while individuals who take the heuristic and peripheral information 
processing rely on rules of thumb and global belief systems, such as heuristics, 
stereotypes, schemas, or the partisan information (Chaiken 1987; Chen and 
Chaiken 1999; Petty and Cacioppo 1986). Then, the type of information accessed 
by subjects when they were free to choose the information that they wanted to 
acquire or they thought they lacked is another critical characteristic of cognitive 
engagement. I estimated the type of information considered by an individual 
subject in seeking and processing the given information, measured in percent of 
the partisan information (type of information). 
The Dependent Variable in Experiment 2 
The dependent variable in Experiment 2 is how subjects understand 
affirmative action programs. Affirmative action has been, and is, one of the most 
controversial policy issues in the United States, and there have been, and are, 
many definitions and understandings of it (Pennington and Hastie 1986; Gamson 
and Modigliani 1987; Gamson 1992; Levi and Fried 1994). Indeed, contrary to 
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popular discourse that likely treats affirmative action in blanket terms, there 
seems to be no single concept of affirmative action that is currently being held in 
political circles and among ordinary citizens. Rather, supporters and opponents of 
affirmative action are in many cases arguing about very different, and ultimately 
incompatible, programs (Reyna et al. 2005; Steeh and Krysan 1996). To ask 
survey respondents whether to support or oppose affirmative action is to leave 
indeterminate what the respondent is in fact responding to.  
Reflecting this complex situation, survey researchers have varied question 
wordings and contextual conditions in which affirmative action programs are 
applied in their attempts to capture public opinion on affirmative action.25 They 
find that the variations in question wordings and contextual conditions influences 
overall support for affirmative action policy (Stoker 1998; Sniderman and Piazza 
1993; Sniderman and Carmines 1997; Hochschild 2000; Steeh and Krysan 1996). 
Little research, however, has been devoted to directly exploring what citizens 
think of appropriate applications of affirmative action programs (see Reyna et al. 
2005).  
 
25 Sears and his colleagues measure respondents’ reactions to a single item/wording, “affirmative 
action.” Sniderman, Crosby, and Howell (2000) use the series of National Election Studies (NES) 
questions, which include the word “preferences” for the query about jobs and (in some years) the 
word “quota” for the query about college admissions. Sniderman (Sniderman and Piazza 1993) 
uses the word “quota” in the question about admissions and the phrase “law to ensure that a 
certain number of federal contracts go to minority contractors” in the question about set-asides in 
his 1986 Race and Politics Survey. His 1991 Race and Politics Study (Sniderman and Carmines 
1997) asks “if companies should be required to give a certain number of jobs to blacks.” Finally, 
Stoker (1998) varied the circumstances in which racial quotas in hiring and college admission are 
to be implemented. In “context-free” condition, the question was “do you think that large 
companies should be required to give certain number of jobs to blacks, or should the government 
stay out of this?” In “underrepresentation” context, the same question was put into the contest like 
“there are some large companies where blacks are underrepresented” And in “discrimination” 
context, the same question was put into the context like “there are some large companies with 
employment policies that discriminate against blacks.” 
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I measured how individuals understand affirmative action, asking the 
following question: what would you think is the best understanding of affirmative 
action programs? And, the response options:  
(1) = Correction of the effects of past discrimination (15.3% of 
respondents selected this option);  
(2) = Prohibition of future and current discrimination (25.3%);  
(3) = Promotion of diversity or inclusion (27.6%);  
(4) = Violation against the merit or desert principle (8.2%);  
(5) = Reverse discrimination against bystanders (11.8%); and  
(6) = Quota system (11.8%).  
 
The six alternative understandings of affirmative action programs include the 
major political frames that have been or are prevalent in political communication 
(see Gamson 1992; Gamson and Modigliani 1987; Fine 1992; Summers 1995; 
also see, for a broad review, Hutchings and Valentino 2004).  
Options of 1, 2 and 3 are liberal understandings of affirmative action 
programs (or are framed in liberal ways), and the options of 4, 5, and 6 are 
conservative understandings of affirmative action programs (or are framed in 
conservative ways). In the analysis, the options of 1, 2, and 3 were coded as 1 (= 
liberal understandings of affirmative action programs), and the options of 4, 5, 
and 6 were coded as 0 (=conservative understandings of affirmative action 
programs).   
ONLINE EXECUTION OF EXPERIMENTS 
The two online experiments were executed. A survey questionnaire and a 
briefing document were provided via experimental website.  From a participants’ 
perspective, a web-based, online experiment reduces the inconvenience and 
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opportunity costs of participation. Subjects did not have to convene in a particular 
place at a particular time. Instead, subjects could carry out the experimental and 
survey tasks any time they wanted and anywhere an Internet-ready computer was 
available. In this regard, it is worth noting that face-to-face Deliberative Polling 
recently was converted to online Deliberative Polling (Iyengar et al. 2003). Iyengar 
et al. (2003) note that  
the online process offers greatly improved metrics for determining exactly what 
the participants are doing, what aspects of the experimental  treatment they are 
making use of, which parts of the briefing documents or the answers to questions 
they are reading. Hence online Deliberative Polling opens up new possibilities for 
understanding the mediators of the treatment effects (what exactly is causing the 
opinion changes), and whether there are inequalities in participation in specific 
aspects of the process (21).  
 
My experiments share the same strengths/benefits as the online Deliberative 
Polling offers (I discuss the additional strengths of my experiments with reference 
to online Deliberative Polling in Appendix 4.C).    
The process-tracing method generally provides subjects with the briefing 
documents about the issue at hand in matrix format26 (Redlawsk 2001, 2002; Lau 
and Redlawsk 1992, 2002; Lau 1995). I provided subjects with the briefing 
documents in the website format as any websites on the Internet (see Appendix 
4.B that presents the web sites used for the experiments to provide relevant 
information about affirmative action programs). Thus, my briefing documents 
must be user-friendly given that many people have become familiar with the web 
search for information seeking and gathering. I expect that this user-friendly 
 
26 Matrix format refers to a table of m columns by n rows, in which each cell has a label of the 
information. Subjects can see the information by clicking the label in the cell of the table.   
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experimental setting leads to fewer unintended, instrumental errors than other 
experimental settings do.  
On the other hand, there may be some problems associated with 
managerial supervision of the subjects’ conduct in seeking and processing the 
given information during the experiments. One problem is idling, by which I 
mean inattentive or less attentive participation in the task of the information 
search while doing other things at the same time, like talking on the phone or 
listening to music, or intermittent computing, like stopping computing to take a 
break, go to the toilet, etc. This can be detrimental because measuring the time 
expended in information seeking is critical in testing the hypotheses. One way to 
control idling is to instruct subjects not to be idle when they are doing the 
experimental task, i.e., information seeking (although it is relatively permissible 
when they answer the survey questions). Another way is to look closely at the 
data collected to identify any idling time and, if any exists, do some data 
cleansing. For example, each web page consists of around 300 to 500 words, and 
it should not take more than, for instance, 5 minutes to read them all. Thus, if a 
participant spends more than 5 minutes on a web page, it can be considered idling. 
This kind of data cleansing or after experiment data adjustment is quite possible 
because the time span that each subject expended on each web page is recorded. I 
found that a few participants actually idled during the information session. After a 
close examination of the cases of idled information seeking, I dropped them from 
the data set. Therefore, the data that I analyzed is free from the measurement error 
related to idling in information seeking and processing.    
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Finally, heterogeneous individual conditions for the computing 
environment, like computer and network speed, and heterogeneous individual 
skills in web surfing also may matter because these influence the search time of 
each subject. However, the time span is not measured in milliseconds, but simply 
seconds. I believe there is no significant effect in terms of seconds because of 
slow computer or network speed or low levels of web-search skills. Overall, 
individual variation in information seeking depends reliably on theoretical factors 
rather than instrumental ones.  
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Experiment 1     
Class 1 43 14 (32.6) 07’43” May 5-14, 2005 
Class 2 31 17 (54.8) 12’01” May 1-5, 2005 
Class 3 34 12 (35.3) 06’00” May 5-14, 2005 
Class 4 53 18 (34.0) 09’16” May 1-11, 2005 
Class 5 9 6 (66.7) 09’53” May 1-7, 2005 
Class 6 10 6 (60.0) 06’21” May 5-14, 2005 
Class 7  46 28 (60.9) 08’38” October , 2005 
Class 8  31 23 (74.2) 11’19” October , 2005 
Class 9 26 19 (73.1) 10’53” October , 2005 
Class 10 33 11 (33.3) 06’19” October , 2005 
Class 11 36 20 (55.6) 07’15” October , 2005 
Class 12 46 29 (63.0) 10’12” October , 2005 
Class 13 5 2 (40.0) 19’16” July 1-7, 2005 
Class 14 78 27 (34.6) 06’45” July 1-7, 2005 
Class 15 50 19 (38.0) 05’52” July 6-7, 2005  
Class 16 127 51 (40.2) 08’15” July 1-7, 2005 
Total 658 302 (45.9) 08’28”  
Experiment 2     
Class 1 85 39 (45.1) 07’20” October , 2005 
Class 2 51 24 (47.1) 08’53” October , 2005 
Class 3 149 66 (44.3) 07’39” October , 2005 
Class 4 122 48 (39.3) 08’02” October , 2005 
Total 407 177 (43.5) 07’51”  
 
Notes: Mean of search time is based on white participants.  
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TABLE 4.2. SUMMARY OF SAMPLE CHARCTERISTICS IN 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 
 N % 
Party Identification   
Democrat 71 39.2 
Independent 35 19.3 
Republican 75 41.4 
Political Ideology   
Liberal 112 38.6 
Moderate 104 35.9 
Conservative 74 25.5 
Liberal/Conservative Understanding of Affirmative Action 
Liberal View  196 71.0 
Conservative View 80 29.0 
General Political Knowledge (7 items; α = 0.409): Mean = 5.45; 
Std. Dev. = 1.23 
Race-Specific Knowledge (7 items; α = 0.480): Mean = 2.48; Std. 
Dev. = 1.63 
Political Interest (4 items; α = 0.710): Mean = 2.46; Std. Dev. = 
0.900 
Affective Feelings toward Blacks (Feeling Thermometer): Mean = 
62.19;  Std. Dev. = 28.57 
Search Time: Mean = 08’28” Std. Dev. = 11’16” 
Log of Search Time: Mean = 5.324; Std. Dev. = 1.485 
 
Notes: Entries are based on white participants.  
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TABLE 4.3. SUMMARY OF SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS IN 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
 Partisan Information Condition 
Factual Information 
Condition 
White Sample Only  N % N % 
Party Identification     
Democrat 11 29.4 24 52.2 
Independent 11 20.6 5 10.9 
Republican 25 50.0 17 37.0 
Political Ideology     
Liberal 31 34.4 33 32.9 
Moderate 33 36.7 20 31.4 
Conservative 26 28.9 26 30.8 
Liberal/Conservative Understanding 
 of Affirmative Action 
Liberal View  63 71.6 53 64.6 
Conservative View 25 28.4 29 35.4 
General Political Knowledge  
(7 items; α = 0.444) 
Mean = 5.63;  
Std. Dev. = 1.26 
Mean = 5.49;  
Std. Dev. = 1.15 
Race-Specific Knowledge  
(7 items; α = 0.490) 
Mean = 2.18;  
Std. Dev. = 1.35 
Mean = 3.29; 
 Std. Dev. = 1.95 
Political Interest  
(4 items; α = 0.715) 
Mean = 2.56;  
Std. Dev. = 0.87 
Mean = 2.58;  
Std. Dev. = 0.85 
Affective Feelings toward Blacks 
(Feeling Thermometer) 
Mean = 60.17;  
Std. Dev. = 24.67 
Mean = 56.34;  
Std. Dev. = 32.36 
Racism  
(6 items; α = 0.760) 
Mean = 17.539; 
Std. Dev. = 3.761 
Mean = 17.957; 
Std. Dev. = 4.732 
Search Time  
 
Mean = 06’55”;  
Std. Dev. = 08’48” 
Mean = 08’52”;  
Std. Dev. = 10’49” 
Log of Search Time Mean = 2.189;  
Std. Dev. = 0.637 
Mean = 2.377;  
Std. Dev. = 0.692 
 
Notes: 1. Race-specific knowledge is significantly different in the partisan and the factual 
information conditions. ANOVA reveals F (1, 175) = 19.52, p < .0000. 
2. Other variables are not significantly different between the two experimental groups.    









WHO ACQUIRES WHAT TYPE OF INFORMATION 
 
Individuals’ use of the information available from the environment may 
vary. Some individuals actively seek out new information and reflect on policy 
issues to perform judgmental tasks, while others just rely upon their global 
attitudes for judgmental tasks. Types of the information on which individuals rely 
also may vary. Some individuals refer to information shortcuts or partisan cues, 
while others count on non-partisan, or “encyclopedic,” information for 
judgmental tasks. These postulations appear plausible, yet await empirical 
corroboration.  
To estimate the variability in individuals’ use of information, it is 
necessary to develop a methodology or technique that allows us to track down and 
record individuals’ behavior of information seeking and processing while they are 
being exposed to information. Scholars have developed techniques for studying 
information-acquisition processing, which fall under the generic fabric of 
“process-tracing methodology” (Ford et al. 1989; Jacoby et al. 1987; Lau 1995; 
Lau and Redlawsk 1997, 2001a, 2001b). Process-tracing methodology makes it 
possible to collect data on which information is considered and how long it is 
considered while the decision is being made. It helps us to identify the cognitive 
components in the formation of political judgments and thereby to draw practical 
implications for more informed citizenry.  
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My purpose in this chapter is to estimate the variability of individuals’ use 
of new information in terms of time expended and type of information considered 
in information search and account for it. Based on original data collected from the 
experiment described in Chapter 4, I examine the extent to which white 
Americans expend time and effort to learn about the issues of race. I also examine 
the type of information that individuals prefer when they are free to choose it.  
DATA AND MEASURES 
A total of 658 students at The University of Texas at Austin were recruited 
for this study from late September to mid-October of 2005. Among them, 302 
(45.9%) were whites and 356 were non-whites and Hispanics. The following 
analyses focused solely on white participants. All the details of experimental 
design for this study were presented in Chapter 4.   
Dependent Measures 
The dependent variable is the time expended by an individual subject in 
seeking and processing the given information, measured in seconds (search time). 
This measure is a proxy that estimates how much cognitive attention an individual 
subject paid to the issue at hand in seeking and processing the information. In the 
analysis, search time was log transformed, which corrects the skewed distribution 
into a normal one.  
As another dependent variable, I measured the types of information an 
individual subject accessed when she was free to choose either the partisan or the 
factual information (type of information). Type of information was operationalized 
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as percent of the partisan information considered among all the information 
considered. It ranged from 0 (no partisan information considered) to 100 (only 
partisan information considered).  
Independent Variables 
 
As independent variables, I included political predispositions, such as 
party identification, political ideology, political knowledge, and political interest. 
For these variables, I utilize the same standard question wordings as the NES 
tapped. I also included affective feelings toward blacks and views on affirmative 
action programs. Affective attitudes toward blacks were measured by the 100-
point feeling thermometer toward blacks as used in the NES, where 0 means that 
respondents feel negatively towards blacks and 100 means that respondents feel 
positively towards blacks. And, views on affirmative action programs were 
initially measured with six answer opinions and then recoded 0 for liberal position 
and 1 for conservative position. A complete description of the question wordings 
of the independent variables is presented in the Appendix 5.A.  
WHO ACQUIRES MORE INFORMATION 
I hypothesize that political and racial dispositions direct individuals either 
to actively seek information or to avoid engaged information seeking. 
Party Identification. Party identification is an overarching frame by which 
people formulate political judgments. It also is a standing commitment when 
citizens try to make sense of the swirling confusions of politics (Campbell, 
Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida 1989; Nie, 
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Verba, and Petrocik 1979; Page and Brody 1972; Rabinowitz and MacDonald 
1989). In addition, according to the issue ownership theory, political parties own 
their policy issues. For instance, the Democratic Party is known as the party best 
able to deal with issues of education, welfare, and civil rights, whereas the 
Republican Party is generally considered the party most competent at handling 
foreign affairs, national defense, and crime (Petrocik 1996; Budge and Farlie 
1983; see also Alesina 1988; Bowler 1990). Given the argument that race has 
been, and is, an issue owned by the Democratic Party and that party identification 
is a funnel in shaping policy judgments, it seems reasonable to expect that 
Democrats are more likely than Republicans and independents to have concerns 
about their own issue, affirmative action programs, and likely engage in 
information seeking about it. 
Political Ideology. Many Americans do not truly understand what 
“liberal” and “conservative” means (Converse 1964; Kinder 1983; Neuman 1986; 
Smith 1989; Deli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Yet, “Americans think of politics in 
terms of groups, and liberals and conservatives are two such reference groups 
orienting politics for ordinary citizens” (Globetti 2002, 5; see also Hochschild 
1981). It is quite safe to say, therefore, that although American citizens are not 
ideologues at all, many of them think of policy issues in ideological terms. 
Considering that racial issues have been characterized and framed by liberal 
ideology (Edsall and Edsall 1991; Carmines and Stimson 1989), liberals tend to 
care about the issues that belong to their turf while conservatives tend to less care 
about typical liberal issues.  
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Affective Attitudes toward Blacks.  It is quite well established that 
positive affect can cue attention and motivate deeper information processing (and 
less heuristic processing) (see Taber 2003). Likewise, those who hold positive 
attitudes toward blacks are expected to pay more attention to racial issues and 
thus expend more time in seeking information about affirmative action programs. 
By the same token, those who hold negative attitudes toward blacks are expected 
to pay less attention to racial issues and thus expend less time in seeking 
information about affirmative action programs.   
Views on Affirmative Action Programs. The theory of racism posits that 
policy preferences on racial issues can be explained mostly by anti-black attitudes 
(Sears et al. 2000; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Federico and Sidanius 2002). That 
is, racial policy preferences are driven by gut-level feelings rather than by 
reasoned judgments based on a fair amount of relevant information (Carmines and 
Stimson 1989). If this theory holds, individuals who view affirmative action 
programs in conservative ways are less likely than those who view affirmative 
action programs in liberal ways to care about the issue by expending time and 
effort to learn about the issue.  
General Political Knowledge. By general political knowledge I refer to the 
range of factual information about politics, which is stored in long-term memory. 
General political knowledge is a result of long-term interest and attention to 
politics as well as the opportunity to get involved in politics and the ability to 
understand the complexity of politics (Luskin 1987; Delli Carpini and Keeter 
1996). According to Zaller (1992), cognitive engagement and political knowledge 
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(or Zaller’s political awareness) are meant to convey the same thing. Furthermore, 
Zaller (1992) asserts that “persons who are knowledgeable about politics in 
general are habitually attentive to communications on most particular issues as 
well” (43). This assertion is rather speculative. Higher levels of general political 
knowledge may not necessarily make people more attentive to information. Those 
with higher levels of political knowledge may not feel it necessary to seek out 
more information because they already know a lot; and those with low levels of 
political knowledge may not feel it necessary to acquire information as they have 
never done so before. I test if those with higher levels of general political 
knowledge tend to expend more time in information seeking. 
Issue-relevant Knowledge. Issue-relevant knowledge, or domain-specific 
knowledge, is a direct consequence of long-term interest in and attention to the 
specific issue. Issue-relevant knowledge plays a bigger role than in general 
political knowledge in predicting use of information on that issue. I expect the 
same results in issue-relevant knowledge as expected general political knowledge: 
those with higher levels of issue-relevant knowledge tend to expend more time in 
information seeking. 
Political Interest. Many citizens do not care about politics. Citizen apathy 
may well be a rational allocation of limited resources (Downs 1957; Fiske and 
Taylor 1991). Given the cost of information acquisition and the paltry expected 
payoff of it, rational individuals do not expend cognitive effort to acquire political 
information. It is reasonable to expect, however, that differences in interest in 
politics induce variability in information acquisition (see Chaiken 1980; Petty and 
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Cacioppo 1981, 1986; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Price and Zaller 1993). That is, 
when people lack interest in politics, they do a minimal analysis of the policy 
issues and rely heavily on global beliefs or attitudes. They give up accuracy to 
avoid effort and stress. On the other hand, when people are interested in politics, 
they do the highest or optimal level of analysis of policy issues and may try to 
update their beliefs or attitudes by acquiring currently available information. All 
this having been said, I expect that levels of political interest will be responsible 
for levels of paying attention to relevant information. The more individuals are 
interested in politics, the more attention and time they expend to acquire relevant 
information.   
The Determinants of Search Time 
Let me begin with the descriptive statistics of my dependent variable, 
search time. Figure 5.1 shows that individuals’ use of information in terms of 
search time varies, ranging from 00’03” (read 0 minute and 3 seconds) to 54’52”, 
with a mean of 08’28”, standard deviation of 11’16”, and median of 03’34”. It also 
shows that the distribution of search time is significantly skewed with a long right 
tail (Skewness = 1.789; Standard Error of Skewness = 0.144).27  
The cumulative distribution of search time, as displayed in Figure 5.2, 
shows that 33% of participants expended less than 01’30”, whereas 25% of 
participants expended more than 13’00”. Thus, many participants were reluctant to 
                                                 
27 In general, a skewness value more than twice its standard error is taken to indicate a departure 
from symmetry.
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care to know about the issue. But, on the other hand, among those who belonged 
to the top 25% in search time, information seeking exponentially increases.  
Data also revealed that search time varies in terms of individual political 
predispositions. First, Republicans expended less time (06’24”) than Democrats 
did (11’35”). The difference is statistically significant (t = 2.902, p = 0.004). An 
analysis of variance reveals a statistically significant difference among 
Democrats, Republicans, and Independents (F (2, 181) = 4.035, p = 0.019). 
Similarly, Conservatives expended significantly less time (05’41”) than liberals 
(09’47”) (t = 2.585, p = 0.011) and moderates (09’30”) did. The differences among 
conservatives, liberals, and moderates are also statistically significant (F (2, 276) 
= 3.317, p = 0.038). Considering that affirmative action is a Democratic and 
liberal issue, it is not surprising that Democrats and liberals did want to know 
more about the issue than Republicans and conservatives did. 
Second, general political knowledge is positively related to information 
seeking. As levels of general political knowledge increases, search time increases 
from 06’17” (for those in the bottom 25% on the scale of general political 
knowledge) to 06’46” (for those in between the bottom 25% and the bottom 50% 
on the same scale) to 09’39” (for those in between the top 25% and the top 50% 
on the same scale) and to 10’30” (for those in the top 25% on the same scale). 
Compared to those in the bottom 25% of general political knowledge, those with 
the top 25% of general political knowledge expended significantly more cognitive 
efforts in information seeking (t = -1.891, p = 0.061). Therefore, data support the 
conventional notion that those who are politically knowledgeable want to acquire 
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more information. I found the same pattern between search time and race-specific 
knowledge. As levels of the race-specific knowledge change from low to high, 
search time increases from 07’47” to 08’46” to 08’56” (even though the difference 
is not statistically significant).  
Third, individuals who viewed affirmative action programs in 
conservative ways expended less time (07’13”) than those who viewed affirmative 
action programs in liberal ways (09’14”). Although this difference between the 
two groups is not statistically significant (t = 1.294, p = 0.197), this result shows 
that those who viewed affirmative action in liberal ways did feel they needed to 
expend cognitive efforts to learn more about the issue.  
Fourth, those who held positive feelings toward blacks expended more 
time (09’21”) in information seeking than those who held negative feelings toward 
blacks (07’34”), indicating that negative feelings toward blacks decrease cognitive 
efforts to understand the issue. This result, however, failed to reach statistical 
significance (t = 1.342, p = 0.181). 
Finally, data shows that those with a low level of political interest 
searched a longer time (09’44”) than those with a high level of political interest 
did (07’03”). The difference is statistically significant (t = 2.010, p = 0.045). This 
result is opposite to the notion that political interest motivates individuals to get 
involved more in information seeking.  
Given these analyses, I ran a multivariate regression model, using ordinary 
least-squares, in order to estimate relative effects of the independent variables on 
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search time. Since the dependent variable is skewed,28 thus neither symmetric, nor 
of normal distribution, I did a log transformation of it and thereby could reduce 
the skewness.29 As the histogram in Figure 5.3 shows, log of search time is 
normal and symmetric. The functional form of the model to test the hypotheses is 
as follows.  
Log of Search Time = α + β1*Democrat + β2*Republican + β3*Liberal 
+ β4*Conservative + β5*Political Knowledge + β6*Race-specific 
Knowledge + β7*Political Interest + β8*Affective Feelings toward Blacks 
+ β9*Understandings of Affirmative Action + u  
 
Where, α is constant, βs are ordinary least-squares regression coefficients, and u 
is an error term; The dependent variable, log of search time, is a continuous 
variable, running from 1.10 to 8.32; and details of coding schemes for other 
variables are presented in Appendix 5.A.  
Table 5.1 shows that the coefficient of Democrats is positive and 
significant, indicating that Democrats are more likely than Republicans and 
Independents to expend time in information seeking. The coefficient of political 
knowledge is also positive and significant, suggesting higher levels of political 
knowledge facilitate more cognitive efforts to acquire and process the 
information. And, the coefficient of political interest is negative and significant, 
suggesting that higher levels of political interest discourage cognitive effort to 
acquire and process the information.  
 
28 Skewed data are not bad data. They are simply data that create a few complications because the 
distribution of likely measurements is asymmetrical and less convenient for statistical analysis.  
29 When a positively skewed distribution is log-transformed, the skewness is reduced. This is a 
norm when analyzing skewed data.   
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To sum up, first, individuals vary in their using incoming, relevant 
information when they are free to search it and learn about the issue at hand. 
Although it is known that many individuals do not care to acquire incoming 
information about the issue, evidence provided here illustrated that many 
individuals actually expended time in seeking information about affirmative 
action programs. Second, the results of the analyses generally supported the 
expectation that cognitive engagement is a function of individual motivation and 
cognitive ability. More knowledgeable individuals are willing to become more 
informed by expending cognitive effort in acquiring incoming, new information. 
Third, the results supported the expectation drawn from issue ownership theory 
(Petrocik 1996). Given that affirmative action is a Democratic issue, Democrats 
are significantly more motivated to want to acquire more information about 
affirmative action programs.  
Fourth, contrary to the expectation, political ideology failed to reach 
statistical significance, and the coefficient of political interest showed negative 
sign. I will discuss this issue later in the chapter.   
WHO PREFERS PARTISAN INFORMATION TO FACTUAL 
INFORMATION 
Examining the question posed above, I begin with the assumption that 
search time and type of information are interdependent. More precisely, I predict 
that log of search time will significantly account for variation in the type of 
information considered. That is, the more cognitive effort individuals expend in 
information seeking, the more factual information they access. According to dual-
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process theory, the extent to which individuals expend in seeking and processing 
information is related to the type of information they prefer; and individuals who 
cognitively involve themselves in the issue at hand are more motivated to be 
accurate, thus seeking the objective, factual information (Chaiken and Trope 
1999; Eagly and Chaiken 1993). Drawing on theory, I predict that those who 
expend more time in seeking information will be likely to access factual, 
objective information more than partisan information. Therefore, as was found in 
Study 1, Democrats, liberals, those who viewed affirmative action in liberal ways, 
and those who hold positive feeling toward blacks, and those who are more 
knowledgeable are likely to prefer factual information to partisan information, 
whereas Republicans, conservatives, those who viewed affirmative action in 
conservative ways, those who held negative feelings toward blacks, and those 
who are less knowledgeable  are likely to prefer partisan information to factual 
information. Finally, regardless of individual difference variables, participants are 
expected to prefer the partisan information to the factual information, according to 
heuristics theory (Simon 1985; Lupia 1994, 2000; Lupia, McCubbins, and Popkin 
2001).   
The Determinants of Type of Information 
 Note that the participants in the experiment were exposed to two types 
of information, partisan information and factual information, and asked to choose 
the information they wanted to probe. The briefing documents consisted of 44 
web pages, of which 20 were the factual information and 24 were the partisan 
information. Thus, if subjects randomly choose information, the probability that 
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they will hit factual information is 46% (20 out of 44), and the probability that 
they will hit partisan information is 54% (24 out of 44). The analyses revealed 
that participants accessed 47.8% of the factual information and 52.2% of the 
partisan information. This is not significantly different from the expected 
probability, indicating that individuals did not significantly prefer partisan 
information to factual information.  
Analyses also revealed significant variations in the preferred type of 
information in terms of political predispositions. First, partisan independents 
accessed partisan information more than Democrats. Fifty-seven percent of the 
information that partisan independents accessed was partisan information, 
whereas 44% of the information that Democrats accessed was partisan 
information. The difference in their access to partisan information between 
Democrats and partisan independents is statistically significant (t = -1.871, p = 
0.032). Also, Democrats were more likely than Republicans to access factual 
information (t = -2.289, p = 0.024). The difference in their access to partisan 
information among Democrats, Republicans, and partisan independents is also 
statistically significant (F (2, 181) = 3.166, p = 0.045). Similarly, liberals favored 
factual information (52% of the information accessed by liberals was factual 
information) more than conservatives (45% of the information accessed by 
conservatives was factual information), although the difference is not statistically 
significant (t = 2.062, p = 0.228).  
Second, no significant difference in the preferred type of information is 
found in terms of general political knowledge. In contrast, a significant difference 
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is found in terms of race-specific knowledge. Those with relatively low levels of 
race-specific knowledge favored partisan information (58% was partisan 
information) more than those with relatively high levels of race-specific 
knowledge (46% was partisan information). The difference between the two 
groups is statistically significant (t = 2.357, p = 0.020). This result indicates that 
lack of issue-specific knowledge leads to significantly more reliance on partisan 
information, and that high levels of issue-specific knowledge boost more 
acquisition of factual information.  
Third, among the information accessed by those with relatively low levels 
of political interest, 51% was partisan information. For those with relatively high 
levels of political interest, 54% was partisan information. The difference is not 
statistically significant. Fourth, for those who understood affirmative action 
programs in conservative ways, partisan information was 53%, while among the 
information accessed by those understood affirmative action in liberal ways, 
partisan information was 51%. The difference is not statistically significant. 
Finally, among the information accessed by those who held negative feelings 
toward blacks, 53% was partisan information, and among the information 
accessed by those who held positive feelings toward blacks, partisan information 
was 51%. The difference is not statistically significant.  
To account for the relative impact of the variables on type of information 
an individual participant favored, I ran a regression model, using the ordinary 
least-squares method. I tested the effects of the same variables incorporated in the 
previous model, adding one more variable, log of search time, with different 
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dependent variable, percent partisan information accessed. The functional form 
of the model is as follows. 
Percent Partisan Information Accessed = α + β1*Democrat + β2*Republican 
+ β3*Liberal + β4*Conservative + β5*Political Knowledge + β6*Race-
specific Knowledge + β7*Political Interest + β8 *Affective Feelings 
toward Blacks + β9*Understandings of Affirmative Action + β10*Log of 
Search Time + u 
  
Where, α is constant, βs are ordinary least-squares regression coefficients, and u 
is an error term; The dependent variable, percent partisan information accessed, 
is percent of the partisan information accessed among all the information 
accessed, running from 0 (no partisan information was accessed) to 100 (only the 
partisan information was accessed, theoretically; log of search time is the same 
variable that is used as the dependent variable in Study 1; and other variables are 
coded in the same way as in Study 1. Details of coding schemes for other 
variables are presented in Appendix 5.A.   
Table 5.2 displays the results of the test, in which the coefficients of the 
variable for democrats, affective feelings toward blacks, and log of search time 
are statistically significant at p < .081 level (two-tailed test). The results support 
the hypothesis that Democrats, those who expended much time in information 
seeking, and those who held positive feelings toward blacks would be likely to 
access factual information more than partisan information.  
In sum, the results suggest that partisan information was not always 
preferred. There exist significant differences in the type of information that 
individuals choose to consider. Preferences over the type of information vary as a 
function of political partisanship, affective feelings toward blacks, and cognitive 
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engagement in incoming information. Thus, contrary to the general expectation, 
the case for the preferences over the partisan information is not always warranted.    
DISCUSSION 
This chapter set out to examine how an individual uses incoming, relevant 
information regarding affirmative action programs. Before presenting a summary 
of my findings and accounts of them, I feel compelled to discuss some lingering 
concerns. First, if there is to be a meaningful theory of how individuals use 
information, studying one issue domain will not suffice. We still know little about 
how individuals use information across the diverse issues and under different 
circumstances. Further research on the nature of information processing and 
acquisition across diverse policy issues is needed.  
Second, my data, consisting of college students, is not a representative 
sample of adult population. I admit that generalizing the findings reported from 
the specific sample that was studied here to a larger population is risky. However, 
there is no reasonable or empirical ground to believe that information seeking and 
policy judgments by college students are significantly different from those of a 
larger population.  
Despite the limitations imposed by the data, four major findings stand out. 
First, although I cannot specify with much precision the extent to which an 
individual generally uses new information to make policy judgments, the 
evidence provided here showed that many individuals are able and willing to 
engage in active information seeking to warrant a deeper understanding of the 
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issue at hand. The assumption of individuals’ minimal use of new information is 
not supported by my data. More precisely, under the experimental condition 
where relevant information is available without much costs, many participants are 
proactive information seekers instead of cognitive misers. As dual-process 
theories suggest, individuals can be flexible information seekers as a function of 
individual and contextual differences (Chaiken and Trope 1999; Eagly and 
Chaiken 1993).  
Second, judging from the findings with regard to the preferred type of 
information that individuals accessed, I can safely say that partisan information is 
not always preferred over factual information. Participants under the experimental 
condition, where both the partisan and the factual information are available at the 
same information costs, showed no significant difference in their access to the 
different types of information. It has been thought that ordinary citizens rely a 
great deal upon partisan information. This may be not because they favor partisan 
information, but because partisan information is just more available than factual 
information. In other words, citizen’s reliance on partisan information is 
conditional, but not invariable.  
The finding provided here suggests that individuals may be flexible in 
adopting a strategy to acquire relevant information. That is, under normal 
conditions where acquiring factual information is more costly and partisan 
information is more available, many citizens may rely on partisan information 
instead of paying higher costs for acquiring factual information. However, under 
the condition where both the partisan and the factual information are available at 
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the same information costs, many individuals are willing to acquire factual 
information. Furthermore, the finding suggests that the choice of relying more on 
partisan information or factual information is a function of preexisting attitudes 
toward the issue at hand. That is, positive positions or attitudes toward the 
information object induce more reliance on factual information, while negative 
attitudes toward the information object induce more reliance on partisan 
information.  
Third, the type of information that one favors is a function of how much 
cognitive effort one expends. The more time spent seeking information, the more 
likely a person is to rely on factual information. Therefore, the more 
knowledgeable and the less knowledgeable have different strategies in seeking 
information in terms of time spent gathering information and the type of 
information they favored. Given this finding, it is hard to imagine that less 
knowledgeable individuals can successfully emulate the behaviors of more 
knowledgeable individuals through a mere exposure to a few information cues.  
Finally, individuals vary in their use of incoming, relevant information and 
the types of information they favor even when it comes to race issues. Individuals 
are not unvaryingly indifferent being more informed about race issues. Many 




TABLE 5.1. EFFECTS OF POLITICAL AND RACIAL 
PREDISPOSITIONS ON LOG OF SEARCH TIME 
 
Dependent Variable is  
Log of Search Time β t Sig. 
Democrat 0.155* 1.996 0.047 
Republican 0.030 0.396 0.692 
Liberal -0.033 -0.395 0.693 
Conservative -0.089 -1.142 0.255 
Political Knowledge 0.181** 2.642 0.009 
Race-Specific Knowledge 0.046 0.700 0.485 
Political Interest -0.146* -2.069 0.040 
Affective Feelings toward Blacks 0.075 1.141 0.255 
Support Affirmative Action 0.035 0.506 0.613 
Constant  7.512 0.000 
Number of cases 148 
Adjusted R2 0.051 
 
Notes:1. Entries are standardized ordinary least-squares regression coefficients and 
t-ratios. 2. The dependent variable is a continuous variable, running from 1.10 to 
8.32. 3. The positive sign of a coefficient indicates that participants are more likely 
to expend time in seeking information.  
* p < .05  ** p < .01. Significant tests are two-tailed.  ;  
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TABLE 5.2. EFFECTS OF POLITICAL AND RACIAL 
PREDISPOSITIONS ON % PARTISAN INFORMATION 
ACCESSED 
 
Dependent Variable is  
% Partisan Information Accessed β t Sig. 
Democrat -0.137+ -1.755 0.081 
Republican 0.029 0.385 0.701 
Liberal -0.013 -0.158 0.874 
Conservative -0.061 -0.779 0.437 
Political Knowledge 0.013 0.189 0.851 
Race-Specific Knowledge -0.091 -1.375 0.170 
Political Interest 0.115 1.615 0.108 
Affective Feelings toward Blacks -0.136* -2.078 0.039 
Support Affirmative Action  0.008 0.112 0.911 
Log of Search Time -0.158* -2.345 0.020 
Constant  5.145 0.000 
Number of cases 148 
Adjusted R2 0.095 
 
Notes:1.Entries are standardized ordinary least-squares regression coefficients and t-ratios. 
2.The dependent variable is a continuous variable, running from 0 (no partisan information 
is accessed) to 100 (only partisan information is accessed). 3. A positive sign of a 
coefficient indicates that participants are more likely to access the partisan information. 






















FIGURE 5.1. HISTOGRAM OF SEARCH TIME 
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FIGURE 5.2. CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF SEARCH TIME 
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CHAPTER SIX 
HOW ACQUISITION OF NEW INFORMATION AFFECTS POLICY JUDGMENTS 
 
 
A large body of research in political science has evolved around 
knowledge (i.e., awareness, sophistication, expertise, and constraint), indicating 
that “information,” in the sense of information already held, does matter: better 
informed individuals (i.e., more knowledgeable individuals) have noticeably 
different policy and voting preferences (Luskin 1987, 2002; Zaller 1992; Delli 
Carpini and Keeter 1996; Bartels 1996; Althaus 1998; see also Converse 1964). In 
another way, “new” information available from the current environment also 
matters. New information that primes or frames an individual’s considerations can 
alter her policy and candidate preferences (Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997; 
Nelson 2004; Druckman 2004; Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, Hutchings, and 
White 2002; Iyengar an Kinder 1987; Iyengar 1991). Also new information that 
increases an individual’s knowledge level can alter his policy preferences 
(Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell 2002; Iyengar, Luskin, and Fishkin 2004; see also 
Fishkin 1991; Mansbridge 1983). The theoretical presumption underlying these 
studies is that individuals alter or reinforce their initial considerations if they 
know more by acquiring new information.  
While the effects of information stored in memory have been a subject that 
has captured tremendous scholarly attention, there have been relatively few direct 
inquiries into the effects of new information on policy judgments (see Lau and 
Redlawsk 1997, 2001a, 2001b; Redlawsk 2004; Mutz, Sniderman, and Brody 
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1997; Barker and Hansen 2005). As demonstrated in Chapter 5, individuals’ 
acquisition of new information varies in terms of time expended in seeking the 
given information and types of the information counted on. Some respondents 
proactively sought out the given information, but others did not; some referred to 
factual information, while others relied on partisan information. Left unexplored 
are consequences of different levels of cognitive engagement in political 
judgments.  
Given this finding, I examine three questions in this chapter. First, I 
explore how variability in cognitive engagement affects an individual’s policy 
views of affirmative action programs. Next, I examine how different types of 
information counted on during information seeking and processing affect policy 
views of affirmative action. Finally, I examine how cognitive engagement with 
new information shapes policy views of affirmative action programs, vying 
against the effect of anti-black attitudes.  
This chapter is organized in five sections starting with method and 
procedure, followed by data and measures, two sections of empirical analyses, 
and finally discussion.  
METHOD AND PROCEDURE 
The method and procedure of the experiment for this study was described 
in Chapter 4. Here, I will just briefly underline the essential characteristics of the 
experiment.  
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Participants in the experiment were asked to first learn the issue by 
acquiring the information they chose to learn and then answered a questionnaire. 
Participants were randomly assigned to either set of partisan information or 
factual information. All other conditions were the same between the two groups. 
Thus, the basic experimental design was to compare policy views on affirmative 
action programs of otherwise similar groups of participants except acquiring 
different kinds of information. In addition, the experiment estimated individual 
differences in the time spent in information seeking. 
DATA AND MEASURES 
 
A total of 407 students at The University of Texas at Austin were recruited 
for this study from late September to mid-October of 2005. Among the 
participants, 177 (44%) were whites and 230 were non-whites and Hispanics. The 
analyses in this chapter focus solely on the white samples.30 Ninety-two 
participants in the partisan information condition 85 participants in the factual 
information were analyzed. The distribution of participants was presented in 
Table 4.2. My convenience sample is not a representative one, but the sample 
does contain reasonable variation along several important attitudinal dimensions. 
A complete description of the question wordings and coding schemes of each 
variable I describe in the following is presented in Appendix 5.A. 
Dependent Measure 
                                                 
30 A discussion of why analysis is limited to white Americans is in Chapter 5, pp. 109-110.  
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Affirmative action has been, and is, an extremely controversial issue, and 
citizens differ in what they think affirmative action is (Hastie 1986; Gamson and 
Modigliani 1987; Gamson 1992; Levi and Fried 1994). Indeed, the debate over 
affirmative action is typically waged in terms of symbols and slogans, such as 
“quota,” “racism,” “a color-blind society,” “reverse discrimination,” and 
“diversity.” As I discussed in Chapter 4 (pp. 95-97), I provided the six alternative 
response options that have been or are prevalent in political communication (see 
Gamson 1992; Gamson and Modigliani 1987; Fine 1992; Summers 1995; also 
see, for a broad review, Hutchings and Valentino 2004). In the analysis, the six 
alternative response options were coded in dichotomous way: options of 1, 2, and 
3 were coded as 1 (= liberal understandings of affirmative action programs), and 
the options of 4, 5, and 6 were coded as 0 (=conservative understandings of 
affirmative action programs).     
Independent Measures 
Search Time. My key independent variable is search time. A discussion of 
how this variable was measured is in Chapter 5. Figure 6.1 displays the 
distribution of search time from Experiment 2, showing a distribution that is 
skewed with a long right tail. This result indicates that search time varies 
especially for those who expended relatively longer time in information seeking.  
Type of Information. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two 
experimental groups, allowing me to control the information to which subjects 
were exposed. Thus, the variable of type of information is dichotomous—partisan 
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information or factual information, indicating type of information that subjects 
sought and processed.  
Symbolic Racism. For this measure, I follow the one mostly used in 
previous studies. Anti-black attitudes were measured based on the racial 
resentment scale from National Election Studies (see Kinder and Sanders 1996). 
This variable consisted of six items, and each item is 5-point scale from 1 for the 
lowest racial resentment to 5 for the highest racial resentment. A complete 
description of the question wordings of six items and coding schemes is presented 
in Appendix 5.A. 
Other Control Variables. Party identification, political ideology, political 
knowledge, and political interest were measured as critical ingredients in 
individuals’ understanding of affirmative action programs. For these variables, the 
standard question wordings as used in the National Election Studies were used.  
A complete description of the question wordings and coding schemes of these 
variables is presented in Appendix 5.A. 
INFORMATION SEARCH AND POLICY JUDGMENTS 
Studies show that even mere exposure to a small number of information 
shortcuts is sufficient to compensate uninformed individuals for their chronic lack 
of political knowledge (Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Popkin 1991). 
Voters, for instance, do not need what Lupia and McCubbins (1998) called 
encyclopedic information to make solid, or competent, electoral choices. Lupia 
(1994) argues that  
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the availability of certain types of information cues allows voters to use their 
limited resources efficiently while influencing electoral outcomes in ways that 
they would have if they had taken the time and effort necessary to acquire 
encyclopedic information (72). 
  
More generally,  
by forming simple and effective strategies about what information to use and 
how to use it, people can make the same decisions they otherwise would if they 
were expert” (Lupia and McCubbins 1998, 9; also see Payne, Bettman, and 
Johnson 1993). 
 
Although this line of argument has been prevalent in political science, 
evidence from social psychology indicates that information shortcuts or cues 
based on partisan frames often fail to exert a detectable judgmental impact when 
individuals exert systematic processing of substantial amounts of information, and 
that the factual information based on the logical content of a message plays a 
bigger role in shaping social judgments when individuals are cognitively engaged 
with the factual information (Petty, Cacioppo, and Kasmer 1988; Eagly and 
Chaiken 1993; Chaiken and Trope 1999).  
Drawing on these theories, I expect that the seeking and processing of 
factual information, but not that of partisan information, suppresses racial 
criteria31 and promotes non-racial attitudes toward affirmative action. I further 
expect that the tendency of decreased effect of racial criteria on views on 
affirmative action becomes clearer as cognitive engagement with the information 
increases. More precisely, I hypothesize that participants who expend a 
considerable amount of cognitive efforts to understand race issues by acquiring 
factual information are more likely to consciously process information and thus 
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control their racial resentments. It follows that the greater cognitive engagement 
with factual information tends to lead individuals to be less influenced by their 
racial predispositions.  
The Effect of the Partisan versus the Factual Information 
The data shows that among respondents who answered survey questions 
without information seeking (participants in Experiment 1), 71% viewed 
affirmative action programs in liberal ways. Meanwhile, 68.2% of respondents 
who sought out and processed the information before making their policy 
judgments on affirmative action programs (participants in Experiment 2) viewed 
affirmative action programs in liberal ways. More precisely, 64.6% of participants 
in the factual information condition viewed affirmative action in liberal ways; and 
71.6% of participants in the partisan information condition did.  
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) reveals that there are no statistically 
significant differences in the views of affirmative action programs before and 
after information seeking and regardless of the type of information considered.32 
No difference between pre- and post-treatment views of affirmative action 
programs might be due to failure in the randomization. There is no reason to 
believe, however, that the experimental and control groups were “not equal” 
before the experimental treatment. Another possibility of no difference between 
                                                                                                                                     
31 By racial criteria, I refer to “thoughts and feelings that are far less sublime—racially charged 
feelings of resentment, bigoted and stereotypical beliefs  about blacks, and the belief that racial 
inequality has arisen or persisted because of the failings of blacks themselves” (Stoker 1998, 137).  
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pre- and post-treatment measures is due to null effect of information seeking on 
policy views. Or, this result is just about group difference without taking into 
account individual difference driven by different level of information acquisition. 
In other words, there is a possibility that individuals’ different levels of 
information acquisition can account for different views of affirmative action 
programs. For instance, those who expended relative more time in seeking 
information might have different policy views from those who did not have an 
opportunity to seek information (participants in control group) and those who did 
not expend much time in seeking information. Similarly, those who expended 
relatively more time in seeking factual (or partisan) information might have 
different policy views from those who did not have an opportunity to seek 
information and those who expended relatively less time in seeking partisan (or 
factual) information.    
With that said, I begin a close examination of the effect of the different 
types of information by statistically equating the two experimental groups.33 For 
this I did multivariate analysis, undertaking two separate probit models for each 
of the two information conditions. I regressed individual differences upon views 
on affirmative action for those who accessed partisan information and for those 
who accessed factual information, respectively. With this model, I estimated the 
 
32 The differences among the control group (in Experiment 1) and the two experimental groups are 
not statistically significant (F (2, 443) = 0.68, p = 0.507), and the differences between the two 
experimental groups are not statistically significant, either (F (1, 168) = 0.94, p = 0.333). 
33 Between the two experimental groups, differences exist in terms of party identification (F(1, 
91)=5.97, p = 0.017) and political knowledge (F (1, 116) = 3.54, p = 0.062). Yet no differences 
exist in terms of symbolic racism (F (1, 144) = 0.35, p = 0.554), log of search time (F (1, 134) = 
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different effects of the independent variables on views on affirmative action in 
two different information conditions, controlling the variance in sample 
characteristics. The functional form of the model was as follows.  
Pr (Yi = 1) = Φ (β1 * Party Identificationi + β2 * Political Ideologyi + β3 * Political 
Knowledgei + β4 * Political Interesti + β5 * Symbolic Racismi + β6 * Log 
of Search Timei)                                                  
(1) 
  
Where dependent variable is i’s liberal understandings of affirmative action, 
which is coded as 1; Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution; and coding 
schemes for the variables incorporated are presented in Appendix 5.A.     
In this model, the focus lies in the role that log of search time34 plays in 
the different information conditions. I predict that log of search time plays a 
significantly bigger role in the factual information condition than in the partisan 
information condition. Those who seek and process the factual information are 
more likely than those who seek and process the partisan information to view 
affirmative action in liberal ways if they all spent a fair amount of time to acquire 
information.  
The results presented in Table 6.1 show that my expectation is correct; log 
of search time is positive and significant in the factual information condition, but 
negative and insignificant in the partisan information condition. It is interesting to 
note that general political knowledge reaches statistical significance in the 
partisan information condition, but not in the factual information condition. Under 
 
2.72, p = 0.102), political ideology (F (1, 167) = 0.07, p = 0.791), and political interest (F (1, 147) 
= 0.02, p = 0.888). 
34 As I mentioned before, to reduce the skewness of search time, I log-transformed it. This is a 
recommended method of analysis for skewed data.  
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both conditions, symbolic racism fails to reach statistical significance, indicating 
that variation in understanding affirmative action is better explained by log of 
search time and general political knowledge than by symbolic racism.  
Based on Model (1), I computed changes in the predicted probability of 
liberal understanding of affirmative action at varying levels of log of search time, 
general political knowledge, and symbolic racism in each experimental condition, 
holding other variables at their mean levels. First, Figure 6.2 (a) shows that log of 
search time has a considerable impact on the probability of liberal understanding 
of affirmative action in the factual information condition, but not in the partisan 
information condition. Those who sought and processed the factual information 
are 82.3% more likely to view affirmative action in liberal ways as their time 
expended in information seeking increases from the minimum level to the 
maximum level, while those who sought and processed the partisan information 
are 14.8% less likely to view affirmative action in liberal ways as their time 
expended in information seeking changes from the minimum level to the 
maximum level. This finding suggests that the factual and the partisan 
information function in different ways, depending on the extent to which an 
individual expends time in information seeking. Acquisition of factual 
information significantly facilitates liberal understanding of affirmative action, 
while elaboration, or acquisition, of partisan information slightly facilitates 
conservative understanding of affirmative action.   
Second, Figure 6.2 (b) shows that general political knowledge 
significantly boosts conservative understanding of affirmative action in the 
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partisan information condition, while it hardly affects understandings of 
affirmative action in the factual information condition. For those who hold the 
minimum level of general political knowledge, type of information they sought 
and processed does not matter. But, for those who hold the maximum level of 
general political knowledge, type of information made a significant difference in 
understanding affirmative action. Therefore, the factual and the partisan 
information function in different ways, depending on the extent to which an 
individual possesses knowledge about politics in general.  
Finally, as displayed in Figure 6.2 (c), symbolic racism facilitates 
conservative understanding of affirmative action in both information conditions. 
The effects of the partisan and the factual information on liberal understanding of 
affirmative action do not significantly vary as a function of symbolic racism.  
To summarize, type of information matters in formulating policy 
judgments. The effect of the factual information depends on one’s level of 
cognitive engagement, while the effect of the partisan information depends on 
one’s level of knowledge. The evidence provided here supports the proposition of 
dual-process theory. That is, the impact of an individual’s cognitive engagement 
on policy judgments is related to what information she seeks and processes. 
Different levels of elaboration of the factual information make a significant 
difference in policy judgments on affirmative action, while different levels of 
elaboration of the partisan information do not make a significant difference in 
policy judgments on affirmative action.  
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The Effect of Cognitive Engagement 
 The analysis now turns to the effects of cognitive engagement. Table 6.2 
showed that the more time participants spend seeking information, the more they 
were likely to reach liberal understanding of affirmative action. The mean of 
search time for those who understood affirmative action in liberal ways is 09’14”, 
while that for those who understood affirmative action in conservative ways is 
04’53”. The difference is statistically significant (F (1,168) = 14.26, p = 0.0002). 
In addition, those who belong to the top 50% and the bottom 50% in search time 
hold different policy judgments on affirmative action especially among  
Republicans, conservatives, more knowledgeable individuals, those who are 
highly interested in politics, and those who are low in symbolic racism scale. For 
instance, 90% of Republicans who spent relatively longer time in seeking 
information viewed affirmative action programs in liberal ways, while only 52% 
of Republicans who spent relatively shorter time in seeking information did. The 
difference is statistically significant (t = 2.220, p < 0.032). For more detail, see 
Table 6.2.  
To analyze the data in a more completely, I ran two probit models to 
account for how variation in information seeking affects policy judgments about 
affirmative action, controlling for the relevant factors. The functional form of the 
first model was as follows.  
 Pr (Yi = 1) = Φ (β1 * Party Identificationi + β2 * Political Ideologyi + β3 * Political 
Knowledgei + β4 * Political Interesti + β5 * Symbolic Racismi + β6 * Log 




Where Yi is respondent i’s liberal understanding of affirmative action, which is 
coded as 1; Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution; and coding schemes 
for the variables incorporated are the same as in Model (1) and presented in the 
Appendix 6.A. Note that Model (2) has the same functional form as Model (1), but 
was run on respondents both in the partisan and factual information conditions.    
Next, based on Model (2), I incorporated an interaction term between log 
of search time and type of information to examine the joint effect of information 
seeking and the type of information that participants relied on. The theoretical 
assumption for the interaction term is that partisan information induces 
conservative understanding of affirmative action at higher levels of log of search 
time, but factual information induces liberal understanding of affirmative action at 
higher levels of log of search time. The functional form of the second model was 
as follows. 
Pr (Yi = 1) = Φ (β1 * Party Identificationi + β2 * Political Ideologyi + β3 * Political 
Knowledgei + β4 * Political Interesti + β5 * Symbolic Racismi + β6 * 
Log of Search Timei + β7 * Type of Informationi + β8 * Log of Search 
Timei * Type of Informationi)                                                        
(3)  
 
Where Yi is respondent i’s liberal understanding of affirmative action; Φ is the 
standard normal cumulative distribution; log of search time * type of information 
is an interactive variable between log of search time and type of information; and 
all other variables were coded in the same way as in Model (2).   
As shown in Table 6.3, the results of Model (2) support my expectation. 
Without taking different types of information considered, two variables produce 
significantly different policy judgments on affirmative action. The coefficient of 
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log of search time is positive and significant at p = 0.058 level, suggesting that 
participants who expend more time in information seeking and processing are 
significantly more likely to hold a liberal understanding of affirmative action. 
And, symbolic racism reaches statistical significance at p = 0.089 level, 
suggesting that those who hold anti-black attitudes likely view affirmative action 
in conservative ways.  
 In Model (3), the coefficients of symbolic racism, log of search time, type 
of information, and the interaction term of log of search time and type of 
information reach statistical significance at p < 0.05 level, as shown in Table 6.3. 
The signs of the coefficients are as expected. Given that the probit coefficients do 
not provide much intuition about the absolute magnitude of the hypothesized 
relationships, I graphically display the findings to explain the impact of the 
independent variables on policy judgment of affirmative action.  
First, Figure 6.3 (a) displays changes in predicted probability of liberal 
understanding of affirmative action for those who are at the minimum and the 
maximum levels on the symbolic racism scale as log of search time increases 
from low to high, holding the other independent variables constant at their mean 
values. As log of search time increases, the predicted probability of liberal 
understandings of affirmative action increases for those who are both at the 
maximum and the minimum levels on the symbolic racism scale. Yet, the patterns 
of change in the predicted probability between the two groups are significantly 
different. Those at the highest level on the symbolic racism scale view affirmative 
action in conservative ways when they do not spend a great deal of time seeking 
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information. Yet, their liberal understanding of affirmative action increases in a 
significant fashion the more effort they put into seeking information.  
In contrast, those who are at the lowest level on the symbolic racism scale 
view affirmative action in liberal ways regardless of the time they put into 
information seeking. The difference between those who are at the lowest and the 
highest levels on the symbolic racism scale dies out as they increase their 
cognitive efforts in information seeking. This pattern suggests that, although 
racism is a strong determinant in policy judgments of race matters for those who 
do not care to know more about race matters, the effect of racism on policy 
understanding of affirmative action is moderated by the extent to which 
individuals are willing to be engaged in the issue.  
Second, Figure 6.3 (b) displays changes in predicted probability for the 
most and least knowledgeable respondents by log of search time. For both groups, 
the more time individuals expend in information seeking, the more they 
understand affirmative action in liberal ways. What is distinct between the two 
groups is that the marginal impact of log of search time for the least 
knowledgeable is bigger (0.315) than that (0.027) for the most knowledgeable. 
This suggests that those who are knowledgeable are less susceptible to the effects 
of acquiring new information than those who are not knowledgeable.  
 Third, as displayed in Figure 6.3 (c), liberals and conservatives are more 
likely to understand affirmative action in liberal ways as in the more time they 
spend gathering information. The marginal effects of log of search time are bigger 
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for conservatives (0.566) than for liberals (0.133), suggesting that the impact of 
information seeking is stronger for conservatives than for liberals.  
Policy judgments about affirmative action are significantly influenced by 
the extent to which an individual uses incoming, relevant information. Those who 
generally oppose affirmative action—racists, conservatives, and the more 
knowledgeable—tend to view affirmative action in liberal ways as they become 
more involved in incoming information. The large differences between those who 
are high and low on the symbolic racism scale, the more and the less 
knowledgeable, and liberals and conservatives at the minimum level of 
information seeking die out at the maximum level of information seeking. The 
evidence here corroborates my hypothesis that information seeking plays a 
significant role in moderating the impact of political and racial predispositions on 
policy judgments of affirmative action. Mere exposure to information is not 
sufficient to induce changes in policy understanding. Individuals need to 
cognitively engage an issue, and to the extent that they involve themselves in the 
issue by seeking and acquiring new information, they are likely to hold policy 
views different from those that they would otherwise hold. 
INFORMATION SEARCH AND COMPETENT DECISION-MAKING  
Citizen competence is a broad concept, which is related to a variety of 
psychological constructs, such as heuristics (e.g., whether citizens effectively take 
cues from parties, politicians, interest groups, and other citizens, and whether 
their preferences resemble those of others who are well informed), issue 
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constraints (e.g., whether citizens hold consistent positions across issues and 
stable ones over time), issue framing (e.g., whether citizens maintain their 
positions when given different framings of issues), factual knowledge (e.g., 
whether citizens know relevant facts about issues), and political sophistication 
(e.g., whether citizens’ preferences are correlated with their values and attitudes) 
(see Kuklinski and Quirk 2001). Given the broad range of the concept of citizen 
competence, it is necessary to make it clear how I use the term to account for it on 
empirical base. Since a full discussion of the concept of citizen competence is 
beyond the scope of this research, I will simply take the method of Kuklinski and 
Quirk’s (2001) concept of “well-informed-proxy comparisons.” Here, the policy 
judgments of well informed individuals serve as a criterion for a competent 
decision making.  
My analysis is thus to compare policy views of affirmative action 
programs by individuals who are similar but more or less knowledgeable. I 
examine the link between knowledge and cognitive engagement, predicting that 
the less knowledgeable can emulate the more knowledgeable if the former 
expends as much cognitive effort in information seeking and processing as the 
latter do. In other words, the effect of cognitive engagement with new information 
is greater for less knowledgeable individuals than for more knowledgeable 
individuals if both engage the new information at the same level.  
Drawing on the social psychological literature on “cognitive heuristics” 
(see Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Niesbet and Ross 1980; see also 
Downs 1957), political scientists have presumed that most individuals, especially 
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less knowledgeable individuals, rely on information shortcuts or heuristics to 
comprehend politics, just as they do to understand other issues in their everyday 
life. A multitude of political heuristics has been identified: party identification 
(Campbell et al. 1960), candidate traits (Popkin 1991), trusted elites (Mondak 
1993), interest groups (Lupia 1994), public mood (Rahn 2000), and ideological 
labels (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). Indeed, political heuristics seem 
indispensable especially to less knowledgeable individuals.35 I test whether 
partisan information based on political heuristics can provide the helpful shortcuts 
that some have suggested are especially beneficial for less knowledgeable 
individuals. I hypothesize that less knowledgeable individuals who acquire 
partisan information are more likely than those who acquire factual information to 
hold the same policy judgments as more knowledgeable individuals hold.  
The Effect of Cognitive Engagement for More or Less Knowledgeable 
Individuals 
 
Table 6.4 shows there is virtually no difference in their likelihood of 
holding liberal understandings of affirmative action between more and less 
knowledgeable respondents. The sample was divided into two mutually exclusive 
groups based on general political knowledge scale. The more and the less 
knowledgeable were sorted out by the top and the bottom 50% on general 
political knowledge scale.  
                                                 
35 Of course, benefits of political heuristics are not limited to less knowledgeable individuals. 
Political heuristics provide the helpful shortcuts for anybody who make a better judgments with 
the least efforts.  
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Among the more knowledgeable, 80% had liberal understandings; but 
among the less knowledgeable, 79% had liberal understandings (. t = 0.0001, p = 
1.000). In contrast, among those in the bottom 50% in Search Time (i.e., those 
who expended less than 03’30” in information seeking), 41% of those who were 
the more knowledgeable viewed affirmative action in liberal ways, while 62% of 
those who were the less knowledgeable viewed affirmative action in liberal ways. 
The difference between the two groups is statistically significant (t = 1.707, p = 
0.046). A significant difference was found between the more and the less 
knowledgeable groups when they did not care to acquire information. So, the less 
knowledgeable can emulate the more knowledgeable only if they are highly 
involved in the issue by proactively seeking and processing information.  
The importance of engagement is also demonstrated among those were 
exposed to the partisan information, as 77% of those who were the less 
knowledgeable viewed affirmative action in liberal ways, while only 43% of those 
who were the more knowledgeable viewed affirmative action in liberal ways. This 
difference is statistically significant (t = 2.639, p = 0.006). In contrast, among 
those were exposed to the factual information, 70% of those who were the more 
knowledgeable viewed affirmative action in liberal ways and 56% of those who 
were the less knowledgeable viewed affirmative action in liberal ways. The 
difference between the two groups is not statistically significant (t = 1.091, p = 
0.140). The result that the partisan information makes a significant difference 
between the more and the less knowledgeable does not support the standard view 
 140
that partisan, heuristics-based information helps the less knowledgeable to 
emulate the more knowledgeable.  
In short, the performance of the less knowledgeable depends upon the 
extent to which an individual seeks and processes information and the type of 
information she seeks and processes. Less knowledgeable individuals can emulate 
their more knowledgeable counterparts when they spent time in effortful 
information seeking and processing and when they seek and process the factual 
information rather than the partisan information.  
Given this analysis, I ran a probit model separately for the two groups, the 
more knowledgeable and the less knowledgeable. The functional form of the 
model was as follows. 
Pr (Yi = 1) = Φ (β1 * Party Identificationi + β2 * Political Ideologyi + β3 * Political 
Knowledgei + β4 * Political Interesti + β5 * Symbolic Racismi + β6 * Log 
of Search Timei + β7 * Type of Informationi)                                     
(4) 
 
Where the dependent variable is i’s liberal understanding of affirmative action, 
which is coded as 1; Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution; coding 
schemes for the variables incorporated are the same as the previous model; and 
the model was estimated for the more and the less knowledgeable, separately.  
Table 6.5 displays the results. The coefficients of log of search time and 
type of information are significant at p < 0.097 level for both more and less 
knowledgeable individuals. The coefficients of political ideology and symbolic 
racism reach statistical significance only for more knowledgeable individuals (at 
p < 0.069 level). What is notable here is that the signs of the coefficients of the 
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variables are the opposite for the two different groups, except for political interest 
and log of search time. This suggests that the independent variables (except for 
log of search time and political interest) function in the opposite directions for the 
more and the less knowledgeable in determining whether they understand 
affirmative action in liberal ways or conservative ways.  
Figure 6.4 (a) shows that both the more and the less knowledgeable are 
more likely to view affirmative action in liberal ways as their time expended in 
information seeking increases. But the marginal effect of log of search time for 
the less knowledgeable is bigger (0.253) than that for the more knowledgeable 
(0.179), suggesting that information seeking plays a bigger role for the less 
knowledgeable than for the more knowledgeable. Individuals with less political 
knowledge can make a decision as if they were knowledgeable, when they expend 
cognitive effort in actively acquiring incoming, relevant information.  
Figure 6.4 (b) demonstrates that the less knowledgeable have similar 
understandings to the more knowledgeable under the factual information 
condition. An ANOVA analysis shows that there is no difference between the two 
groups under the factual information condition (F (1, 59) = 0.84, p = 0.363). 
Under the partisan information condition, however, the less knowledgeable do not 
hold the same policy judgment as the more knowledgeable hold. Another 
ANOVA analysis reveals a significant difference between the more and the less 
knowledgeable in understanding of affirmative action under the partisan 
information condition (F (1, 52) = 5.82, p = 0.019). This result suggests that 
individuals who are less knowledgeable can make a decision as if they were well 
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informed when they access factual information but not when they access partisan 
information.  
Finally, the coefficient of symbolic racism is negative and significant for 
the more knowledgeable, indicating that symbolic racism plays a significant role 
in determining policy judgments about affirmative action of the more 
knowledgeable. The more knowledgeable are significantly less likely to view 
affirmative action in liberal ways as their symbolic racism scale goes higher. But 
this pattern is not found for the less knowledgeable, as displayed in Figure 6.4 (c).  
Overall, evidence shown here demonstrates that more knowledgeable 
individuals use different factors than less knowledgeable individuals when 
reaching conclusions about racial policy judgments. First, political ideology and 
symbolic racism are significant factors in the policy judgments about affirmative 
action of the more knowledgeable, but not of the less knowledgeable. Second, 
partisan information boosts liberal understanding of affirmative action for the less 
knowledgeable, but boosts conservative understanding of affirmative action for 
the more knowledgeable. Third, one factor that is common for the two groups is 
log of search time. The more time one expends in information seeking, the more 
one is likely to view affirmative action in liberal ways, regardless of one’s level of 
knowledge.  
An individual can compensate for her lack of stored information by 
seeking out information. Mere exposure to incoming information is not sufficient 
for those who lack knowledge to be able to emulate the policy judgments of those 
who possess lots of knowledge. Also, factual information helps the less 
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knowledgeable to better emulate the more knowledgeable than does partisan 
information.  
DISCUSSION 
The analyses here reveal that different levels of cognitive engagement 
interact with the different types of information to make a difference in policy 
judgments about affirmative action. Acquisition of a larger amount of incoming 
information induces liberal understanding of affirmative action, and factual 
information produces more liberal understandings of affirmative action if an 
individual spends a good deal of time seeking and processing relevant 
information.  
These findings are consistent with dual-process theories, which posit that 
more systematic and effortful processing of objective, factual information results 
in opinions that differ from those resulting from unsystematic and uneffortful 
processing of partisan, heuristics-based information. Also, the findings support 
the thesis of controlled processing of race issues. Although racial issues are 
cognitively less demanding and more emotionally charged, the effects of racial 
predispositions on policy judgments about affirmative action are moderated to the 
extent that an individual seeks and processes new information. In addition, as 
opposed to the standard views that information shortcuts or partisan cues are 
efficient for those who are not knowledgeable as well as for those who are 
knowledgeable, less knowledgeable individuals are not able to reach the same 
understanding as more knowledgeable individuals are unless the former expended 
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considerable amount of time in seeking and processing the factual information 
available from the environment. While scholars propose that information 
shortcuts allow many citizens to reach better policy judgments, a deeper 
understanding of how individuals use and process incoming, new information 
suggests that citizens must learn about political matters by actively expending 
time and effort in acquiring incoming, relevant information. Information shortcuts 
do not seem to be a real substitute for stored information in long-term memory or 
cognitive engagement with incoming information.    
To summarize the findings, first, increasing levels of cognitive 
engagement is a meaningful step for individuals to make more informed and 
better reasoned understanding of race matters. Second, factual information helps 
individuals to better emulate the more knowledgeable in understanding 
affirmative action, to the extent that they expend time in information seeking. 
Third, individuals can control their racial predispositions to the extent that they 
engage in incoming, relevant information. Fourth, the availability of or a mere 
exposure to information cues is not sufficient to ensure citizens’ competence.  
Finally, it should be noted that measuring cognitive engagement in terms 
of time expended in information seeking provided empirically grounded account 
of policy judgments on affirmative action. While scholars have long assumed the 
role that cognitive engagement may play in shaping policy judgments, a proper 
measurement of the extent to which an individual uses incoming, new information 
was hard to come by. I do not argue that my methodology adopted in this research 
estimates a whole array of cognitive engagement. But I believe that my 
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measurement of cognitive engagement uncovered how the new information 
affects policy judgments on affirmative action.    
 146
TABLE 6.1. EFFECTS OF EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS ON POLICY 







Dependent Variable is 
Understanding of Affirmative 
Action Programs 
(Liberal Understanding = 1) B S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig. 
Party Identification  -0.675 0.797 0.398 0.047 0.588 0.937 
 -0.242   0.008   
Political Ideology 0.037 0.669 0.956 -0.736 0.738 0.319 
 0.014   -0.164   
Political Knowledge -1.114+ 0.593 0.060 0.130 0.390 0.739 
 -0.874   0.043   
Political Interest -0.090 0.782 0.909 1.177 1.162 0.311 
 -0.022   0.166   
Symbolic Racism -0.296 0.226 0.190 -0.271 0.232 0.243 
 -0.429   -0.392   
Log of Search Time -0.781 1.362 0.567 3.313+ 1.725 0.055 
 -0.148   0.823   
Pseudo R2 0.441 0.608 
Number of Cases 25 33 
 
Notes: 1. 2. Entries in bold are changes in predicted probabilities for the dependent variable as each 
independent variable changes from its minimum to its maximum with other variables at their mean. 2. 
The positive sign of a coefficient indicates liberal understanding of affirmative action programs.  
























TABLE 6.2. PERCENTAGE OF LIBERAL UNDERSTANDING OF 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS FOR THOSE IN THE BOTTOM 
50% VERSUS THOSE IN THE TOP 50% IN SEARCH TIME, BY 
FACTORS 
 
Percentage of Liberal Understanding of Affirmative 
Action Programs 
 
Subjects in the 
Bottom 50% in 
Search Time 
Subjects in the 
Top 50%  in 
Search Time 
T p < |t| 
Democrats 0.77 (17) 
0.89 
(18) 0.927 0.361 Party 
Identification Republicans 0.52 (31) 
0.90* 
(10) 2.220 0.032 
Liberals 0.68 (25) 
0.83 





(14) 1.808 0.077 
High 0.41** (29) 
0.79** 
(29) 3.153 0.003 Political 
Knowledge Low 0.62 (37) 
0.80* 
(20) 1.392 0.170 
High 0.52* (33) 
0.79* 
(24) 2.137 0.037 Political 
Interest Low 0.72 (18) 
0.83 
(18) 0.778 0.442 
High 0.53 (32) 
0.60 
(15) 0.441 0.661 Symbolic 
Racism Low 0.69** (48) 
0.94** 
(46) 3.209 0.002 
 
Notes:  Number of cases is in parentheses. 


















TABLE 6.3. EFFECTS OF COGNITIVE ENGAGEMENT ON POLICY 
JUDGMENTS ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS 
  
Model (2) Model (3) Dependent Variable is  
Understandings of Affirmative 
Action Programs 
(Liberal Understanding = 1) 
B S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig. 
Party Identification -0.131 0.300 0.663 -0.072 0.359 0.840 
 -0.081   -0.025   
Political Ideology -0.259 0.339 0.444 -0.461 0.407 0.257 
 -0.161   -0.173   
Political Knowledge -0.166 0.186 0.373 -0.316 0.213 0.139 
 -0.232   -0.286   
Political Interest 0.013 0.495 0.979 0.051 0.516 0.921 
 0.006   0.013   
Symbolic Racism -0.177+ 0.104 0.089 -0.256* 0.124 0.039 
 -0.544   -0.571   
Log of Search Time  1.266+ 0.667 0.058 3.377* 1.334 0.011 
 0.521   0.916   
Type of Information     7.272* 3.471 0.036 
    0.707   
   -3.934* 1.769 0.026 Log of Search Time * Type of 
Information       -0.996   
Pseudo R2 0.328 0.433 
Number of Cases 58 58 
 
Notes:1. Positive sign indicates liberal understanding of affirmative action programs. For instance, 
Republicans (coded as 5) are less likely than Democrats (coded as 1) and Independents (coded as 
3) to view affirmative action in liberal ways; Conservatives (coded as 5) are less likely than 
liberals (coded as 1) and moderates (coded as 3) to understand affirmative action programs in 
liberal ways; The more knowledgeable, those who are more interested in politics, and those who 
hold stronger racial resentment are less likely to take liberal position on affirmative action 
programs; Those who expended more time in information seeking are more likely to view 
affirmative action programs in liberal ways; and those who sought and processed the partisan 
information (coded as 1) are less likely than those who sought and processed the factual 
information (coded as 0) to understand affirmative action programs in liberal ways. 2. Type of 
Information is coded as 1 if the partisan information condition, 0 if the factual information 
condition. 3. Log of Search Time is the natural log of Search Time. 4. Entries in bold are changes 
in predicted probabilities for the dependent variable as each independent variable changes from its 
minimum to its maximum with other variables at their mean.   





TABLE 6.4. PERCENTAGE OF LIBERAL UNDERSTANDING OF 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS, BY KNOWLEDGE * SEARCH 
TIME AND TYPE OF INFORMATION 
 
The Less Knowledgeable The More 
Knowledgeable 
 
Mean Std. Dev. N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. N 
t p < |t| 
High  80 0.410 20 79 0.412 29 0.000 1.000 
Search Time 
Low  62* 0.492 37 41* 0.501 29 1.707 0.046 
Partisan  77** 0.430 30 43** 0.507 23 2.639 0.006 Type of 
Information Factual  56 0.507 25 70 0.467 33 1.091 0.140 
 
Notes: Entries are percentage of liberal understanding of affirmative action programs.  
* p < .05; ** p = .01. Significance tests are one-tailed.   
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TABLE 6.5. EFFECT OF COGNITIVE ENGAGEMENT ON POLICY 
JUDGMENTS ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS FOR THE 
MORE AND THE LESS KNOWLEDGEABLE 
 
Model (4) 
The Less Knowledgeable The More Knowledgeable 
Dependent Variable is  
Understanding of Affirmative 
Action Programs 
(Liberal Understanding = 1) B S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig. 
Party Identification -1.368 1.086 0.104 0.474 0.502 0.173 
 -0.507   0.252   
Political Ideology 0.812 1.006 0.210 -1.112+ 0.693 0.054 
 0.202   -0.599   
Political Interest 0.490 0.981 0.309 0.469 0.910 0.303 
 0.072   0.194   
Symbolic Racism 0.184 0.273 0.250 -0.469+ 0.317 0.069 
 0.306   0.775   
Log of Search Time  5.034+ 3.403 0.069 1.414+ 1.085 0.097 
 0.876   0.538   
Type of Information  3.358+ 2.218 0.065 -2.749* 1.554 0.039 
 0.160   0.375   
Pseudo R2 0.553 0.478 
Number of Cases 29 29 
 
Notes: 1. 2. Entries in bold are changes in predicted probabilities for the dependent variable as each 
independent variable changes from its minimum to its maximum with other variables at their mean. 2.  
The positive sign of a coefficient indicates liberal understanding of affirmative action programs.  
+ p < .10; * p < .05: Significance tests are one-tailed. 
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FIGURE 6.2. CHANGES IN PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF LIBERAL 
UNDERSTANDING OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS UNDER 
THE PARTISAN AND THE FACTUAL INFORMATION CONDITIONS 
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Notes: Predicted probability was computed based on Model (1) in Table 6.1. 
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FIGURE 6.3. CHANGES IN PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF LIBERAL 
UNDERSTANDING OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS BY LOG 
OF SEARCH TIME 
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 Predicted probability was computed based on the Model (2) in Table 6.3. 
Log of Search Time
Notes:
FIGURE 6.4. CHANGES IN PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF LIBERAL 
UNDERSTANDING OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS FOR THE 
MORE AND THE LESS KNOWLEDGEABLE 
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Notes: Predicted probability was computed based on Model (4) in Table 6.5. 
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FINAL DISCUSSION: FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS  
 
 
 At the end of this journey, informed by my analyses and results, we are 
now in a better position to return to the two major questions that I posed in the 
beginning. The questions were about which persons are more likely to acquire 
new information available from the environment and how variability in 
information seeking and acquisition determines policy judgments. By providing a 
theoretically organized approach to information acquisition and its impacts on 
policy judgments and stressing the method of tracking individuals’ activities in 
information search, this study focused attention on policy judgments on a 
controversial policy issue, affirmative action programs.  
I started with an observation that scholarly focus on minimal use of 
information and prevalent use of heuristics has undermined the efforts to 
understand the precise way that an individual acquires new information and uses 
it to make policy judgments. I have attempted to fill the void between the 
allegation of minimal use of information and prevalent use of heuristics and the 
lack of empirical evidence for this allegation.  
This final chapter is not a systematic summary of the earlier chapters, but 
discusses my findings in theoretical perspectives and addresses a few broader 
arguments that warrant further study. In doing so I do not distinguish sharply 
between conclusions and findings, for my findings need replications across 
diverse policy issues and under different contexts.    
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FINDINGS IN THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
This study was guided by an information processing perspective that 
emphasizes the possibility that citizens attend to relevant information under 
certain conditions. In this perspective some citizens can actively seek and process 
relevant information and thus reach a policy judgment that otherwise would be 
different. As far as my evidence goes, I can safely say that individuals are not 
doomed to be cognitive misers but can be proactive information seekers, and that 
the greater cognitive engagement with factual information leads individuals to 
reach different policy judgments from those through cognitive engagement with 
partisan information and the less cognitive engagement.  
In another respect, studies show that white opposition to racial policies is 
driven mostly by affective attitudes toward blacks, such as racial prejudices, 
resentment, and stereotypes. Furthermore, racial considerations remain critical for 
shaping Americans’ attitudes and policy preferences on a host of policy issues.  
Notwithstanding the importance of affective attitudes toward blacks in accounting 
for racial and other policy preferences, I postulated that cognitive engagement 
would play a significant role in shaping policy judgments on race issues. The 
findings reported here are consistent with this postulation: policy judgments on 
affirmative action are contingent upon the extent to which individuals acquire 
new information and the type of information that they choose to consider. More 
precisely, individuals who expend more cognitive efforts in seeking and 
processing information tend to understand affirmative action programs in liberal 
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ways, holding their political ideology, party identification, and racial affects 
constant, and that this tendency becomes stronger when individuals acquire 
factual information than when they acquire partisan information.  
Drawing on the theories of automatic and controlled information 
processing, I examined the interactions between cognitive engagement and 
affective racial attitudes. According to automaticity thesis, people perform most 
decision-making tasks automatically and unconsciously, and white Americans’ 
policy judgments on race are considered to be made by automatic process driven 
by anti-black attitudes (Bargh 1999; Bargh and Chartrand 1999; see also 
Mendelberg 2001). Evidence shows, on the other hand, that some individuals can 
successfully inhibit the automatically activated considerations and replaced them 
with thoughts reflecting racial norms like racial equality and negation of the 
stereotype (Devine 1989; Devine and Monteith 1993). The findings reported in 
this study support the possibility of controlled information processing for those 
who expend a fair amount of cognitive efforts to acquire information. Those who 
are cognitively involved in new information, especially the factual information, 
are less influenced by anti-black attitudes. 
There has been a prolonged and heated debate among researchers of 
American race relations and white racial attitudes. Although research on race and 
public opinion is ample and in many respects illuminating, as Hochschild (2000) 
claims, “the debate among proponents of principled conservatism, symbolic 
racism, and social structural approaches has gone as far as it can for the present” 
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(340).36 Similarly, “neither side [of principled conservatism, symbolic racism, and 
social structural approaches] has produced incontrovertible evidence in support of 
their position,…, resulting in an impasse that we believe has hindered the 
advancement of research on white racial policy attitudes” (Feldman and Huddy 
2005, 168).  
My purpose was to offer an empirically grounded account of white 
Americans’ policy judgments on race-targeted public policies, with an alternative 
perspective that leads us to go beyond racism-centered approaches. The 
theoretical importance of cognitive engagement in accounting for the formation of 
policy judgments is clear. I have shown that although anti-black attitudes remain 
critical for shaping white Americans’ racial policy judgments, their impact on 
policy judgments is variable, depending on the extent to which individuals pay 
cognitive attention to the issue. By adding this case to the research, we are better 
able to understand policy judgments on race-targeted public policies.  
IMPLICATIONS ON THE FORMATION OF RACIAL POLICY 
JUDGMENTS 
White Americans have become less concerned about race matters. A 
greater portion of white Americans are “rationale ignorant” concerning race 
matters as well as other policy matters (Shipler1977; Nadeau, Niemi, and Levine 
1993; Schuman et al. 1997). Sniderman and Carmines (1997) observe “the 
 
36 Hochschild (2000) contends that “these authors [proponents of racism-centered theory and 
politics-centered theory—my addition] appropriately criticize each other for not paying sufficient 
attention to the many meanings of concepts that they have found to be crucial to their own 
research. They might instead, or in addition, devote their energy to developing new ways to bring 
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continuing obtuseness and indifference of white Americans to the special cross of 
discrimination and economic disadvantage that black Americans still must bear” 
(16). Similarly, Shipler (1977) finds that “Most whites rarely have to give race 
much thought…Few whites I interviewed had considered the questions [regarding 
race matters] I put to them” (10). A study of the 1991 NES Pilot Study by 
Nadeau, Niemi, and Levine (1993) shows that 54 percent of white Americans 
overestimate percent of black population as being more than 30 percent (the 
actual black population was 12.1 percent, according to the 1990 Census). All 
these findings suggest that most white Americans have no incentives or interests 
at stake in understanding race matters. Because of this ignorance and apathy, 
many white Americans are riveted by their “racial” considerations rather than 
reasoned or informed considerations in making policy judgments on race issues.  
In addition, race has become less salient as a policy issue in the national 
political scene and in national-level political campaigns (Frymer 2002). And, it 
also has become more complicated and ambiguous in terms of ideological and 
partisan line of thinking (Sniderman and Carmines 1997; Sniderman and Piazza 
1993; Edsall and Edsall 11992; Feldman and Zaller 1994). Furthermore, elite-
supplied information as to race matters has deteriorated and coded (Edsall and 
Edsall 1992; Frymer 2002; Mendelberg 2001). Edsall and Edsall (1992) observe 
that “race is no longer a straightforward, morally unambiguous force in American 
politics; instead, considerations of race are now deeply imbedded in the strategy 
 
more of these concepts into the foreground, where they can be carefully analyzed without 
themselves and their readers in endless detail” (331-332). 
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and tactics of politics, in competing concepts of the function and responsibility of 
government, and in each voter’s conceptual structure of moral and partisan 
identity” (53). This sort of information environment requires ordinary citizens to 
expend much more cognitive efforts in identifying the nuanced differences of 
competing elites’ contingent positions on race matters.  
With that said, a primary source of the problem is the information 
environment unsatisfactory for citizens’ information acquisition or learning. 
Although ordinary white citizens see little relevance of race issues in public life 
and feel little personal responsibility to race matters, a better information 
environment for learning or information acquisition will help them to get more 
involved in and learn about race issues. According to one basic lesson from 
modern cognitive science, the availability of the relevant information is necessary 
for active attention to and involvement in the issues. If the information 
environment where relevant information is readily available and information cost 
is cheap, then, as this study demonstrated, white citizens tend to have different 













Appendix 1. Variables Numbers and Coding Schemes for the 1996 
and 2004 NES 
 
The 1996 and 2004 (advance release file) NES data is drawn from ICPSR website 
at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu. The following list provides variable numbers for 
all variables used in the analyses. For each variable, the numbers started with v96 
corresponds to the 1996 NES data and the numbers started with v04 represents the 
variables in the 2004 NES data. The coding scheme and descriptive statistics are 




Federal Aid to Blacks: v961210, v043158  
Affirmative Action: v961209, v045207a 
 
The NES codes Federal Assistance with 1 for “Government should help 
blacks” and 7 for “Blacks should help themselves” and Affirmative Action with 1 
for “Favor” and 5 for “Oppose.” Thus higher scores represent more opposition to 
racially targeted policies.   
 Question wording of affirmative action was that “Some people say that 
because of past discrimination, blacks should be given preference in hiring and 
promotion.  Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion of blacks is 
wrong because it gives blacks advantages they haven't earned. What about your 
opinion -- are you FOR or AGAINST preferential hiring and promotion of 
blacks?” And, question wording of Federal aid to blacks was that “Some people 
feel that the government in Washington should make every effort to improve the 
social and economic position of blacks. (Suppose these people are at one end of a 
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scale, at point 1.)  Others feel that the government should not make any special 
effort to help blacks because they should help themselves.(Suppose these people 
are at the other end, at point 7.) And, of course, some other people have opinions 
somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would you place 
YOURSELF on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? 
 
Independent Variables: 
Attentiveness: v960069, v960073, v960074, v960489, v043402, v043406, 
v043407, v043159   
 
R’s Cooperation and Interest in the interview are 5-point scale and R’s 
Sincerity is 3-point scale. The NES codes these variables with 1 for high 
cooperation and interest and with 5 for low cooperation and interests and with 1 
completely sincere and with 3 for often seem to be insincere. I recoded the 
sincerity variable into 5-point scale and all the three variables in reverse order. 
Thus, in my analyses, for R’s cooperation and interest, 1=very poor and low, 
2=poor and below average, 3=fair and average, 4=good and above average, 
5=very good and very high; and for R’s sincerity, 1=often seem to be insincere, 
3=usually sincere, 5=completely sincere.  
The question wording of “importance of aid to blacks” reads: “Some 
people feel that the government in Washington should make every effort to 
improve the social and economic position of blacks. Others feel that the 
government should not make any special effort to help blacks because they should 
help themselves. How important is this issue to you?” This question was courted 
in the 1996 (v960489) and 2004 NES (v043159) but not in others. This variable 
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on 1-to-5 scale was also recoded in reverse order: 1=not important, 2=not too 
important, 3=somewhat important, 4=very important, 5=extremely important. The 
composite measure of attentiveness was standardized.   
Symbolic Racism: v961230, v961231, v045193, v045194, v045195, v045196 
 
The items from the 2004 NES are (1) The history of slavery and 
discrimination makes it more difficult for blacks to succeed; (2) If blacks would 
only try harder they could be just as well off as whites; (3) Blacks should work 
their way up like other racial groups; and (4) Blacks have gotten less then they 
deserve. The items from the 1996 NES are: (1) We have gone too far in pushing 
equal rights in this country; and (2) one the big problems in this country is that we 
don’t give everyone an equal change. 
Each variable is 5-point scale, 1 for agree to 5 for disagree. I recoded the 
variables, except for v045194 and v045195, in reverse order. Thus higher scores 
indicate more symbolic racism. In the 1996 NES, I used 2 items of symbolic 
racism, thus as shown in the table below, the measure of symbolic racism ranges 
from 2 to 10. In the 2004 NES, since 4 items are used, it ranges from 0 to 20.  
Stereotypes: v961312, v961315, v961318, v045223, v045227, v045231 
 
Each variable is 7-point scale, 1=hardworking/intelligent/trustworthy, 
7=lazy/unintelligent/ untrustworthy. The measure of stereotypes is the sum of the 
three variables.  
Political Knowledge: v961189, v961190, v961191, v961192, v961072, v961073, 
v045163, v045164, v045165, v045089, v045090 
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This measure was based on factual knowledge items of identification 
questions (the vice-president, the Chief of Justice of the Supreme Court, the 
Russian President (or the British Prime Minister), and the Speaker of the House--
the 1996 NES only) and party control of the House and the Senate. Correct 
answer is coded 1 and incorrect answer or refuse to answer are coded 0. Each 
variable is summed up for the measure of political knowledge. 
 
Party Identification: v960420, v043116 
 
A 7-point scale is used: 1=Strong Democrat, 2=Weak Democrat, 
3=Leaning Democrat, 4=Independent, 5=Leaning Republican, 6=Weak 
Republican, 7=Strong Republican. 
Ideology: v960369, v043086 
 
A 5-point scale is used: 1=Liberal, 3=Moderate, 5=Conservative. 
 
Education: v960610, v043254 
 
Age: v960605, v043250 
 
Male: v960066, v043411 coded 1=Male, 0=Female 
 
South: v960109, v041203 coded 1=South (10 southern states), 0=Non-South 
 
Appendix 2. Online Survey Questionnaire 
 
Survey Session 
Please select and check a box.  
1.1. Some people don't pay much attention to political campaign. How about you, 
would you say that you have been/were very much interested, somewhat interested, 
or not much interested in following the political campaigns (so far) this year? 
   Not much interested 
   Somewhat interested  
   Very much interested  
   Can't Say; Don't Know 
 
1.2. Generally speaking, would you say that you personally care a good deal which 
party wins the presidential election this fall, or that you can't care very much which 
party wins?  
   Don't care very much 
   Care a good deal 
   Can't Say; Don't Know 
 
1.3. How much would you say that you personally cared about the way that the 
elections to the U.S. House of Representatives came out? 
   Not very much  
   Pretty much, very much 
   Can't Say; Don't Know 
 
1.4. Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs 
most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that 
interested. Would you say that you follow what's going on in government and public 
affairs more of the time, some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all? 
   Hardly at all  
   Only now and then 
   Some of the time  
   Most of the time 




2.1. Some people feel that the government in Washington should see to it that every 
person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government should 
just let each person get ahead on his/their own. Where would you place your self on 
this scale? 
Government see to job 




person get ahead on his
own
1 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 7  
7 
 
2.2. In the past yeas, we have heard a lot about improving the position of black 
people in this country. How much real change do you think there has been in the 
position of black people in the past few years? 
   Not much at all 
   Some 
   A lot 
   Can't Say; Don't Know  
 
2.3. Some say that the civil rights people have been trying to push too fast. Others 
feel they haven't pushed fast enough. How about you? 
   Too slowly  
   About right  
   Too fast  
   Can't Say; Don't Know 
 
2.4. Some people say that the government in Washington should see to it that white 
and black children go to the same schools. Others claim that this is not the 
government's business. Have you been concerned enough about this question to 
favor one side over the other? If yes, do you think the government in Washington 
should 
   see to it that white and black children go to the same school 
   stay out of this area as it is none of government's business  
   Can't Say; Don't Know 
 
2.5. Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every 
possible effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks. Others feel 
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that the government should not make any special effort to help blacks because they 
should help themselves. Where do you place yourself on this scale, of haven't you 
though about this?  
Government should help 
blacks  
  
Blacks should help 
themselves  
1 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 7  
7 
 
2.6. Do you think that large companies should be required to give a certain number 
of jobs to blacks, or should the government stay out of this? Where do you place 
yourself on this scale?  
Government should make 
the companies to give a 
certain number of jobs to 
blacks 
 
Government should stay 
out of this 
1 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 7  
7 
 
2.7. Would you think what is the best understanding of affirmative action programs? 
   Correction of the effects of past discrimination 
   Prohibition of future and current discrimination 
   Promotion of diversity or inclusion 
   Violation against the merit or desert principle 
   Reverse Discrimination against bystanders 
   Quota system 
   Can't Say; Don't Know  
3.1. How old are you? yrs  
3.2. Are you a freshman, sophomore, junior, or senior? 
3.3. Are you male or female? Female Male 
3.4. What racial or ethnic group or groups best describe you?  
   Asian/Pacific Islander  
   Native American  
   Hispanic  
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   Black  
   White  
   Others; Specify  
 
4.1. Which party has the most members in the House of Representatives in 
Washington? 
   Democrats 
   Republicans 
   Can't say; Don't Know 
 
4.2. How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and House of 
Representatives to override a presidential veto? 
   One-Half plus one vote  
   Three-Fifths 
   Two-Thirds 
   Three-Quarters 
   Some other percentages 
   Can't Say; Don't Know 
 
4.3. In general, thinking about the political parties in Washington, would you say 
Democrats are more conservative than Republicans, or Republicans are more 
conservative than Democrats? 
   Democrats are more conservative  
   Republicans are more conservative 
   Both parties are equally conservative 
   Can't Say; Don't Know 
 
4.4. Whose responsibility is it to determine if a law is constitutional or not? 
   The President  
   Congress 
   The Supreme Court  
   Some other Groups/Persons 
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   Can't Say; Don't Know  
 
4.5. How many members of the U.S. Supreme Court are there? 
   Nine 
   Eleven  
   Some other numbers 
   Can't Say; Don't Know 
 
4.6. What job or political office is now held by Dennis Hastert?  
4.7. What is the name of the president of Russia?  
 
Just give me your best guess on the following questions. 
 
5.1.What percent of people in this country would you say are black? percent 
5.2. What percent of all the poor people in this country would you say are black? 
percent 
5.3. Of all the people arrested for violent crimes in this country last year, what 
percent do you think were black? Do you think it's closer to percent 
5.4. Of all the welfare recipients in this country last year, what percent do you think 
were black? Do you think it's closer to percent  
5.5. Of all the black males of working age in this country, what percent do you think 
are unemployed? Do you think it's closer to percent  
5.6. Of all the black population in this country, what percent do you think are 
educated four years or more of college? percent  
5.7. What percent of white citizens do you think support for quotas in education? 
percent 
 
We are asking your political orientation. 
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6.1. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a 
Republican, an Independent, or what? 
   Democrat (GO TO 6.2)  
   Republican (GO TO 6.3) 
   Independent (GO TO 6.4)  
   No Preference  
   Other 
   Can't Say; Don't Know 
 
6.2. (If Democrat): Would you call yourself a Strong Democrat or not very Strong 
Democrat? 
   Strong 
   Not very Strong 
 
(SKIP TO 6.5) 
 
6.3. (If Republican): Would you call yourself a Strong Republican or not very Strong 
Republican? 
   Strong 
   Not very Strong  
 
(SKIP TO 6.5) 
 
6.4. (If Independent): Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic party or 
closer to the Republican party?  
   Closer to the Democratic party 
   Closer to the Republican party 
   Neither  
 
6.5. Generally speaking, would you consider yourself to be a liberal, a conservative, 
a moderate, or haven't you thought about this? 
   Liberal (GO TO 6.6)  
   Conservative (GO TO 6.7)  
   Moderate (GO TO 6.8)  
 178
   Can't Say; Don't Know 
 
6.6. (If Liberal); Do you think of yourself as a Strong liberal of not a very strong 
liberal? 
   Strong 
   Not very Strong 
 
(SKIP TO 6.9)  
 
6.7. (If Conservative); Do you think of yourself as a Strong conservative of not a 
very strong liberal?  
   Strong 
   Not very Strong 
 
(SKIP TO 6.9)  
 
6.8. (If Moderate): Do you think yourself as more like a liberal or more like a 
conservative?  
   More like a Liberal  
   More like a Conservative 
   Just a Moderate 
 
6.9. Do you remember when you were growing up whether your father was very 
much interested in politics, somewhat interested, or did not he pay attention to it? 
   Did not pay much attention 
   Somewhat interested  
   Very much interested  
   Can't Say; Don't Know 
 
6.10. Now how about your mother? When you were growing up was she very much 
interested in politics, or didn't she pay much attention to it? 
   Did not pay much attention  
   Somewhat interested  
   Very much interested  
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   Can't Say; Don't Know 
Now I am going to present several statements. After each one, I would like 
you to tell me whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree 
nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly.  
7.1. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve. 
   Agree Strongly 
   Agree Somewhat 
   Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
   Disagree Somewhat  
   Disagree Strongly  
   Don't Know  
7.2. Irish, Italians, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and 
worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors. 
   Agree Strongly 
   Agree Somewhat 
   Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
   Disagree Somewhat  
   Disagree Strongly  
   Don't Know  
7.3. It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only 
try harder they could be just as well off as whites.  
   Agree Strongly 
   Agree Somewhat 
   Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
   Disagree Somewhat  
   Disagree Strongly  
   Don't Know  
7.4. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it 
difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.  
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   Agree Strongly 
   Agree Somewhat 
   Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
   Disagree Somewhat  
   Disagree Strongly  
   Don't Know  
7.5. Most blacks who receive money from welfare programs could get along without 
it if they tried.  
   Agree Strongly 
   Agree Somewhat 
   Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
   Disagree Somewhat  
   Disagree Strongly  
   Don't Know  
7.6. Government officials usually pay less attention to a request or complaint from a 
black person than from a white person.  
   Agree Strongly 
   Agree Somewhat 
   Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
   Disagree Somewhat  
   Disagree Strongly  
   Don't Know  
7.7. Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has en 
equal opportunity to succeed.  
   Agree Strongly 
   Agree Somewhat 
   Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
   Disagree Somewhat  
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   Disagree Strongly  
   Don't Know  
7.8. We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.  
   Agree Strongly 
   Agree Somewhat 
   Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
   Disagree Somewhat  
   Disagree Strongly  
   Don't Know  
7.9. One of the big problem in this country is that we don’t have give everyone an 
equal chance.  
   Agree Strongly 
   Agree Somewhat 
   Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
   Disagree Somewhat  
   Disagree Strongly  
   Don't Know  
7.10. This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are. 
   Agree Strongly 
   Agree Somewhat 
   Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
   Disagree Somewhat  
   Disagree Strongly  
   Don't Know  
7.11. It is not really that big of a problem if some people have more of a chance in 
life than others.  
   Agree Strongly 
   Agree Somewhat 
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   Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
   Disagree Somewhat  
   Disagree Strongly  
   Don't Know  
7.12. If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer 
problems.  
   Agree Strongly 
   Agree Somewhat 
   Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
   Disagree Somewhat  
   Disagree Strongly  
   Don't Know  
7.13. Most people who don’t get ahead should not blame the system; they have only 
themselves to blame.  
   Agree Strongly 
   Agree Somewhat 
   Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
   Disagree Somewhat  
   Disagree Strongly  
   Don't Know  
7.14. Hard work offers little guarantee of success.  
   Agree Strongly 
   Agree Somewhat 
   Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
   Disagree Somewhat  
   Disagree Strongly  
   Don't Know  
7.15. If people work hard they almost always get what they want.  
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   Agree Strongly 
   Agree Somewhat 
   Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
   Disagree Somewhat  
   Disagree Strongly  
   Don't Know  
7.16. Most people who do not get ahead in life probably work as hard as people who 
do.  
   Agree Strongly 
   Agree Somewhat 
   Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
   Disagree Somewhat  
   Disagree Strongly  
   Don't Know  
7.17. Any person who is willing to work hard has a good chance of succeeding.  
   Agree Strongly 
   Agree Somewhat 
   Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
   Disagree Somewhat  
   Disagree Strongly  
   Don't Know  
7.18. Even if people try hard they often cannot reach their goals.  
   Agree Strongly 
   Agree Somewhat 
   Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
   Disagree Somewhat  
   Disagree Strongly  
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   Don't Know  
I'd like to get your feeling toward some groups and I'll ask you to rate that 
group on a thermometer that runs from 0 to 100 degrees. Rating above 50 
means that you feel favorable and warm toward the group. Rating below 50 
means that you feel unfavorable and cool toward the group. Rating right at 
the 50 degree make means that you don't feel particularly warm or cool. 
You may give any number from 0 to 100 to tell me how favorable or 
unfavorable your feelings are.  
 
8.1. The Federal Government in Washington: , or No Rating; I do not 
know where to rate  
8.2. Blacks: , or No Rating; I do not know where to rate 
8.3. Conservatives: , or No Rating; I do not know where to rate 
8.4. Liberals: , or No Rating; I do not know where to rate 
8.5. Labor Unions: , or No Rating; I do not know where to rate 
8.6. Big Business: , or No Rating; I do not know where to rate 
8.7. Poor People: , or No Rating; I do not know where to rate 
8.8. Whites: , or No Rating; I do not know where to rate 
8.9. Hispanics: , or No Rating; I do not know where to rate 
8.10. People on Welfare: , or No Rating; I do not know where to rate 
8.11. Christian Fundamentalists: , or No Rating; I do not know where to 
rate 
8.12. Environmentalists: , or No Rating; I do not know where to rate 
8.13. Gay Men and Lesbians: , or No Rating; I do not know where to rate 
8.14. Feminists: , or No Rating; I do not know where to rate 
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Thanks a lot.  





Appendix 3. Online Briefing Document 
a. Instruction Page 
Welcome to The Race and Information Project 
Principal Investigators: Jaesung Ryu, Ph.D. Candidate & Professor. Daron R. Shaw, Department of 
Government, University of Texas at Austin.  
This project is designed to provide you with information regarding Affirmative Action Programs (AAP), to 
p you make a better decision on race-related public policies.  
Affirmative action has been one of the most controversial policy issues in the U.S. The issue has 
historically been, and continues to be, plagued by ambiguity surrounding the concept and by the manner in 
which the various policies have been implemented. This is primarily because since the 1970s there have 
been many different kinds of affirmative action regulations, programs, understandings, and purposes.  
It might be easy to answer to the question of whether to support or oppose AAP. But it might NOT be easy 
to explain to others about what one knows about them. According to a study, approximately 40 percent of 
people are completely unfamiliar with the concept of Affirmative Action; and many of those who claimed 
familiarity provide a vague or inaccurate definition. This study indicates that many people do not have 
knowledge about AAP, and that they lack opportunity to acquire information to enlarge their knowledge 
and sharpen their rationale for or against AAP.  
As you access the websites here, we want you try to think about the following questions: Do the nature and 
magnitude of continuing economic and social inequality between the races require concerted public and 
private action, or are natural forces in the economy satisfactorily narrowing the gaps? Do race-based 
discrimination and exclusion continue to be important factors in American life, affecting the opportunities 
and welfare of blacks and other minorities, or are they not aberrant and insubstantial? Is affirmative action 
effective in combating discrimination and exclusion? Is it consistent with inviolable principles in the U.S.? 
Please note that people best answer these questions when they are more informed and imagine themselves 
as a responsible public official. Feel free to think and take time while processing information and 
answering the survey questions. 
Now, you will go to Survey Session, in which you'll be asked several questions. Please note that your 
personal identity is never disclosed to anybody including the investigators. Then you move onto 
Information Session, in which a wide range of information about AAP will be provided. Throughout the 
web pages you can select the information you want to study from the menu. As you will see, there will be 
no problem for you to search the information you want because the websites are exactly the same as any 
other websites. Anytime you think you feel you have enough information, you can go to the final session 
Survey Session II, in which just four questions will be courted. Please note that if you do not finish the 
second survey, you cannot claim the credit.  
Again, the websites provided will help you better understand AAP as well as lead you to more informed 
decision-making on this important policy matter. Hope you enjoy yourself to surf the sites.  
So, are you ready to go? All Right. Here We Go
b. Initial Page in Information Session in Experiment 1 
You can collect and integrate information with regard to race and Affirmative Action Programs by clicking the 
items on the menu below. Each item contains detailed information. We strongly recommend you to do a 
thorough search, so that you not only enlarge your knowledge about race and Affirmative Action Programs but 
also shape (and reshape) your issue position on this important policy matter. 
Many believe that substantive, factual knowledge (like in Green Box) is essential to make a sound, rational 
decision. Here are statistics of lives of African Americans, historical origins of AAP, must-know rulings of the 
Supreme Court on AAP, and recent events regarding AAP. 
In another way, a shortcut to posit yourself on some policy issues is to look at the positions of reference 
groups or individuals who you can trust (like in Orange Box). Here are ideas, arguments, and perspectives of 













Origins of Affirmative 
Action Programs 
 




Public Opinion Polls 
 
 
The Supreme Court's 
Decisions 
Recent Development 






c. Initial Page for Treatment Group 1 (Factual Information Condition) in 
Experiment 2 
You can collect and integrate information with regard to race and Affirmative Action Programs by clicking the 
items on the menu below. Each item contains detailed information. We strongly recommend you to do a 
thorough search, so that you not only enlarge your knowledge about race and Affirmative Action Programs but 
also shape (and reshape) your issue position on this important policy matter. 
Many believe that substantive, factual knowledge (like in Green Box) is essential to make a sound, rational 
decision. Here are statistics of lives of African Americans, historical origins of AAP, must-know rulings of the 
Supreme Court on AAP, and recent events regarding AAP. 
Statistics: African Americans 
 
 
Origins of Affirmative Action Programs 
 
The Supreme Court's Decisions 






d. Initial Page for Treatment Group 2 (partisan Information Condition) in 
Experiment 2 
You can collect and integrate information with regard to race and Affirmative Action Programs by clicking the 
items on the menu below. Each item contains detailed information. We strongly recommend you to do a 
thorough search, so that you not only enlarge your knowledge about race and Affirmative Action Programs but 
also shape (and reshape) your issue position on this important policy matter. 
In another way, a shortcut to posit yourself on some policy issues is to look at the positions of reference 
groups or individuals who you can trust (like in Orange Box). Here are ideas, arguments, and perspectives of 
the presidents & prominent politicians, the public interest groups, the political parties, and the American 
public. 







The Political Parties:  
Democrats v. Republicans 
What Citizens Think: 





e-1. President and Politicians 
  
Go To SurveyPresidents and Politicians Speak out... 
Presidents and prominent political figures are at the center of public 
policy making. They set the national agenda, provide references by which 
ordinary citizens can start thinking about and understand the issues, and 
mobilize people who would support their policy positions.  
 
For the sake of their own political cause and/or interests, presidents and 
politicians provide well-organized, easy-to-follow definitions and 
arguments about public policy issues.  
 
George Bush (43th) || Bill Clinton || Lyndon B. Johnson || Ronald 
Reagan || Martin Luther King, Jr. || Jesse Jackson || Colin Powell || 
Justice Clarence Thomas
 
MAIN MENU  
Presidents and 
Politicians 
Interest Groups  
Political Parties  
Public Opinion Polls  
Statistics 
Origins 
The Supreme Court 
Recent Development  
 
 
e-1.1. Presidents and Politicians: George W. Bush  
 
George W. Bush Bill Clinton Lyndon Johnson Martin Luther King Jr. 
Go To Survey
 
President George Bush 
I strongly support diversity of all kinds, 
including racial diversity in higher education. 
But the method used by the University of 
Michigan to achieve this important goal is 
fundamentally flawed. At their core, the 
Michigan policies amount to a quota system that 
unfairly rewards or penalizes perspective 
students, based solely on their race. 
Our Constitution makes it clear that people of all 
races must be treated equally under the law. Yet 
we know that our society has not fully achieved 
that ideal. Racial prejudice is a reality in 
America . It hurts many of our citizens. As a 
nation, as a government, as individuals, we must 
be vigilant in responding to prejudice wherever 
we find it. Yet, as we work to address the wrong 
of racial prejudice, we must not use means that 
create another wrong, and thus perpetuate our 
divisions. 
America is a diverse country, racially, 
economically, and ethnically. And our 
institutions of higher education should reflect 
our diversity...Yet quota systems that use race to 
include or exclude people from higher education 
and the opportunities it offers are divisive, 
unfair and impossible to square with the 
Constitution.  
 
MAIN MENU  
Presidents and Politicians
Interest Groups  




e-1.2. Presidents and Politicians: Bill Clinton 
 
George W. Bush Bill Clinton Lyndon Johnson Martin Luther King Jr. 
Go To Survey
 
President Bill Clinton  
Let me be clear about what affirmative action must 
not mean and what I won’t allow it to be. It does not 
mean—and I don’t favor—the unjustified preference 
of the unqualified over the qualified of any race or 
either gender. It doesn't mean—and I don’t favor—
numerical quotas. It doesn’t mean—and I don’t 
favor—selection or rejection of any employee or 
student solely on the basis of race or gender without 
regard to merit.  
Affirmative action did not cause the great economic 
problems of the American middle class. It is just 
wrong.  
Affirmative action has not always been perfect, and 
affirmative action should not go on forever. It 
should be changed now to take care of those things 
that are wrong, and it should be retired when its job 
is done. I am revolved that that day will come. But 
the evidence suggests—indeed, screams—that that 
day has not yet come.  
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e-1.3. Presidents and Politicians: Lyndon Johnson  
  




You do not take a man who, for years, has been 
hobbled by chains, liberate him, bring him to the 
starting line of a race saying, “You are free to 
compete with all the others,” and still justly believe 
you have been completely fair. Thus it is not enough 
to just open the gates of opportunity. All our citizens 
must have the ability to walk through those gates.  
This is the next and more profound stage of the 
battle for civil rights. We seek not just freedom of 
opportunity, not just legal equity; not just equality as 
a right and theory, but equality as a right and result. 
The Negro, …, will have to rely mostly on his own 
efforts. But he just can not do it alone. For they did 
not have the heritage of centuries to overcome. They 
did not have the cultural tradition which had been 
twisted and battered by endless years of hatred and 
hopelessness. Nor were they excluded because of 
race or color—a feeling whose dark intensity is 
matched by no other prejudice in society.  
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e-1.4. Presidents and Politicians: Martin Luther King, Jr.  
 
George W. Bush Bill Clinton Lyndon Johnson Martin Luther King Jr. 
Go To Survey
 
Martin Luther King, Jr.  
Can any fair-minded citizen deny that the Negro has 
been deprived? Few people reflect that for two 
centuries the Negro was enslaved, and robbed of any 
wages—potential accrued wealth which would have 
been the legacy of his descendants. All of America 
’s wealth today could not adequately compensate its 
Negroes for his centuries of exploitation and 
humiliation. It is an economic fact that a program 
such as I propose would certainly cost far less than 
any computation of two centuries of unpaid wages 
plus accumulated interest. In any case, I do not 
intend that this program of economic aid should 
apply only to the Negro, it should benefit the 
disadvantaged of all races.  
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e-2. Interest Groups 
 
 
Go To SurveyInterest Groups on Race & Affirmative Action 
Many believe that organized groups, pursuing special agendas, dominate 
the governmental and policy-making process. There are an enormous 
number of interest groups in the United States, and millions of Americans 
are members of one or more groups, at least to the extent of paying dues or 
attending an occasional meeting. Over the past thirty years, there has been 
an enormous increase both in the number of interest groups seeking to play 
a role in the American political process and in the extent of their 
opportunity to influence that process. 
 
Public interest groups articulate the policy issues they are concerned and 
mobilize as many public as possible for promoting their political goals. For 
people public interest groups are an information shortcut to understand on-
going political controversies as well as an helping hand for their political 
cause and/or interest. 
 
Consider the issue positions of the following public interest groups on race 
and affirmative action.  
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) || The Center for Individual Rights || NFL-CIO || American 





Interest Groups  
Political Parties  
Public Opinion Polls  
Statistics 
Origins 
The Supreme Court 
Recent Development  
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e-2.1. Interest Groups: National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP)
 
NAACP The Center for Individual Rights  NFL-CIO
American Civil Rights 
Coalitions
Go To SurveyNational Association For the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 
Our Mission: The NAACP insures the political, educational, social 
and economic equality of minority groups and citizens; achieves 
equality of rights and eliminates race prejudice among the citizens of 
the United States; removes all barriers of racial discrimination through 
the democratic processes; seeks to enact and enforce federal, state, and 
local laws securing civil rights; informs the public of the adverse 
effects of racial discrimination and seeks its elimination; educates 
persons as to their constitutional rights and to take all lawful action in 
furtherance of these principles.  
Equal opportunity programs such as affirmative action are effective, 
fair, and necessary, particularly since as you yourself have admitted 
racial discrimination still exists. In education, employment, and 
contracting, ethnic minorities and women are still largely 
underrepresented. Equal opportunity programs provide qualified 
women and people of color with opportunities they might not 
otherwise have. In many ways, equal opportunity programs are the 
epitome of the American ideal of self-reliance and personal 
responsibility: they help to provide access, yet it is up to the individual 
to work hard to take advantage of the opportunities that may be 
available. 
 
Critics of affirmative action sometimes disingenuously inject the issue 
of "quotas" into the public debate. Such divisive tactics have misled 
many to believe that affirmative action and "quotas" are the same thing 
- for example, that employers are required by law to hire fixed 
percentages of members of specific groups, regardless of their 
qualifications. Such claims are clearly erroneous: the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly made clear that quotas are illegal and that properly-
designed affirmative action programs simply create opportunities for 
qualified women and people of color.  
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e-2. 2. Interest Groups: The Center for Individual Rights
 
NAACP The Center for Individual Rights  NFL-CIO
American Civil Rights 
Coalitions
Go To SurveyThe Center for Individual Rights 
CIR's civil rights litigation is based on the principle of strict state 
neutrality: the state must not advantage some or disadvantage others 
because of their race.  
 
Race, like religion, must be placed beyond the reach of the state. Our 
objections to racial preferences are legal, moral, and pragmatic. 
Preferences are almost always unconstitutional when used to achieve 
an arbitrary racial diversity; they are only legal when narrowly tailored 
to remedy past discrimination against identifiable individuals. As a 
moral matter, preferences are dehumanizing and reduce individuals to 
the color of their skin. And pragmatically, racial preferences almost 
always add to division and discord in society.  
 
In a case that could sharply limit the federal government's use of racial 
preferences for minority contractors, CIR is representing a small Long 
Island company whose ability to compete (and even stay in business) 
continues to be hobbled by the federal government's extensive use of 
race preferences in awarding government contracts.  
 
The complex, mechanical preferences used by Department of Defense 
include quota-like goals, set-asides, noncompetitive contract awards, a 
ten percent price adjustment factor, and performance evaluation 
incentives for contracting officers. These preferences, codified in 
Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act as well as in related statutes and 
regulations, are said to be for small, "socially disadvantaged" business 
owners of all races. However, the government defines social 
disadvantage so as to presumptively include virtually all racial 
minorities, ranging from African-Americans and Hispanics to 
Samoans, Tongans, Pakistanis, and Sri Lankans.  
 
In theory, the preference program is limited to "economically 
disadvantaged" individuals — those with net worth of no more than 
$750,000. In practice, the beneficiaries include many millionaire 
minority business owners. 
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e-2.3. Interest Groups: NFL-CIO
 
NAACP The Center for Individual Rights  NFL-CIO
American Civil Rights 
Coalitions
Go To SurveyNFL-CIO 
The AFL-CIO has long supported affirmative action as an effective 
way to promote diversity and remedy past and present discrimination. 
Solid affirmative action program in our nation's university system is 
one of the first steps to reducing prejudice and stereotypes in America's 
workplaces. 
 
The unique opportunities to interact with people from other races and 
ethnic groups on a college campus at the very threshold of the 
workplace that are fostered by the admissions policies will make 
students not only more productive members of society, but better 
citizens in our democracy and in the workplace. 
 
Among the most clearly documented educational benefits of a diverse 
student body is the reduction of stereotypes and prejudices that lead to 
discrimination. Specifically, multiple long-term national studies of 
primary, secondary as well as higher education have documented a link 
between interaction among students of diverse races and ethnic 
backgrounds and a reduced resistance to working with such people 
after graduation. These studies demonstrate that white, African 
American and Hispanic students who have gone to school with diverse 
peers are more likely to work well in integrated workplaces.  
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e-2.4. Interest Groups: American Civil Rights Institute (ACRI)
 
NAACP The Center for Individual Rights  NFL-CIO
American Civil Rights 
Coalitions
Go To SurveyAmerican Civil Rights Institute 
The American Civil Rights Institute is a national civil rights 
organization created to educate the public about racial and gender 
preferences. 
 
The Right Argument: The so-called "diversity rationale" for 
preferences is constitutionally insufficient to justify discrimination on 
the basis of skin color or where a student's ancestors came from. 
Furthermore, achieving skin-color diversity assumes that all racial 
minorities are simply interchangeable with one another: Any black 
student in a college class will bring a "black" perspective to the 
discussion and the learning experience: it doesn't matter if he or she 
attended an impoverished inner-city high school or a chic prep school, 
black or brown skin creates diversity. 
 
The Wrong Argument: The rewards of "diversity" -- or, in reality, a 
student body that is proportionate to the nation's racial and ethnic 
populations -- is so beneficial to everyone, that admitting or rejecting 
students because of skin color is permissible. Objective social 
scientists have questioned the methodology and validity of this 
argument. 
 
The Split-the-Baby Argument: Even if educational diversity at the 
public universities is important enough to justify a thumb on the scale 
in favor of certain preferred minorities, the school's racial preference 
policies must be fashioned in a way that is "narrowly tailored" -- in 
other words, the implementation of racial preferences must be 
accomplished through laser surgery, rather than a shotgun approach. In 
the real world of college admissions policies, this means the thumb on 
the scale can't be too heavy.  
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e-3. Political Parties 
  
Go To SurveyDemocrats vs. Republicans on Race & 
firmative Action  
Many place political parties at the center of democratic political life, 
believing that they are the most effective institutions for promoting 
democracy for the people. A long line of thinkers have maintained that 
parties are essential to both the creation and the furthering of one of the 
democratic values--civic participation in political process.  
 
Political parties offer ways of how to view what is going on in politics. 
This is why partisan labeling on political issues is a very strong cue 
which ordinary citizens can use to guide themselves in making their 
political decisions.  
 
Presented below are the 2000 and 2004 National Party Platforms for 
Democrats and Republicans, a summary of parties' electoral politics, and 
the current presidential campaigns, regarding race and affirmative action. 
Democratic National Platform, 2000 & 2004 || Republican National 
Platform, 2000 & 2004 || Party Politics and Race || Democrats vs. 
Republican in 2004 Campaign  
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e-3.1. Political Parties: Democratic National Platform, 2000 & 2004 
 
Democratic National 
Platform, 2000 & 2004 
Republican 
National Platform, 
2000 & 2004 
Party Politics and 
Race 
Political Parties in 2004 
Campaign
Go To Survey
2000 Democratic National Platform  
America’s diversity is expanding, yet amidst important signs of progress, 
there is widespread evidence of persistent discrimination, growing racial 
segregation of our schools and neighborhoods, and dream-crushing 
barriers to opportunity. We cannot-- we dare not--remain a nation divided. 
Our vision is of an America healed of hatreds and is understanding, with 
equality and opportunity so rich that legacies of discrimination and 
exclusion will be found only in history books, and not in our 
communities. 
 
Despite undeniable progress over the last several decades, inequality and 
polarization nevertheless persist in far too many American workplaces, 
schools, and communities. Over the last eight years, we have fought hard 
to end discrimination. We have increased funding for civil rights 
enforcement--so that the laws on our books are not just pleasant words, 
but pledges of justice. 
 
Al Gore has strongly opposed efforts to roll back affirmative action 
programs. He knows that the way to lift this nation up is not by pulling the 
weakest down, but by continuing to expand opportunities for everyone 
who wants to achieve. 
 
Al Gore and the Democratic Party know that much remains to be done. 
We must remember we do not have an American to waste. We continue 
to lead the fight to end discrimination on the basis of race, gender, 
religion, age, ethnicity, disability, and sexual orientation. The 
Democratic Party has always supported the Equal Rights Amendment and 
will continue to do so.  
2004 Democratic National Platform  
Our commitment to civil rights is ironclad. We will restore vigorous 
federal enforcement of our civil rights laws for all our people, from fair 
housing to equal employment opportunity, from Title IX to the Americans 
with Disabilities Act. We support affirmative action to redress 
discrimination and to achieve the diversity from which all Americans 
benefit. 
 
Racial and religious profiling is wrong and we will work to stamp it out. 
Hate crimes desecrate sacred spaces and demean good people, and we 
support a strong national law to punish them. 
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e-3.2. Political Parties: Republican National Platform, 2000 & 2004
 
Democratic National 
Platform, 2000 & 2004 
Republican 
National Platform, 
2000 & 2004 
Party Politics and 
Race 
Political Parties in 2004 
Campaign
Go To Survey2000 Republican National Platform 
We seek to be faithful to the best traditions of our party. We are the party 
that ended slavery, granted homesteads, built land grant colleges, and 
moved control of government out of Washington, back into the hands of 
the people. We believe in service to the common good--and that good is 
not common until it is shared.  
2004 Republican National Platform 
Equality of individuals before the law has always been a cornerstone of 
our party. We therefore oppose discrimination based on sex, race, age, 
religion, creed, disability, or national origin and will vigorously enforce 
anti-discrimination statutes. As we strive to forge a national consensus on 
the crucial issues of our time, we call on all Americans to reject the forces 
of hatred and bigotry. Accordingly, we denounce all who practice or 
promote racism, anti-Semitism, ethnic prejudice, and religious 
intolerance...We believe rights inhere in individuals, not in groups. We 
will attain our nation’s goal of equal opportunity without quotas or 
other forms of preferential treatment. It is as simple as this: No one 
should be denied a job, promotion, contract, or chance at higher education 
because of their race or gender. Equal access, energetically offered, 
should guarantee every person a fair shot based on their potential and 
merit. 
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e-3.3. Political Parties: Party Politics and Race
 
Democratic National 
Platform, 2000 & 2004 
Republican 
National Platform, 
2000 & 2004 
Party Politics and 
Race 
Political Parties in 2004 
Campaign
Go To SurveyParty Politics and Race: The primary goal of political parties is to win the elections, so that they 
can execute the policies that they beleive work better or are right. They 
take certain issue positions by which they court voters in election 
campaigns. Race and Affirmative Action are, many beleive, wedge issues. 
Followings are about how race has been treated in the presidential 
elections campaigns since 1930s. 
 
The 1968 Election: Humphery vs. Nixon: The election of 1968 signaled 
the end of the civil rights era and the beginning of the Republican 
dominance in presidential elections, a dominance built in large part on the 
successful racial tactics of the Nixon campaign.  
 
The 1968 election was the first in which a majority of whites voted for a 
Republican party firmly aligned with the center-right. The Democrats, to 
their electoral determinant, were firmly established as the party of blacks 
and the left and increasingly lost their attraction for most whites. From 
1968 onward the Democratic party experienced high levels of white 
defection from its ranks, accompanied by eventual conversion to the 
Republican party.  
 
The 1972 Election: McGovern vs. Nixon: Focusing public attention on 
the costs of the new liberalism, Nixon sought to provide moral and 
ideological legitimacy to those who did not want to pay those costs.  
 
Race facilitated the beginning of an ideologically conservative conversion 
of the electorate, as the social costs of programs such as housing 
integration, busing, and affirmative action became indissolubly fused in 
the minds of crucial numbers of voters with steeply rising taxes, cultural 
metamorphosis, increases in violent crime, expanding welfare rolls, 
greater numbers of illegitimate children, and evidence of the deterioration 
of both black and white family structure.  
 
The 1976 Election: Carter vs. Ford: The political landscape heading 
into the election season of 1976 was dominated by a single issue: 
Watergate. Explicitly racial issues were less pressing by 1976 than they 
had been in any election since 1960.  
 
Ford, for reasons of either strategy or conscience, let sleeping racial issues 
lie and did not reach out to blacks or racially conservative whites.  
 
On the other hand, Jimmy Carter achieved Bobby Kennedy’s dream of 
bringing together blacks and blue-color whites in a reconciling coalition. 
He did this, however, not by forthrightly addressing busing and 
affirmative action, but by adroit vagueness on racial issues.  
 
In the end, neither Ford or Carter would venture far into the ghetto, the 
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perfect symbol of how both campaigns did not want to highlight the issues 
of race.  
 
The 1980 Election: Cater vs. Reagan: Racial issues were far from the 
minds of most voters in 1980. Racial issues seldom surfaced. The 
presidential campaigns of 1980 reflected a weary centrism on racial 
matters. 
 
Yet amid the noise of the 1980 election, racial politics can be discerned at 
key points. Truly, racial politics was so embedded in our national 
elections that not even high unemployment and an ongoing foreign policy 
crisis could eliminate it from the campaign.  
 
Reagan had found an ostensibly neutral language that would become a 
powerful tool with which to advocate stands that polarize voters on race-
freighted issues--issues ranging from welfare to busing to affirmative 
action. He did do without communicating overt bigotry or anti-black to 
whites. By 1980 the issues of taxes, of an ailing economy, and of the 
collective set of grievances closely linked to race and rights--including 
crime, affirmative action, welfare spending, busing, IRS regulation of the 
Christian school movement, women’s liberation, homosexual rights, 
abortion, etc .--had reached an unprecedented level of intensity among 
key segments of the white electorate. This intensity provided Reagan and 
the Republican party with the opportunity to activate a new set of 
polarizing issues to rupture the frayed class base of a traditional, 
economically-oriented Democratic liberalism.  
 
By 1980, the white public had become far more ambivalent-- torn 
between support for the principle of racial justice, but opposed to 
aggressive mechanisms to remedy discrimination. Democratic whites who 
voted for Reagan in 1980 were more conservative on racial issues than 
were Republican voters. White Democrats who stayed loyal to Carter, in 
contrast, were more liberal than were Republicans.  
 
The 1984 Election: Mondale vs. Reagan: Reagan’s campaign knew well 
before the election that 90 percent of blacks would vote against them, but 
instead of attempting to reduce that number, they sought to get 58 percent 
of the white vote to counterbalance the Democrats’ strength among 
blacks.  
 
Reagan made almost no effort to woo the black vote, as he had in 1980. 
Overall, the Republican strategy on race was to ignore blacks, except as 
scarecrow to spur white registration. There was no plan to inflame the 
racial divide by raising affirmative action. The Reagan strategists intended 
to use social issues as a wedge to divide Democrats from their loyalty to 
Mondale, but the issue they focused on were school prayer and, to a lesser 
extent, abortion.  
 
Mondale’s racial liberalism hurt him greatly in the South, and Jackson’s 
candidacy served to make race much more salient. The backlash against 
Jackson was deep and played a significant role in Reagan’s victory. It did 




The 1988 Election: Dukakis vs. Bush: By 1988, the perception of a link 
between the Democratic party and controversial government policies on 
race, rights, and taxes has become imbedded in the conscious and 
unconscious memory of American politics--a perception still close enough 
to the surface to be accessible to political manipulation. This perception 
often exerted influence on an unarticulated level, a level at which the 
national Democratic party was still tied, in the minds of many voters, to 
the problems of crime, welfare, school failure, family dissolution, 
spreading urban squalor, an eroding work ethic, and global retreat.  
 
The use of themes ranging from law and order to Willie Horton to the 
ACLU has sought to take political advantage of the linkage of backs to 
crime. Regardless of the legitimacy of the issues of black poverty and 
crime as subjects for public policy debate, their political function has been 
to polarize the electorate in a manner beneficial to the development of a 
majority conservative coalition.  
 
The 1992 Election: Clinton vs. Bush: As the Republicans forswore both 
sincere outreach to lacks and the ugly race baiting of 1988, Clinton was 
able to downplay racial issues to an extraordinary degree. As he did on a 
whole array of social issues, Clinton found the precise tone of sincere 
moderation on race that resonated with Reagan Democrats. Wounded by a 
brief steep recession, the Republican party could find no effective 
response to Clinton’s careful positioning on race.  
 
Clinton appeared to be willing to trade enthusiasm among blacks in return 
for taking white votes from Bush. Clinton’s task, then, was to hold onto 
his black support without seeming to appear overly submissive to it and to 
reach out to white Reagan democrats without gratuitous offense to 
African Americans.  
 
The debate over racial equality under the law was long over. Neither 
proponents nor opponents of affirmative action, hater crimes legislation, 
or laws against racial profiling could credibly claim that any of these 








Platform, 2000 & 2004 
Republican 
National Platform, 
2000 & 2004 
Party Politics and 
Race 
Political Parties in 2004 
Campaign
Go To SurveyBush vs. Kerry on Race and Affirmative Action 
Bush’s appearance prompted criticism of his civil rights record from the 
campaign of Democratic rival John Kerry. Bush drew just 9 percent of the 
black vote in 2000, the lowest since Barry Goldwater garnered just 6 
percent after his campaign against Johnson in 1964, and has tried 
sporadically to attract more black voters.  
 
Kerry’s campaign accused Bush of "backsliding" on civil rights 
throughout his White House term and said the appearance was hollow, 
given Bush’s record on civil rights. Kerry spokesman Phil Singer said 
Bush had nominated judges who would roll back civil rights, had 
"effectively closed" the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division and 
had opposed affirmative action.  
 
In January 2003, Bush asserted that a program of racial preferences for 
minority applicants at the University of Michigan was "divisive, unfair 
and impossible to square with the Constitution." He took a position 
against the program in a Supreme Court case--acting on the birthday of 
civil rights hero Martin Luther King. 
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e-4. Public Opinion Polls  
Go To SurveyCitizens' Views on Race and Affirmative Action 
Many ordinary folks think that knowing the opinions of the majority is 
helpful to make their own decisions. In this section you can learn how 
your fellow Americans think about race matters and affirmative action 
programs. Americans' racial attitudes have changed a lot since the 1960s. 
Presented are:  
• Trend data for questions concerning white explanations of black 
socioeconomic disadvantages; questions about perceptions of 
discrimination; and questions about two forms of affirmative 
action;  
• More recent data concerning the same questions mentioned 
above;  
• Scholarly discussions about racial attitudes of white Americans 
based on the poll results;  
• Theoretical explanations of why some white Americans oppose 
Affirmative Action.  
Trend of Polls, 1971-2000 || Recent Polls, 2001-2004 || Scholarly 
Discussions about Racial Attitudes || Explanations of Opposition to 
Affirmative Action  
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e-4.1. Public Opinion Polls: Trend of Polls, 1971-2000   
Go To Survey Trend of Polls, 1971-2000 
Inequality due to  
 1985 1986 1988 1989 1990 1991 1993 1994 1996
Discrimination 41% 40 39 38 36 35 37 36 34 
Less Ability 78 79 80 81 81 85 88 86 90 
No Chance for 
Education 52 52 52 53 52 52 54 49 45 
No Motivation 39 36 38 38 35 39 46 45 48 
Blacks have as good a chance as white people to get any kind of job for which they are 
qualified  
 1963 1978 1989 1990 1991 1993 1995 1997
As good/same 
chance  51% 82 74 79 74 72 71 81 
In your area, blacks generally are discriminated in getting housing qualified  
 1981 1989 1994 
No 
Discrimination 83% 79 82 
In your area, blacks generally are discriminated in getting managerial jobs  
 1981 1989 1994 
No 
Discrimination 74% 76 80 
These days police in most cities treat blacks as fairly as they treat whites  
 1981 1989 1992 1994 
Agree 62% 48 53 53 
Are you for or against quotas to admit black students for colleges and universities?  
 1986 1988 1990 1992 
Favor 29% 28 30 26 
Are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of blacks?  
 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
Favor 15% 13 17 14 10 12 
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Go To SurveyRecent Polls, 2001-2004 
Do you generally favor or oppose affirmative action programs for 
women? 
 Favor Oppose No Opinion 
2003 59% 34 7 
2001 53% 38 9 
Do you generally favor or oppose affirmative action programs for racial 
minorities?  
 Favor Oppose No Opinion 
2003 47% 43 8 
2001 47% 44 9 
Which comes closer to your view about evaluating students for admission 
into a college or university ? Applicants should be admitted solely on the 
basis of merit, even if that results in few minority students being admitted 
(or) an applicant's racial and ethnic background should be considered to 
help promote diversity on college campuses, even if that means admitting 
some minority students who otherwise would not be admitted? 





2003 69% 27 4 
If two equally qualified students, one white and one black, applied to a 
major U.S. college or university, who do you think would have the better 
chance of being accepted to the college ?the white student, the black 
student? or would they have the same chance?  







2003 32% 29 36 4 
Do you think that businesses should or should not be allowed to consider 
race as a factor in making hiring decisions? 
 Yes, Should No, Should Not No Opinion 
2003 11% 87 2 
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Do you think that colleges should or should not be allowed to consider 
race as a factor in student admission decisions?  
 Yes, Should No, Should Not No Opinion 
2003 16% 84 - 
2001 11% 7 2 
On the whole, do you think affirmative action has been good for the 
country, or do you think it has not been good? 
 Good Not Good No Opinion 
2001 58% 33 9 
In general, do you think we need to increase, keep the same, or decrease 
affirmative action programs in this country?  
 Increase Keep the Same Decrease No Opinion
2001 24% 34 35 7 
1995 31% 26 37 6 
Today do you think affirmative action programs are needed to help 
women and minorities overcome discrimination, or are they not needed 
today?  
 Needed Not Needed No Opinion 
2001 56% 41 3 
1995 49% 47 4 
Do you think the day will ever come that affirmative action programs 
will no longer be needed at all, or will they always be needed?  
 Always Needed Not Needed No Opinion 
2001 66% 30 4 
1995 69% 27 4 
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e-4.3. Public Opinion Polls: Scholarly Discussions about Racial Attitudes
  
Go To SurveyScholarly Discussions about White Racial Attitudes  
Principles of Equal Treatment: It would be reasonable to conclude that 
there has been a remarkably large, wide-ranging, and generally consistent 
movement toward white acceptance of the principles of equal treatment 
and integration in most important areas of American life. Moreover, 
clear-cut educational differences support the assertion that more-educated 
respondents are more liberal in their responses, and consistent regional 
differences indicate a historic North-South difference that disappears 
only when a ceiling of 100 percent is approached.  
Implementation of Equal Treatment: The questions about government 
implementation of principles of equal treatment and integration produce 
results more complex than those produced by the questions about the 
principles themselves. Levels of support go down whenever concrete 
action is proposed. Generally speaking, Americans moderately support 
compensatory action(e.g., extra training for minorities), and oppose 
preferential treatment and the use of quotas.  
Beliefs about Inequality: White Americans have some difficulty when 
asked to account for black disadvantage. The type of explanation that has 
greatest appeal is one that focuses on a lack of motivation by blacks to 
improve their own status. If blacks really wanted to, and were willing to 
work hard, so the explanation goes, their problems could be solved, At 
the same time, there is not much recognition of past or present 
discrimination as a factor impeding black achievement, and there is 
evidence that even limited recognition of discrimination as a source of 
black disadvantage has decreased over time.  
Affirmative Action: White support for affirmative action in the sense of 
compensatory preferential treatment for blacks has never been close to 
being the majority position during the relatively brief period since 1985. 
Depending on phrasing, support has ranged from at most a third of the 
white public down to just a few percentage points, and with little 
evidence of change over time. The least support occurs when preferential 
treatment is generalized beyond particular settings in which 
discrimination is said to have taken place in the past.  
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e-4.4. Public Opinion Polls: Explanations of Opposition to Affirmative Action 
Go To SurveyExplanations of Opposition to Affirmative Action: 
There are several explanations about why some white Americans oppose 
affirmative action.  
The Persistence of Domination:The primary cause of white Americans' 
opposition to affirmative action is to maintain economic, political, and 
cultural dominance over blacks. It is argued that white Americans have a 
superficial adherence to principles of equality and no real tendency to 
call on these principles when real-life issues are at stake. The increasing 
number of people who take liberal positions on principles of equality is in 
fact no more than a superficial shift in ideological tactics that is used to 
defend white interests more effectively. 
 
Symbolic Racism and Racial Resentment:This thesis is also skeptical 
about the significance of white attitudes that appear liberal with regard to 
principles of equal treatment. We have a new form of racial attitudes, 
called symbolic racism, which is composed of a blend of antiblack affect 
and belief in traditional American values of individualism and self-
reliance. The word "symbolic" is used to imply that these new white 
attitudes are based not on materialistic, self-interest, but rather on a more 
general sense that blacks are violating American values of individualism 
through their persistent demands for special treatment like affirmative 
action. Antiblack affect is regarded as coming largely from childhood, 
though its exact origin is left somewhat indeterminate. 
 
Individualism and Equalitarianism: In this thesis, "individualism" is a 
genuine and strongly held value that motivates many whites who oppose 
attempts to improve the status of blacks by means of preferential 
treatment. On the central issues involving racial discrimination, the 
American consensus is powerfully against discrimination. The consensus 
breaks down, however, when compulsory integration is involved. Many 
whites deeply resent efforts to force racial integration on them, not 
because they oppose racial equality, but because they feel it violates 
individual freedom.  
 
Opposition to Government Intrusion: Many white Americans are 
negative toward government enforcement of equal treatment because of a 
more general rejection of government--especially federal--coercion. 
Prejudice or bigotry of a traditional kind plays some role in producing 
opposition to race-related policies, especially for educated whites. But 
nonracial principles are even more important, which are somewhat 
different principles relevant to different policy goals. 
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e-5. Statistics: African Americans  
Go To SurveyStatistics about Race and Affirmative Action  
In many cases, where you stand on certain policy issues depends on what 
you know about factual information concerning those issues. How to 
perceive issues is often guided by what you know. Many ordinary 
Americans have little knowledge / information about race. Now consider 
the following survey results, which show huge misperceptions of the 
American public:  
• The average American thinks America is 32 percent black, 21 
percent Hispanic and 18 percent Jewish (Gallup and Newport, 
1990);  
• Over half of Americans think that the nation is at least 30% 
black, and a seventh of Americans think that the nation is at least 
half black (National Election Study, 1989).  
Here are basic statistics about the life of African Americans  
 
In the numbers such as 
 
Population || Education || Income || Unemployment || Welfare
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e-5.1. Statistics: African Americans: Population
 
Population Education Income Unemployment Welfare
 
Go To SurveyBlack Population:  
 
According to the 2000 U.S. Census, of the total, 36.4 million, or 12.9 
percent, reported Black or African American. This number includes 34.7 
million people, or 12.3 percent, who reported only Black in addition to 1.8 
million people, or 0.6 percent, who reported Black as well as one or more 
other races. Within this group, the most common racial combination was 
black and white, making up 45 percent of the pairings. 
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e-5.2. Statistics: African Americans: Education  
 
Population Education Income Unemployment Welfare
 
Go To SurveyBlack Education: 
 
Blacks have made substantial progress in narrowing the educational 
attainment gap relative to Whites.  
• In 1940, only 7.7 percent of Blacks 25 years old and over had 
completed high school, compared with 26.1 percent of Whites.  
• In 1965, the corresponding figures were 27.2 and 51.3 percent, 
respectively.  
• By 1993, 70.4 percent of Blacks 25 years old and over had 
completed high school, compared with 81.5 percent of Whites. 
Hence, the difference between the Black and White rates was 
smaller in 1993 than in the earlier years.  
• By 1993, there was no statistical difference in the proportions of 
Black men and White men who had completed high school: 85.0 
and 86.0 percent, respectively.  
• Similar gains were made by young Black women but they 
remained different from White women in 1993, when 80.9 
percent of Black women 25 to 29 years old had completed high 
school, compared with 88.5 percent of White women. In 1940, the 
proportions were 13.8 percent of Black and Other-races women 
and 43.4 percent of White women.  
Although the proportion of Blacks 25 years old and over who have 
completed college has increased since 1940, it is about one-half the 
proportion of their White counterparts.  
Among young adults 25 to 29 years old in 1993, Blacks were more than 
half as likely as Whites (13.2 percent compared with 24.7 percent) to have 
completed 4 or more years of college. 
Source: the U.S. Census Bureau  
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e-5.3. Statistics: African Americans: Income 
 
Population Education Income Unemployment Welfare
 
Go To SurveyBlack Income:  
The U.S. Census Bureau released its 2001 income and poverty estimates, 
showing that Blacks, Asians and Pacific Islanders and Hispanics stayed at 
historic lows, while Whites and non-Hispanic Whites' poverty rates rose 
from 7.4 percent in the last year to 7.8 percent.  
The black-to-white ratio of median income has been stuck in the mid-50 to 
mid-60 percentage range for two decades, improvement apparently stalled. 
The median annual income for black males working full-time is 30 percent 
less than for white males.  
Wealth disparities are even more dramatic than income inferences, as 
shown in the chart below. Net worth measures a household's total assets 
and liabilities, including equity in home or automobile. The median net 
worth of black household is only 8 percent that of white households, and 
the average is 25 percent that of whites.   
Wealth and Race  
Race White Black Ratio B/W 
Median Income  $25,384 $15,630 62% 
Median Net Worth* $43,800 $3,700 8% 
Mean Net Worth  $96,667 $23,818 25% 
Median Net Financial 
Assets**  $6,999 $0 - 
Mean Net Financial 
Assets  $47,347 $5,209 11% 
* Net Worth = all assets, minus debts.  
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e-5.4. Statistics: African Americans: Unemployment  
 
Population Education Income Unemployment Welfare
 
Go To SurveyBlack Unemployment Rate:  
 
Black Unemployment Rate doubles rate of whites. Blacks are losing their jobs 
twice as fast as whites.  
 1994  1995  1996  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
White  5.3% 4.9 4.7 4.2 3.9 3.7 3.5 4.2 5.1 5.2 
Black  11.5% 10.4 10.5 10.0 8.9 8.0 7.6 8.6 10.2 10.8 
Source:Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor  
Black people continue to have twice the unemployment rate of White people 
during the last decade, as shown in the Table above.  
Affirmative action has made unmistakable gains in employment, which have 
historically been integral elements in creating social progress. But in another 
respect, current affirmative action programs have little value for the black poor 
despite the roots of those of programs in the labor and community struggles of 
black working people. 
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e-5.5. Statistics: African Americans: Welfare 
 
Population Education Income Unemployment Welfare
 
Go To SurveyBlack Welfare:  
Racial politics has so dominated welfare reform efforts that it is 
commonplace to observe that "welfare" has become a code word for race. 
When Americans discuss welfare, many have in mind the mythical Black 
"welfare queen" or profligate teenager who becomes pregnant at taxpayers' 
expense to fatten her welfare check.  
But the fact is: whites form the largest racial group on welfare; and 
teenagers form less than 8 percent of all welfare mothers.  
 
Families on AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) 
White Black Hispanic Asian Other 
38.8% 37.2% 17.8% 2.8% 3.4% 
Blacks comprise only 12 percent of the nation, but, according to the above 
figures, they comprise 37.2 percent of the welfare rolls. This should not be 
surprising; in 1994, blacks had a poverty rate of 33 percent. We should not, 
of course, think it unusual to find poor people on welfare. Consequently, 
discussions of race and welfare must turn on different issues.  
 
The most prevalent question is why there are so many blacks in poverty. 
Liberals argue that it is the result of continuing racism and discrimination, 
especially at hiring time. Conservatives have argued a variety of other 
causes: moral shortcomings, poor work ethic, even intellectual inferiority. 
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e-6. Origins of Affirmative Action  
Go To SurveyOrigin of Affirmative Action  
Affirmative action per se was never a law, or even a coherently developed 
set of governmental policies designed to attack racism and discrimination. 
 
It was instead a series of presidential executive orders and governmental 
programs regarding the awarding of federal contracts and licenses to 
minorities, as well as the enforcement of fair employment practices, with 
the goal of uprooting the practices of bigotry.  
 
It can be said that, at their origins, Affirmative Action Programs were 
designed to provide some degree of compensatory justice to the victims of 
slavery, Jim Crow segregation, and institutional racism. 
Now consider the following information: 
Original Idea of Affirmative Action || Under Kennedy Presidency || 
Under Johnson Presidency || Under Nixon Presidency
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e-6.1. Origins of Affirmative Action: Original Idea of Affirmative Action 





Presidency Under Nixon Presidency  
Go To Survey
Initial Idea about Affirmative Action:  
 
When the affirmative action was begun in the early 1960s, the basic idea 
was that those making admission and hiring decisions should be required 
to demonstrate that African Americans were included in lists of 
candidates and given full consideration.  
Then, affirmative action has become to be identified in many quarters 
with giving preference to blacks when final decisions are made about 
admission or employment, particularly if they would otherwise be 
greatly underrepresented among the people finally selected. This practice 
could be justified on the ground that is different from the ideas behind 
the questions about principles in policy making.  
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e-6.2. Origins of Affirmative Action: Under Kennedy Presidency 
 





Presidency Under Nixon Presidency  
Go To SurveyUnder Kennedy Presidency:   
In 1961, president Kennedy issued Executive Order 10925 that directed 
federal contractors to take affirmative action to ensure nondiscrimination 
in hiring, promotions, and all other areas of private employment. This 
order did not refer to discrimination in public accommodations, housing, 
government employment, and private-sector employment in firms that 
did not have contracts with the federal government.  
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e-6.3. Origins of Affirmative Action: Under Johnson Presidency 
 





Presidency Under Nixon Presidency  
Go To SurveyUnder Johnson Presidency:   
Executive Order 11246 (September 24, 1965) enforces affirmative action 
for the first time. Issued by President Johnson, the executive order 
requires government contractors to "take affirmative action" toward 
prospective minority employees in all aspects of hiring and employment. 
Contractors must take specific measures to ensure equality in hiring and 
must document these efforts. On Oct. 13, 1967, the order was amended 
to cover discrimination on the basis of gender.  
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e-6.4. Origins of Affirmative Action: Under Nixon Presidency 
 





Presidency Under Nixon Presidency  
Go To SurveyUnder Nixon Presidency:   
Nixon’s endorsement of quotas came in the early 1970s when his 
administration approved the Philadelphia Plan, which involved the 
direct imposition of hiring goals in the construction trades.  
Under Nixon presidency, federal goals began to shift from equal 
opportunity as defined in the Civil Rights legislation to an emphasis on 
equal (or proportional) results.  
Under Nixon presidency, contractors were required to establish target 
“goals and timetables” for the hiring of “under-utilized” minority group 
members and women, and to show “good faith efforts” to meet these 
hiring goals and timetables; although not a rigid quota system, the “goals 
and timetables” requirement was a results-oriented approach to 
employment policy that its critics would charge operated, in practice, 
little differently than a quota system. 
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e-7. The Supreme Court’s Decisions  
Go To SurveyThe Supreme Court's Decisions on Affirmative 
Action  
The Supreme Court has been characterized as the eye of the storm of 
politics by modern scholars and was considered the least dangerous 
branch of government by the nation's founder. Contrary to the serene 
pictures of these descriptions, the Court has frequently interjected itself 
into highly charged political controversies, making important and final 
decisions on the several controversial policy issues.  
 
The Supreme Court has pushed the country forward in a number of key 
areas: civil rights, a woman's right to choose, gay rights, the death penalty, 
rights of prisoners and suspected criminals, etc.  
 
Now, check it out how the Court rules on the sub-issues of Affirmative 
Action such as:  











e-8. Recent Developments of Affirmative Action Program    
Go To SurveyRecent Developments in Affirmative Action  
Starting in the mid-1990s politicians and grassroots groups began to attack 
affirmative action at the state level, with some success.  
• In 1996 California voters approved Proposition 209, an initiative 
that ended affirmative action throughout the state in public 
hiring, purchasing, and other government business.  
• In 1998 Washington State voters passed Initiative 200, a measure 
that banned affirmative action in state and local government.  
• In Michigan, the campaign to outlaw affirmative action started its 
petition drive January 12, 2004 and, if successful, will put the 
issue on the ballot for Michigan voters to decide November 2, 
2004.  
• In Colorado , lawmakers proposed a bill to eliminate or restrict 
using race to help decide college admissions.  
Opponents of affirmative action vowed to continue fighting and noted the 
Court's opinion that "enshrining a permanent justification of racial 
preferences would offend the equal protection principle" of the 
Constitution. 
Proponents of affirmative action believe that equal opportunity programs 
such as affirmative action are effective, fair, and necessary, particularly 
since racial discrimination still exists.  
Now, consider the following information related to recent developments 
about affirmative action.  
Color-Blind Society vs. Affirmative Action Programs || Proposition 
209 of California & Initiative 200 of Washington State || Michigan 







 Appendix 4. Online Deliberative Poll vs. Online Information-Board Poll 
 
 
There are similarities and differences between Online Deliberative Poll 
(ODP) and my design, Online Information-Board Poll (OIBP). Focusing on the 
key features of them, I argue that although ODP has many advantages compared 
to its origin, Face-to-face Deliberative Poll (FDP), it barely explain the mental 
mechanisms under which opinion change between pre- and post-deliberation 
occurs. Let me flesh out more of my arguments.  
ODP addresses the very simple question; whether or not and to what 
extent post-deliberation opinion differs from pre-deliberation opinion. Indeed, all 
the reports from Iyengar and colleagues (Iyengar, Luskin, and Fishkin 2004a, 
2004b; for FDP see also Fishkin and Luskin 2004) are based on simple 
documentation of the opinion change between pre- and post-deliberation. More 
precisely, they hypothesized and found that the opinion change stems from 
“learning effects” or “knowledge effects” by which they refer to the fact that 
those who learn something or increase their knowledge levels are more likely to 
change their opinion.  
Granted, now let me discuss how my approach and question differ from 
those of ODP. First, knowledge measure can be a proxy as taping how subjects 
deliberately process information. But it is at best an indirect measure of 
information seeking and processing based on factual knowledge items. Thus it 
cannot be better than a direct measure of information seeking.  
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Second, the assumption that increased knowledge results from deliberation 
during the information discussion and from attendance to the relevant information 
is plausible, but increased knowledge are determined by previous levels of 
political knowledge and learning/communication skills. This means that 
knowledge measure represents not only deliberative efforts but also other factors.   
Second, ODP fails to estimate one’s cognitive engagement in issue-
relevant information. Each subject must be more or less involved in, interested in, 
motivated to, and capable of processing information. That is, each subject 
responds to the treatments in various ways, which in turn likely affect post-
deliberation opinion. ODP as well as FDP, however, is not capable of measuring 
the variations in each subject’s distinctive attitudes and behaviors in treating 
information.  
Third, ODP like FDP does not allow subject to choose the information 
contents they want to study. Information is provided regardless of subject’s 
necessity. This means that ODP cannot estimate which information is favored to 
needed by subjects, thus determines subject’s opinion formation.  
In contrast, the key advantage of my design, OIBP, is that it allows us to 
trace the behaviors of the subjects’ information search. And in doing that, it can 
estimate the variations in each subject’s response to the information in terms of 
time spent and amount and types of information accessed. This measure makes it 
possible to address the questions and test the hypotheses of how different attitudes 
and behaviors in information acquisition and processing affect policy preferences 
after processing information. In short, my design produces and tests the 
 228
hypotheses that are theoretically more interesting and important; the ways of 
impact of information processing on opinion formation (and change), not to 
mention the opinion change between pre- and post-information processing.  
One shortfall of my design needs to be mentioned here. My design 
provides subjects less opportunity for deliberation because it has no options of 
group discussion and Q&A session with policy experts that OPD operated. This 
relative lack of deliberation opportunity might be disadvantage for the subjects to 


















Appendix 5. Coding Schemes for Experimental Data Analysis 
 
For Party Identification, the standard question as used in the National 
Election Studies was used. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as 
a Democrat, a Republican, or an Independent? (1= Democrat, 3 = Independent, 5 
= Republican).  
Political Ideology was measured, using the same question as used in the 
National Election Studies. Generally speaking, would you consider yourself to be 
a liberal, a conservative, a moderate, or haven't you thought about this? (1 = 
Liberal, 3 = Moderate, 5 = Conservative).  
Knowledge consisted of seven items of general political knowledge (α = 
0.485) and seven items of race-specific knowledge (α = 0.556). For general 
political knowledge, (1) Which party has the most members in the House of 
Representatives in Washington? (2) How much of a majority is required for the 
U.S. Senate and House of Representatives to override a presidential veto? (3) In 
general, thinking about the political parties in Washington, would you say 
Democrats are more conservative than Republicans, or Republicans are more 
conservative than Democrats? (4) Whose responsibility is it to determine if a law 
is constitutional or not? (5) How many members of the U.S. Supreme Court are 
there? (6) (open-ended question) What job or political office is now held by 
Dennis Hastert? (7) (open-ended question) What is the name of the president of 
Russia? 
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Questions for race-specific knowledge were all open-ended. (1) What 
percent of people in this country would you say are black? (2) What percent of all 
the poor people in this country would you say are black? (3) Of all the people 
arrested for violent crimes in this country last year, what percent do you think 
were black? (4) Of all the welfare recipients in this country last year, what 
percent do you think were black? (5) Of all the black males of working age in this 
country, what percent do you think are unemployed? (6) Of all the black 
population in this country, what percent do you think are educated with four years 
or more of college? (7) What percent of white citizens do you think support quotas 
in college education for blacks? Right answers were coded as 1 and wrong as 0. 
This variable ranges from 4 to 14, with a mean of 8.407 and standard deviation of 
2.157.  
Political Interest is a combined variable of four items (α = 0.71), running 
from 0 for the lowest political interest to 4 for the highest political interest with a 
mean of 2.572 and standard deviation of 0.856.   
(1) Some people don't pay much attention to political campaigns. How 
about you, would you say that you have been/were very much interested, 
somewhat interested, or not much interested? (0 = Not much interest, 0.5 = 
Somewhat interested, 1 = Very much interested). (2) Generally speaking, would 
you say that you personally care a good deal which party wins the presidential 
election, or that you can't care very much which party wins? (0 = Do not care 
very much, 1 = Care a good deal). (3) How much would you say that you 
personally cared about the way that the elections to the U.S. House of 
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Representatives came out? (0 = Not vary much, 1 = Pretty much). (4) Some 
people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of 
the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. 
Would you say that you follow what's going on in government and public affairs 
most of the time, some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all? (0 = 
Hardly at all, 0.33 = Only now and then, 0.67 = Some of the time, 1 = Most of the 
time).  
Symbolic Racism is based on the racial resentment scale from National 
Election Studies (see Kinder and Sanders 1996). This variable consisted of six 
items (α = 0.775). Each item is 5-point scale from 1 for the lowest racial 
resentment to 5 for the highest racial resentment. The six items were additively 
scaled. Thus, the scores theoretically range from 6 to 30, but actually ranges from 
7 to 28 with a mean of 17.917 and standard deviation of 4.278. 
Now I am going to present several statements. After each one, I would like 
you to tell me whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor 
disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly. (1) Over the past few years, 
blacks have gotten less than they deserve (1 = Disagree strongly, 2 = Disagree 
somewhat, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 4 = Agree somewhat, 5 = Agree 
strongly). (2) Irish, Italians, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame 
prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any 
special favors (1 = Disagree strongly, 2 = Disagree somewhat, 3 = Neither agree 
nor disagree, 4 = Agree somewhat, 5 = Agree strongly). (3) It’s really a matter of 
some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be 
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just as well off as whites (1 = Disagree strongly, 2 = Disagree somewhat, 3 = 
Neither agree nor disagree, 4 = Agree somewhat, 5 = Agree strongly). (4) 
Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it 
difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class (1 = Agree strongly, 2 
= Agree somewhat, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 4 = Disagree somewhat, 5 = 
Disagree strongly). (5) Most blacks who receive money from welfare programs 
could get along without it if they tried (1 = Disagree strongly, 2 = Disagree 
somewhat, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 4 = Agree somewhat, 5 = Agree 
strongly). (6) Government officials usually pay less attention to a request or 
complaint from a black person than from a white person (1 = Agree strongly, 2 = 
Agree somewhat, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 4 = Disagree somewhat, 5 = 
Disagree strongly).  
Understandings of affirmative action either in liberal or conservative way 
were measured. The following question was used: What would you think is the 
best understanding of affirmative action programs? (1= Correction of the effects 
of past discrimination (15.3%); 2= Prohibition of future and current 
discrimination (25.3%); 3= Promotion of diversity or inclusion (27.6%); 4= 
Violation against the merit or desert principle (8.2%); 5= Reverse Discrimination 
against bystanders (11.8%); 6=Quota system (11.8%)). Then, the options of 1, 2 
and 3 were recoded as liberal understanding of affirmative action and those of 4, 
5, and 6 were recoded as conservative understanding of affirmative action.   
Log of Search Time is a natural log transformation of Search Time. It runs 
from .78 for the shortest time spent in information seeking to 3.43 for the longest 
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time spent in information seeking, with a mean of 2.264 and standard deviation of 
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